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ABSTRACT 
 
In its conversations with four texts by J.M. Coetzee – Age of Iron (1990), Life & Times of 
Michael K (1983), Elizabeth Costello: Eight Lessons (2003) as well as the critical essays 
published in Doubling the Point, “The Poetics of Reciprocity” (1992) – this thesis will 
demonstrate the manner in which the singularities of each of these texts prompt, expand 
and challenge the framework that sustains its reading of Coetzee’s fiction. Whereas some 
critical methodologies seek to eliminate the characteristic indeterminacy of Coetzee’s 
fiction, imprisoning his novels in a contextual cage, this thesis demonstrates an allegiance 
to the primacy of the literary text together with a concern with the ethics of reading. The 
thesis proposes – in both content and form – an inductive ‘style of reading’ concerned 
with the continuous modification of its own strategies according to the ‘internal logics of 
the text’. I first encountered the term, ‘confinement’, in relation to Coetzee in an 
unpublished conference paper by Lucy Graham, “‘It is hard to keep out of the camps’: 
Areas of confinement in the fiction of J.M. Coetzee”. Graham’s paper focuses on the 
different camps, the ‘different circles of hell’, in Life & Times of Michael K especially, 
mentioning that ‘images of the camp resonate throughout Coetzee’s most recent fiction’. 
Although this thesis considers a variety of concrete and conceptual camps as well, it 
rather places predominant emphasis on the relationship between reader and literary text, 
which is examined in terms of two forms of delimitation, confinement and containment. 
   
This study identifies its style of reading as a ‘containment’ rather than a ‘confinement’. 
The term is intended to evoke an adaptable, constructive delineation of Coetzee’s fiction 
that involves a reciprocal relationship between reader and/or critic and text. As the 
thesis’s primary conceptual tool, one that I will argue is both solicited and thematised in 
Coetzee’s fiction, containment refers not only to a style of reading, but also to any 
reciprocal relationship, any mutual exchange. It applies to the relationship between 
genres (realism and metafiction) and ‘reality’ in Age of Iron; between text and reader in 
Life & Times of Michael K; between self and other in Elizabeth Costello; and between 
text and critic in “The Poetics of Reciprocity”. The notion of containment accepts the 
 
 
v 
critical challenge posed by Coetzee’s fiction to engage with what Derek Attridge would 
call each ‘singular event’ or ‘act of literature’ on its own terms.  
 
 
vi 
OPSOMMING 
 
 
In die tesis se gesprek met vier tekste deur J.M. Coetzee – Age of Iron (1990), Life and 
Times of Michael K (1983), Elizabeth Costello: Eight Lessons (2003) asook die kritiese 
tekste wat in Doubling the Point, “The Poetics of Reciprocity” (1992) gepubliseer is – sal 
dit toon hoe die sonderlinghede van elk van hierdie tekste die raamwerk wat my 
interpretasie van Coetzee se fiksie ondersteun, uitbrei en uitdaag. Waar sekere kritiese 
metodologieë probeer om die kenmerkende onbepaaldheid van Coetzee se fiksie te 
elimineer en sy romans in ’n konstekstuele hok te beperk, demonstreer hierdie tesis ’n 
getrouheid aan die voorrang wat die literêre teks moet geniet, insluitend ’n gemoeidheid 
met die etiek van lees. Die tesis stel, ten opsigte van sowel inhoud as vorm, ’n induktiewe 
‘leesstyl’ voor wat gemoeid is met die deurentydse aanpassing van sy eie strategieë 
volgens ‘die interne logikas van die teks’. Ek het die term ‘beperking’ vir die eerste keer 
teëgekom in ’n ongepubliseerde referaat deur  Lucy Graham, “‘It is hard to keep out of 
the camps’: Areas of confinement in the fiction of J.M. Coetzee”. Hierdie voordrag fokus 
op die onderskeie kampe in spesifiek Life & Times of Michael K. Graham wys daarop dat 
‘die kamp-beeld in resente Coetzee-werke resoneer’. Alhoewel hierdie tesis ook variante 
van konkrete en konsepsuele kampe bekyk, gaan dit verder om by voorkeur die klem te 
laat val op die verhouding tussen leser en literêre teks. Dit word ondersoek in terme van 
twee vorme van afbakening en ontperking, naamlik beperking en inperking.  
 
Hierdie studie definieer sy eie leesstyl as ‘inperking’, in teenstelling tot ‘beperking’. Die 
bedoeling met die term is om `n aanpasbare, konstruktiewe afbakening van Coetzee se 
fiksie te ontlok wat ’n wedersydse verhouding tussen leser en/of kritikus en teks behels. 
As die tesis se primêre konsepsuele instrument, waarvan ek sal aanvoer dat dit in Coetzee 
se fiksie aangevra en getematiseer word, verwys ‘inperking’ nie net na leesstyl nie, maar 
ook na enige wederkerige verhouding, enige wedersydse uitruiling. Dit geld vir die 
verhouding tussen genres (realisme en metafiksie) en realiteit in Age of Iron; tussen teks 
en leser in Life and Times of Michael K; tussen die self en die ander in Elizabeth 
Costello; en tussen teks en kritikus in “The Poetics of Reciprocity”. Die begrip 
‘inperking’ aanvaar die kritiese uitdaging wat deur Coetzee se fiksie gestel word om wat 
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Derek Attridge elke ‘sonderlinge geleentheid’ of ‘literatuurdaad’ sou noem, op sy eie 
terme te benader. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
“THE GILDED CURLICUES OF THE FRAME”: COETZEE’S  
CRITICAL RECEPTION 
 
[People] want me to open my heart and tell them the story of a life lived in 
cages. (Life & Times of Michael K 247) 
 
Michael K’s pivotal observation regarding the confinement of a life defined by actual and 
by conceptual imprisonment, does not only pertain to his life – as Chapter Three, “‘A 
Life Lived in Cages’: The Reader and Confinement in Life & Times of Michael K” will 
demonstrate – but also to the life and times of the novel that bears this protagonist’s 
name, that is, Life & Times of Michael K (1983).1 In fact, though somewhat contrived, 
this statement can be extended to encapsulate the ‘story’ of the entire oeuvre of the Nobel 
Prize-winning South African author, J.M. Coetzee, stretching from the pioneering text, 
Dusklands (1974), to the newly released Summertime (2009).2
 
  
In order to clarify, explain or, in Stefan Helgesson’s terms, “make sense” (184) of the 
characteristic ambiguity and elusiveness of Coetzee’s fictional writing – as embodied by 
Michael K in Life & Times and Vercueil in Age of Iron (1990), for example – critical 
responses often use historical, biographical, theoretical and/or critical contexts in order to 
frame their respective perspectives on the novel.3
                                                 
1 I first encountered the term, ‘confinement’, in relation to Coetzee in an unpublished conference paper by 
Lucy Graham, “‘It is hard to keep out of the camps’: Areas of confinement in the fiction of J.M. Coetzee” 
(2005). Opening with a similar quotation from Life & Times of Michael K, “What I have learned of life tells 
me that it is hard to keep out of the camps”, Graham’s paper considers the different camps, the “different 
circles of hell” (4), in Life & Times of Michael K especially, mentioning that “images of the camp resonate 
throughout Coetzee’s most recent fiction” (5). Although this thesis considers a variety of concrete and 
conceptual camps as well, it rather places predominant emphasis on the relationship between reader and 
literary text, which is examined in terms of two forms of delimitation, confinement and containment.  
 Losing sight of the literary text, such a 
contextual framework may assume the shape of a preconceived grid, a cage that compels 
2 Coetzee’s nationality has been a source of controversy since he relocated to Australia in 2002 and became 
a citizen in 2006. Timothy Francis Strode, for example, recognises a “poetics of exile” (179, italics 
removed) in Coetzee’s fiction, given its “orientation outward, away from home, counter to the nostos of 
nostalgia” (178).  
3 In Narcissistic Narrative: The Metafictional Paradox (1980), Linda Hutcheon makes a similar point by 
stating that “critics and theorists today have seemed much more willing to read and assimilate the latest 
theory, hot off the press, than to trust to [sic] the insights revealed by the self-reflexivity of the equally 
recent fiction” (xii). 
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the text to yield the contextual or allegorical meaning pursued by the critic.4 In the same 
manner that a particular painting is overpowered by “the gilded curlicues of the frame” 
(140) in The Master of Petersburg (1994), the particularities of the text can be 
overwhelmed by such a predetermined framework.5 According to Helgesson, concerning 
the critical reception of Life & Times, literary critics “all seem to be cornering Coetzee’s 
novel” (187) given an “‘allergic’ relation to alterity” (Strode 7).6
 
 Along similar lines, 
Dominic Head, with reference to a particular image in Disgrace (1999):  
[is] tempted to see in the use of ‘shovels to beat corpses into a more 
convenient shape for processing’ a metaphor for the critical betrayal or 
mastery of a text, processed by the critic careless of the text’s integrity. 
Where Lurie stands for a world in which men do not beat corpses in this 
way, does Coetzee not stand for a world in which critics do not do 
‘violence’ to works of literature? (“Belief” 107)7
 
  
Given that a conceptual framework serves as lens through which the critic reads and 
interprets the literary text, how, then, should an analytical reading frame Coetzee’s fiction 
without confining its ‘life’ to a critical cage? In its conversations with three of Coetzee’s 
fictional texts, Age of Iron, Life & Times of Michael K and Elizabeth Costello: Eight 
                                                 
4 Chapter Three draws a parallel between the medical officer and the reader’s attempts at extracting 
meaning from Michael K’s elusive frame: “I appeal to you, Michaels: yield!” (Life & Times 208) 
5 “A fragment of memory comes back to him, of a painting he has seen in a gallery somewhere: a woman in 
dark, severe dress standing at a window, a child at her side, both of them gazing up at a starry sky. More 
vividly than the picture itself he remembers the gilded curlicues of the frame” (The Master of Petersburg 
140). 
6 According to Derek Attridge, “[i]t is precisely this unpredictability … that gives literature its ethical 
force: in doing justice to a literary work, we encounter the singular demands of the other. Coetzee’s works 
both stage, and are, irruptions of otherness into our familiar worlds, and they pose the question: what is our 
responsibility toward the other?” (The Ethics of Reading xii) In an unpublished paper, “The Case of 
Coetzee”, Michael Chapman criticises Attridge’s approach by arguing that “[w]hen we in the apartheid-
scarred divisions of South Africa should be seeking a tenuous commonality, scholars in literary criticism 
pursue a determined othering, in which Levinas’s epistemology of the Other is imposed as a material 
entity” (7). Although my thesis falls into the second category, it does acknowledge the other end of the 
spectrum, as represented by Chapman’s paper.  
7 With regard to literary criticism in general, De Man also notes that “demystifying critics are in fact 
asserting the privileged status of literature as an authentic language, but withdrawing from the implications 
by cutting themselves off from the source from which they receive their insight” (Blindness and Insight 
17). 
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Lessons (2003),8 as well as critical essays published in Doubling the Point: Essays and 
Interviews, “The Poetics of Reciprocity” (1992), the thesis hopes to demonstrate the 
extent to which each text – if closely attended to by the reader – prompts and guides the 
critic’s response.9
 
 These four encounters address an overarching concern with the ethics 
of reading and interpretation, especially the notion of narrativisation as a cage, as 
confinement, not only thematised in, but also solicited by, Coetzee’s fictions. Given that 
such an ethics relates directly to the manner in which the reader and/or critic frames the 
literary text, a consideration of the codes, the Barthesian term for the “system of 
constraints and possibilities that exists within any given language” (Macey 65) and 
govern the relationship between reader and text, appears justified. A regard for the 
primacy of the literary text in the field of literary analysis constitutes the foundation of 
my inquiry.  
Before launching my interpretation of the texts in question, a “style of reading” 
concerned with the continuous modification of its own methods according to the “internal 
logics of the text” (Macey on Derrida 93), I find it necessary to provide an outline of 
some influential critical responses to Coetzee’s fiction. Therefore, in addition to offering 
a preliminary framing of the study’s primary concerns, this introduction will 
contextualise (contain) my perspective, revealing its constraints and possibilities. The 
concluding chapter, Chapter Five, on the other hand, will delineate the methods 
employed by four of Coetzee’s own critical essays published in “The Poetics of 
Reciprocity” to further embed the thesis in a critical context. This text will be regarded in 
the same light as the critiques of Coetzee’s fiction to emphasise the peripheral status both 
of critical commentary and the author’s intention.  
 
It follows that the thesis’s primary focus, that is to say the textual analysis of three of 
Coetzee’s fictional texts, has been situated between the introduction and the conclusion, 
                                                 
8 Instead of using ‘novels’, I use ‘fictional texts’, given that Elizabeth Costello cannot be categorised as 
such. 
9 The fictional texts will not be considered in chronological order. Age of Iron’s (1990) preliminary 
delineation of the major concerns of this thesis influenced the arrangement of the chapters. Regardless, a 
sequence that takes the text’s considerations – instead of the date of publication – into account, can perhaps 
be said to correspond to the principle of textual primacy.  
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the two supplementary sections that constitute the thesis’s contextual horizon. Rather 
than providing the customary demarcation of the fiction’s relevant contexts (an 
introduction to the thesis’s content, an outline of each chapter, an elaboration of 
conceptual and critical tools like ‘containment’ and ‘confinement’), this introduction, in 
acknowledging its marginality and subsequent subservience to the literary text, will only 
offer an outline of the manner in which other literary critiques circumscribe, in other 
words, introduce and approach, Coetzee’s fiction.  
 
Consequently, the thesis will postpone the establishment of its framework to Chapter 
Two, “‘The Tongue of a God’: Realism and Containment in Age of Iron”. It is this 
chapter that, by way of a close consideration of the significant shantytown scene and its 
encircling events in Age of Iron, will demonstrate the manner in which the particularities 
of the literary text – rather than one of its contexts – can propose the framework that 
facilitates the critic’s conversation with that same text. My structure is inspired by 
Derrida’s understanding of deconstruction not “as a method to be applied to texts, but 
rather as a style of reading or criticism which works by teasing out the internal logics of 
the text … a mode of reading [that] develops and changes in the course of those readings” 
(Macey 93). It is an inductive approach to literature, a style of reading that starts with the 
specific and concrete, in other words, the particularities of the literary text, and moves 
towards the general and the abstract, that is, the theoretical framework generated by the 
text. This style of reading does not deny the merits of conventional methodologies. 
Rather, it attempts to provide a different vantage point on the conventional style(s) of 
reading adopted by Coetzee criticism in order to bring its constraints and possibilities to 
light. In order to prove its point, this thesis will demonstrate the particularities of its 
approach, not only in content but also in form, in a manner more explicit than deemed 
necessary.  
 
Before discussing, in subsequent chapters, the manner in which Coetzee’s fiction gives 
rise to a particular style of reading, allow me to contextualise my approach by examining 
five critical frameworks (as listed alphabetically): Derek Attridge’s J.M. Coetzee and the 
Ethics of Reading: Literature in the Event (2005), David Attwell’s J.M. Coetzee: South 
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Africa and the Politics of Writing (1993), Teresa Dovey’s The Novels of JM Coetzee: 
Lacanian Allegories (1988), Susan VanZanten Gallagher’s A Story of South Africa: J.M. 
Coetzee’s Fiction in Context (1991), and Dominic Head’s J.M. Coetzee (1997). I have 
chosen to focus on full-length studies rather than a compilation of essays by different 
authors, given the systematic and comprehensive coverage of the author’s whole oeuvre 
in the former. The studies I have chosen are the most renowned, respected and, 
consequently, most frequently cited full-length studies in the field of Coetzee criticism, 
and might be said to constitute its foundation.10
 
  
The discussion of these critical frames will not be arranged in chronological order, but 
according to their primary contexts. For example, whereas Gallagher concentrates on 
South Africa’s various historical contexts, Head places more emphasis on Coetzee’s 
biography. On the other hand, both Dovey, in her discussion of Coetzee’s novels as 
Lacanian allegories, and Attwell, in his account of the fiction’s literary and intellectual 
climate, demonstrate a concern with theoretical influences. Finally, in J.M. Coetzee and 
the Ethics of Reading: Literature in the Event, the study that inspired the style of reading 
of this thesis, Attridge actually circumvents such contextualisations by bringing to light 
the literary text as the principal object of literary analysis, in all its singularity.  
 
Gallagher’s Story of South Africa  
 
Many of Coetzee’s novels were written during the era of apartheid. While South African 
authors like Lewis Nkosi and Nadine Gordimer were producing activist works of 
literature, “realistic documentation[s] of oppression” that “[bore] witness” (Attwell The 
Politics of Writing 11) to the apartheid regime’s atrocities, Coetzee’s fictions were 
                                                 
10 For the sake of brevity, I have chosen to focus on five texts only. However, other influential book-length 
studies require specific mention as well, including Dick Penner’s Countries of the Mind: The Fiction of 
J.M. Coetzee (1989). Nonetheless, as Helgesson notes, “Penner’s cautious comparative readings amount 
mostly to an accumulation of paraphrase and conventional aesthetic observations” (184). For this reason, I 
have chosen to exclude this book. Two recent book-length studies should also be taken into account: Laura 
Wright’s Writing “Out of All the Camps”: J.M. Coetzee's Narratives of Displacement (2009) offers an 
interdisciplinary examination of the displacement of narrative and authorial voice in Coetzee’s fiction, 
while Stephen Mulhall’s The Wounded Animal: J. M. Coetzee and the Difficulty of Reality in Literature 
and Philosophy (2009) concentrates solely on Elizabeth Costello. I also take into consideration non-English 
studies like Arnim Mennecke’s Koloniales Bewusstsein in den Romanen J.M. Coetzees (1991). 
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understood more broadly as “realist representations of, and humanist protests against, 
colonial rapacity at large, and in particular against the intricately institutionalised system 
of racial oppression that … prevailed in South Africa” (Parry 149).  
 
Susan VanZanten Gallagher’s A Story of South Africa: J.M. Coetzee’s Fiction in Context 
(1991) situates Coetzee’s fiction against such a backdrop as part of its consideration of 
the relationship between the fiction and the ‘life and times’ of its production. As 
suggested by the book’s title, Gallagher understands Coetzee’s novels as direct 
engagements with or representations of the history of South Africa and, subsequently, 
proceeds “to resituate Coetzee’s fictions in their discursive moments, to examine a 
variety of social, cultural, and rhetorical contexts from which his novels emerge and in 
which they participate” (ix-x). In the preface’s justification of her “strongly externalistic” 
(Helgesson 184) project, Gallagher maintains that “[t]he study of literature in recent years 
… has shifted from a focus on language to a focus on history” (ix).  
 
The preface and following two chapters clearly demonstrate Gallagher’s focus on history 
via a detailed discussion of a variety of contexts. In chapter one, “History and the South 
African Writer”, Gallagher provides a concise history of apartheid, followed by a 
summation of the manner in which South African writers responded to this era of 
repression. She, then, considers Coetzee’s personal history, the critical reception of his 
work, and his conception of the role of the author in society, concluding with a brief 
consideration of his own critical writing. The ensuing chapter, “Naming the Other: 
History, Language and Authority”, introduces the notion of the other in relation to the 
discursive practices of the apartheid era. This discussion is developed with a 
consideration of the white myths of history, the subsequent banning of black voices 
during apartheid, and the manner in which language was utilised as a tool of oppression. 
An illustration of the manner in which these factors challenged the white writer’s 
fictional engagement with the times brings the chapter to a close. Here, on page 44, 
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Gallagher briefly mentions and summarises Coetzee’s fictional oeuvre – for the first 
time.11
 
  
Traces of Gallagher’s partiality towards historical explication can also be found in the 
ensuing chapters in that each, concerned with one of Coetzee’s novels, is launched by a 
detailed contextualisation of the particular work in terms of historical events and/or 
Coetzee’s biography. The chapter on Waiting for the Barbarians (1980), for example, 
opens with an exposition of Stephen Biko’s death in 1977. Although there are certain 
similarities between the death of the first prisoner in the novel and the demise of Biko, 
Gallagher’s introduction has to mould the ensuing text to fit this interpretive frame.  
 
It should be noted that the contextualisation of a literary work is standard procedure in 
the field of literary criticism, given its contribution to the critic’s understanding. Indeed, 
as argued by Gallagher herself, critics are generally “urged … to acknowledge that 
literature is situated within a web of historical conditions, relationships, and influences” 
(ix). Attridge, for one, acknowledges “the valuable insights that this mode of reading has 
produced and no doubt will continue to produce” (The Ethics of Reading 33).  
 
However, although Gallagher’s historicist critique generates a myriad of insightful 
observations, its introductory contextualisations, predetermined grids of social, cultural 
and rhetorical contexts, result in the reduction of the characteristic elusiveness of 
Coetzee’s fiction, as demonstrated in the chapter on Waiting for the Barbarians. Such 
fixed, preset frameworks are “always reductive of the complexity of the writing process” 
(Attridge “Coetzee in Context” 233) in that some of the literary text’s focal features are 
inevitably overlooked. Gallagher’s discussion of Biko’s torture, for example, forces the 
text to yield allegorical significance in this regard, negating the singularity, the ‘reality’ 
of the first prisoner’s demise – and the integrity of the novel as a whole.  
 
 
                                                 
11 Throughout the thesis, I use the British ‘–se’ instead of the American ‘-ze’ (for example, ‘summarise’ 
instead of ‘summarize’). However, when quoting directly from American texts, I keep the ‘-ze’ as it 
appears in the quoted text.    
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Head’s Story of ‘Coetzee’ 
 
Like Gallagher’s A Story of South Africa, Dominic Head’s J.M. Coetzee (1997) firmly 
locates Coetzee’s “post-colonising literature” (27) within the context of apartheid South 
Africa.12
 
 An initial chronology, for example, lists Coetzee’s most important biographical 
information, including the publication dates of his novels, together with the dates of 
significant events in the history of South Africa. Furthermore, chapter one, “The Writer’s 
Place: Coetzee and Postcolonial Literature”, provides a brief biography of Coetzee’s life 
and times, giving emphasis to his position within the literary community, as well as to the 
relation between his literary and cultural identities.  
Whereas Gallagher places Coetzee against the backdrop of apartheid South Africa, Head 
concentrates on Coetzee’s fictional reactions to these historical conditions. The preface, 
for example, introduces Head’s monograph with an immediate discussion of Coetzee’s 
main concerns, associating them with the environments that motivated their emergence. 
Unlike Gallagher, Head relates his particular portrayal of the South African situation 
directly to the concerns of Coetzee’s fiction. In addition, his chapters serve as direct 
engagements with the respective texts.  
 
Consequently, Head’s contextualisation of Coetzee’s oeuvre serves to inform and 
illuminate certain aspects of the fictional texts. Although each chapter reveals an 
awareness of the novel’s milieu, the interpretative frames do not overshadow the 
individual narratives themselves, allowing Head to encounter the fiction on its own 
terms.13
 
  
Nevertheless, as Gallagher’s study leans towards providing a particular history of 
apartheid, as seen through the frame of Coetzee’s fiction, Head’s introductory chapter 
tilts in the direction of a biography of Coetzee’s life and times, founded on his fiction. 
                                                 
12 Head’s The Cambridge Introduction to J.M. Coetzee (2009) has just been published and promises to be 
an interesting read. At the time of submission, a copy was not yet obtainable.  
13 See the concluding chapter for a discussion of the limits and possibilities of a style of reading that 
encounters the text on its own terms. Coetzee describes this relation as “an equal marriage” (Doubling 61) 
between literature and criticism.  
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The title of Gallagher’s book, A Story of South Africa, proposes the history of South 
Africa as its main object of analysis. Similarly, Head’s title, J.M. Coetzee, presents 
Coetzee as the book’s primary focus. But what is meant by ‘Coetzee’? Note how critics 
often talk of reading ‘Coetzee’ (instead of reading ‘Coetzee’s fiction’), using only his 
name to designate his body of work. In addition, a critic of Coetzee’s fiction is often 
referred to as a ‘Coetzee scholar’. On the one hand, this may be a sign of the fiction’s 
institutionalisation, in a manner of speaking. On the other, it may also imply that the 
persona that is ‘Coetzee’ is predominantly constituted by his fictions – even is (his) 
fiction. The name of Head’s book invokes the manner in which author and fiction are 
customarily conflated in the field of Coetzee criticism. Certainly, Head’s study 
interrogates the association between Coetzee, the fictional oeuvre, and Coetzee, the 
writer, in what appears to be an attempt to (re)introduce the field of Coetzee, the fiction, 
to Coetzee, its maker.  
 
Dovey’s Allegory of Academia  
 
Like the previous two studies, Teresa Dovey’s psychoanalytic explorations or, in the 
words of Attridge, “relentless theoretical readings” (“Coetzee in Context” 321) of 
Coetzee’s oeuvre in The Novels of JM Coetzee: Lacanian Allegories (1988) is another 
example of the manner in which an indeterminate text can be used as a vehicle to involve 
extraneous discursive contexts. Whereas Gallagher and Head contextualise Coetzee’s 
fiction in terms of the life and/or times of its author – that is, the social, political, 
intellectual and literary climate of Coetzee’s life in apartheid South Africa – Dovey 
locates his body of work chiefly within the realm of contemporary thought. She reads 
Coetzee’s metafiction as staged upon Lacanian psychoanalysis and proceeds to 
demonstrate “how Coetzee’s novels recuperate the themes of each model they inhabit for 
a thematics of the Lacanian subject” (11).  
 
Dovey’s study translates Coetzee’s multifaceted, multi-dimensional texts into 
illustrations of post-structuralist paradigms and, by doing so, fails to acknowledge the 
primacy of the literary narrative. She justifies this rendition by referring to Coetzee’s 
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texts as “criticism-as-fiction, or fiction-as-criticism”, stating that “with a writer like 
Coetzee the novelist and critical discourses fuse” (9). Coetzee’s fiction is undoubtedly 
permeated with the traces of a variety of styles of thought and modes of writing. These 
ideas delicately frame the narrative whilst assisting the play of events.  
 
According to Dovey, “Coetzee’s novels perform this function, of criticism-as-fiction, in a 
self-conscious and systematic fashion, engaging in the contemporary theoretical debate in 
a way that circumvents some of the problems facing critics who adhere to more 
conventional forms of critical discourse” (9). Therefore, Dovey appears to consider 
Coetzee’s fictions as the instruments of or vehicles for particular ideas. In considering the 
text as a kind of supplement to criticism, her perspective denies the singularity, 
sovereignty and integrity of the literary text. As stated by Head, “Coetzee’s novels have a 
power and a resonance beyond the concerns of academia” (Coetzee xi).  
 
I agree with Attwell when he states that, although “Dovey was able to make the startling 
but justifiable claim that the novels possessed a pre-emptive theoretical sophistication 
that disarmed the critics in advance”, her “theoretical allegory turns Coetzee’s novels into 
a supplement to Lacan” (The Politics of Writing 2). Indeed, although Dovey paved the 
way for sophisticated engagements with Coetzee’s fiction, her Lacanian Allegories, the 
first book-length study on Coetzee, should be perceived as an example of the manner in 
which literary criticism can construct and impose preconceived theoretical frameworks, 
in the shape of contextualisation or allegorisation, that reduce a text’s multi-
dimensionality.14
 
  
 
 
                                                 
14 Note how my discussion of the abovementioned studies of Coetzee’s fiction does not explain its claims 
by reading back into the historical or biographical contexts of its authors. If a critic such as Dovey chooses 
to refer to a theoretical study such as Lacan’s psychoanalysis without contextualising that study’s claims in 
terms of Lacan’s life and times, why should that same critic then choose to examine the literary text in 
terms of its contexts? It appears that there exists an underlying and unnecessary uncertainty as to the 
relevance of literature as opposed to more historically or theoretically oriented discourses. Is this the task 
that some literary critics have assigned themselves: the historical and theoretical validation of narrative 
fiction? 
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Attwell’s Self-awareness 
 
Perhaps writing with a foreign audience in mind, it appears that Gallagher, Head and 
Dovey intended to accommodate the overseas demand for contextualisation via their 
introductions.15
 
 However, when the integrity of the discipline bows to the international 
market, self-interrogation is imperative – especially when attending to the metafiction of 
a self-conscious novelist like Coetzee, who “refuses to subordinate form and technique to 
content, while ensuring that form and technique are never deployed purely for their own 
sakes” (Attridge “Coetzee in Context” 321). Although Gallagher’s, Head’s and Dovey’s 
studies make valuable contributions to the field, these studies’ introductions partially 
negate the literary text’s primacy and, as a result, impede the respective encounters with 
Coetzee’s fictional texts. 
David Attwell, on the other hand, exhibits a redeeming self-awareness as to his chosen 
methodological path. In the introduction to his study, J.M. Coetzee: South Africa and the 
Politics of Writing (1993), Attwell admits that his reading of Coetzee’s novels “back into 
their contexts” and thus “against the grain” (7) might constitute either “a tribute or a 
betrayal” (7) of narrative concerns.  
 
In order to demonstrate how Coetzee’s fiction “seriously addresses the ethical and 
political stresses of living in, and with, a particular historical locale, that of contemporary 
South Africa” (1), Attwell’s book “turn[s] to the theoretical and historical contexts 
brought into play by Coetzee’s reflexive South African fictions” (7). The introductory 
contextualisation can be perceived, in a sense, as a synthesis of Gallagher’s historicism, 
Head’s biography and Dovey’s theory. Chapter one, “Contexts: Literary, Historical, 
Intellectual”, contains traces of all of the above: the history of apartheid, Coetzee’s 
critical work, Coetzee’s position within the literary community and its “vehement debates 
on the shaping of a national culture” (Colleran 585), his position regarding post-
                                                 
15 Attridge notes that “[n]on-South African readers in particular will find the result a useful guide to 
Coetzee’s novels” (“Coetzee in Context” 321).   
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colonialism and postmodernism, as well as the correlation between the fiction’s agency 
and contemporary theory.  
 
However, in locating Coetzee’s “form of situational metafiction … in the nexus of history 
and text” (2-3), Attwell’s first two chapters explicate the history only – and not the text. 
In Attwell’s study, the literary text serves as an explanation of the context, which brings 
its discursive environment to the fore. Note Colleran’s related observation:  
 
Attwell’s … book is so intently trained on the circumstances in which 
each novel appeared or, more exactly, on the historically situated 
discursive formulations within and against which each novel operates, that 
primary emphasis is given to each work’s status as historical artefact, and 
less is placed on any synthesis between novels or an accumulated sense of 
them. (588)  
 
Indeed, in the words of Sarah Nuttall, “David Attwell … has undertaken to do something 
which Coetzee has explicitly resisted” (731). Therefore, I must conclude that, like 
Dovey’s study, Attwell’s contextual analysis – however valuable its insights may be – 
overpowers Coetzee’s fiction, giving rise to a betrayal of its contents; a betrayal that is 
alleviated, nonetheless, by the introduction’s singular self-awareness.  
 
Coetzee’s Commentary  
 
Given that Gallagher, Head, Dovey and Attwell tend to use the fictional text to promote 
predetermined arguments, it follows that the textual substantiation is not always 
sufficiently substantial. Instead of relying primarily on the text, they quote not only other 
critics and theorists in validation of their assumptions, but also Coetzee’s own comments 
about his fiction or extracts from his academic work.16
                                                 
16 Critics regularly quote Coetzee in defence of their arguments. Although some do so more than others, I 
will provide only one example from each of the five monographs to illustrate this tendency: Gallagher’s A 
Story of South Africa, page 145; Head’s J.M. Coetzee, page 95; Dovey’s The Novels of JM Coetzee: 
 I am putting my case more 
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strongly than I should, but it seems to me that some literary critics, with notable 
exceptions, have developed a blind spot with regard to Coetzee’s fiction. Although 
regular references to and close considerations of Coetzee’s observations speak of a great 
reverence on the critic’s part, these observations are not necessarily conducive to the 
development of a style of reading suited to engaging with Coetzee’s singularly self-
reflexive fictions.  
 
In addition, some critics conflate the perspectives of author, implied author, narrator and 
character under the title of ‘Coetzee’. The medical officer’s statements in Life & Times, 
for example, are occasionally understood as the personal opinions of ‘Coetzee’.17 
Furthermore, the notion of the implied author as an intermediary consciousness appears 
to be dwindling in this field.18
 
 This encourages the impression that the novels are the 
straightforward, unproblematic vehicles of Coetzee’s personal opinion. But, according to 
Rimmon-Kenan:  
[a]n author may embody in a work ideas, beliefs, emotions other than or 
even quite opposed to those he had in real life; he may also embody 
different ideas, beliefs and emotions in different works. Thus while the 
flesh-and-blood author is subjected to the vicissitudes of real life, the 
implied author of a particular work is conceived as a stable entity, ideally 
consistent with itself within the work. (87) 
 
In following Coetzee’s pronouncements too closely, critics run the risk of negating his 
fiction’s primacy. In fact, one would think that the critical commentary of a faithful 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lacanian Allegories, page 320; Attwell’s J.M. Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing, page 89; 
and Attridge’s J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading: Literature in the Event, page 64. 
17 Attridge notes that the medical officer from Life & Times’s “interpretation of K’s mode of existence in 
the Kenilworth camp has frequently been extended by commentators to embrace the whole novel; yet the 
fact that it is advanced by the well-meaning but uncomprehending medical officer must throw some doubt 
on it, and on allegorical readings of the work more generally” (The Ethics of Reading 34). As an example, 
Attridge refers specifically to the following statement, as uttered by the medical officer: “Your stay in the 
camp was merely an allegory, if you know that word. It was an allegory – speaking at the highest level – of 
how scandalously, how outrageously a meaning can take up residence in a system without becoming a term 
in it” (The Ethics of Reading 34). 
18 For an example of such an oversight, see Gallagher’s chapter on Life & Times of Michael K in A Story of 
South Africa.  
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follower of Coetzee’s impressions of his own fiction would reflect his belief in the rivalry 
of history and literature in his novels, to the subordination, one might add, of history. 
Attwell and Head both quote Coetzee’s renowned statement from “The Novel Today”:  
 
[i]n times of intense ideological pressure like the present, when the space 
in which the novel and history normally coexist like two cows on the same 
pasture, each minding its own business, is squeezed to almost nothing, the 
novel, it seems to me, has only two options: supplementarity or rivalry. 
(The Politics of Writing 15; Coetzee 10-11) 
 
In quoting this statement, using Coetzee’s ‘real’ opinion as a method of justifying their 
arguments, Attwell and Head are defying Coetzee’s intention by placing their faith in the 
primacy of reality, of history; and not in fiction. In quoting this excerpt to prove the 
prevalence of fiction, they are, in fact, revealing an ironic allegiance to the ‘reality’ of the 
quotation, the reality of Coetzee’s life and times.  
 
The renowned evasiveness of Coetzee’s answers in response to questions about his 
fiction speaks of his resistance to making such proclamations.19
 
 When formulating 
statements about his fiction in ‘real’ time, Coetzee may seem to implicate himself in the 
reduction of his fiction’s multi-textured performances to mere representations of reality. 
Nonetheless, he displays a characteristic irony in statements such as the following, 
imbuing them with performativity: “[W]hat is criticism, what can it ever be, but either a 
betrayal (the usual case) or an overpowering (the rarer case) of its object? How often is 
there an equal marriage?” (Doubling 61). In making such a critical statement – a 
statement that is often quoted by critics in literary commentary (for example, Head 
Coetzee 26) – Coetzee is performing the manner in which criticism, including his own, 
can overpower, betray and thus confine fiction.  
 
                                                 
19 In his preface to J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading, Attridge aptly thanks Coetzee, “who, in true 
friendship, kept his reservations to himself” (xiii). 
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Attridge’s Singular Style  
 
In J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading: Literature in the Event (2005), Derek Attridge 
argues for a critical response, “a response that might be called ‘responsible’” (9), one that 
“attempt[s] to do justice to the singularity and inventiveness” (xi) of Coetzee’s fiction. By 
largely avoiding what Helgesson describes as the act of “chasing the Holy Grail of a 
wholly non-appropriative form of reading” (189), such a responsible reading is “one that 
is fully responsive to [the literary work’s] singularity, inventiveness, and otherness, as 
these manifest themselves in the event or experience of the work” (The Ethics of Reading 
11). According to Head:  
 
[a] responsible reading, for Attridge, does ‘not attempt to pigeonhole a 
work’: ‘To read a work responsibly ... is to read it without placing over it a 
grid of possible uses, as historical evidence, moral lesson, path to truth, 
political inspiration, or personal encouragement. It is to trust in the 
unpredictability of reading, its openness to the future.’ This would seem to 
represent the critical equivalent of Coetzee’s insistence on the autonomy 
of the writer and the novel. (“Belief” 105)  
 
Three aspects of the ‘responsible’ methodology followed by Attridge in his 
comprehensive consideration require specific mention. First, unlike Gallagher, Head, 
Dovey and Attwell, Attridge’s frame does not attempt to bring Coetzee’s fiction into the 
order of the same as part of a pursuit of meaning and ‘truth’, but emphasises the fiction’s 
alterity instead. Secondly, Attridge’s creation of a “companion volume” (xiii) to The 
Ethics of Reading, called The Singularity of Literature (2004), allowed him to theorise 
and elaborate “some of the questions about literature raised briefly in the chapters” (xiii) 
without having to subject Coetzee’s literary texts to this theoretical progression. Ideas 
that might have been inspired by, but not directly related to, the novels could be explored 
elsewhere. Thirdly, he does not provide a comprehensive introduction; only a preface that 
succinctly describes his personal response to each novel. The ensuing description of the 
work’s methodology and the various chapters’ associated aims appears to emerge from 
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these respective experiences. There is an acute sense that Attridge’s study will “follow 
Coetzee’s lead” (xii) in order to stay true to his initial impression of each text. The 
preface is a nuanced, sophisticated, introspective and self-aware delineation of the 
research field that, nevertheless, allows the ensuing chapters the necessary autonomy to 
effectively and responsibly engage with the narrative fictions on their own terms.20
 
 
Clearly, my thesis attempts to follow Attridge’s lead in this regard.  
In a critique of Attridge’s methodology, Head draws attention, however, to the loss of 
autonomy and critical distance that might accompany “this cozy relationship” (“Belief” 
108), suggesting that, unless Attridge’s notion of “a responsible instrumentality” 
(Attridge qtd. in “Belief” 108) is introduced to such a reading, the critic might not “arrive 
at an appropriately modified (and evolving) ethical overview of a field of study” 
(“Belief” 108).  
 
Contextualisation as Supplementation  
 
Thus far, I have mentioned certain types of contextualisation or acts of framing with 
regard to Coetzee’s fiction. To summarise the potential pitfalls of such interpretative 
frames, I now refer to a Master’s thesis that was written by Julia Streuber, under Nuttall’s 
supervision at Stellenbosch University ten years ago, called ‘South Africa’ in Three 
Novels by J.M. Coetzee. In a conventional manner, Streuber reaches for a number of 
contexts in justification of her argument, regarding Coetzee’s oeuvre as the unmediated 
expression of his own personal condemnation of apartheid and, thus, a direct engagement 
with the contexts of his fictional works’ production. She quotes Coetzee, the person not 
the fiction, on page 10, for example, as well as prominent scholars, on pages 1 to 6, for 
instance, deeming their opinions as valid as, if not more valid than, the notions that arise 
from the novels themselves. Streuber does not interrogate or test these statements against 
the examined narratives, reading them as objective truths instead of subjective 
                                                 
20 However, this expectation is somewhat thwarted by the contextualisations that launch most of the 
volume’s chapters. In most cases, the literary examination is conducted only after a consideration of a 
specific context or concept – and this undercuts the preface’s promise of an ethical engagement with the 
voices of the individual narratives.  
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assessments. In addition, the perspectives of author, narrator and character are often 
conflated (see pages 14 and 38).  
 
I offer this brief critique of Streuber’s thesis, a thesis unacquainted with the implications 
of its chosen methodology, to indicate the manner in which the field of Coetzee criticism 
has been shaped. The respective responses to his oeuvre have regularised a particular 
approach to and engagement with the fictional texts; a method which is followed by 
many students of his literature. Although each literary commentator should be at liberty 
to respond to a text in a personal and individual manner, as befitting the text, he/she 
should bear in mind, I would suggest, the primacy of the literary text. Often, the large 
body of responses to Coetzee’s fiction causes literary analysts to lose sight of the object, 
or, perhaps, one should say ‘subject’ of their analyses, namely the literary text, as they 
struggle over interpretations generated by other critics.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In conclusion, I am fully aware that these critics, nevertheless, supply more nuanced 
readings than their interpretative programmes might suggest. Their own observations 
exceed their frames of reference, which is why I often quote them approvingly 
throughout this study. As mentioned, the presentation of my case might be considered too 
extreme. However, in order to problematise the critic’s delineation of the literary text, I 
deemed it necessary to make explicit the particulars of my concerns, including the style of 
reading embodied by this thesis. For example, it seems that Coetzee criticism generally 
assumes that it should expose the ‘underlying’ or ‘hidden’ ‘truth’ of the fictional text. In 
the introduction to The Politics of Writing, Attwell, for example, states that his project 
has set itself the “goal of explication” (6). Is it even necessary to explain Coetzee’s 
fictions? Are they not self-sufficient, sovereign texts that speak for themselves through 
the act of reading? The meaning of the literary text is by no means reliant on its critical 
‘explication’. Though immoderate, such concerns prompted me to deploy a style of 
reading which (like Coetzee’s own critical style) endeavours to supplement and intensify 
– and not to reduce or overpower – the concerns of the literary text.  
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Such considerations open a space in which one can ask how precisely the critic should go 
about framing and supplementing Coetzee’s fiction. What should and should not be said, 
lest the delimitation confine and condemn the study to ‘a life lived in cages’? The 
following chapter on Age of Iron strives to demonstrate the practicalities of an ethical 
encounter, a containment of Coetzee’s fiction as opposed to a confinement, placing 
specific emphasis on the interpretative frame provided by the literary text itself. It is this 
frame that will facilitate the consequent illumination of and supplementation to the 
aspects I have chosen to consider.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
“THE TONGUE OF A GOD”: REALISM AND CONTAINMENT IN  
AGE OF IRON  
‘To speak of this’ – I waved a hand over the bush, the smoke, the filth 
littering the path – ‘you would need the tongue of a god.’ (Age of Iron 91) 
 
In her letter that comprises the narrative, Elizabeth Curren, the protagonist of J.M. 
Coetzee’s sixth novel, Age of Iron (1990), does indeed speak of and evoke the particulars 
(‘the bush, the smoke, the filth’) of this scene of devastation to her daughter, despite the 
demurral. Various emphases on Mrs Curren’s lack of authority and objectivity suggest 
that she possesses anything but the tongue of a god, a tongue that would succeed in 
providing an unmediated, truthful representation of ‘this’ reality.21
 
 Mrs Curren’s attempt 
to find her “own words” (91) to describe the scene suggests an awareness of the 
ideological implications of an aging, white woman’s promotion of her subjective stance 
on the matter as ‘truth’. In fact, the shantytown scene, the scene to which Mrs Curren is 
responding in the citation, ends with an appeal to her daughter to recognise the 
subjectivity of her portrayal (95-6). 
As a demonstration of the merits of close reading, the following consideration of a 
significant passage and its encircling events should serve to illustrate how the primary 
concerns and style of reading that constitute my act of framing ‘Coetzee’ are prompted by 
the codes of the text itself. In addition, this chapter will argue that the shantytown scene, 
this mimetic moment in Age of Iron, is not a coincidental concession to the project of 
literary realism, as some critics would like to believe, but rather a careful consideration of 
the conditions, limitations and possibilities of this device by way of a metafictional 
performance of the manner in which realism (re)presents or (re)produces reality. 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 “This house, I thought. This world. This house, this music. This” (27).  
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The Shantytown Scene 
 
The inside of the hall was a mess of rubble and charred beams. Against the 
far wall, shielded from the worst of the rain, were five bodies neatly laid 
out. The body in the middle was that of Florence’s Bheki. He still wore the 
grey flannel trousers, white shirt and maroon pullover of his school, but 
his feet were bare. His eyes were open and staring, his mouth open too. 
The rain had been beating on him for hours, on him and his comrades, not 
only here but wherever they had been when they met their deaths; their 
clothes, their very hair, had a flattened, dead look. In the corners of his 
eyes there were grains of sand. There was sand in his mouth …  
I was shaking: shivers ran up and down my body, my hands trembled. I 
thought of the boy’s open eyes. I thought: What did he see as his last sight 
on earth? I thought: This is the worst thing I have witnessed in my life. 
And I thought: Now my eyes are open and I can never close them again. 
(95)  
 
This realistic representation of Mrs Curren’s response to the death of Bheki, her 
housekeeper’s fifteen-year old son, is a pivotal point in Age of Iron. Contained by the 
events that precede and follow it, this central scene lies at the core of Mrs Curren’s 
conflict-ridden journey to Guguletu, a township on the outskirts of the South African city 
of Cape Town.22 Here, at the sight of Bheki’s dead body, her eyes, till then “sunk in the 
sleep of worldliness” (153) are prised open and forced to see, and acknowledge, the 
reality of apartheid.23
 
  
                                                 
22 Attridge observes that some critics refer to the protagonist, ‘Mrs Curren’, as ‘Elizabeth’ “out of the same 
unconscious sexism that makes critics speak of ‘Susan’ – but not ‘Robinson’ or ‘Daniel’ – in Foe” (The 
Ethics of Reading 95). With this observation in mind, I will henceforth refer to Elizabeth Curren, not as 
Elizabeth, but as Mrs Curren. 
23 Feeling “[t]ired beyond cause, tired as an armour against the times, yearning to close my eyes, to sleep” 
(117), Mrs Curren frequently struggles to keep her eyes open – open eyes indicating a direct, unmediated 
and thus ‘truthful’ picture of reality. “How do I know the scales are not already thickening over my own 
eyes?” (117), she asks with reference to the conservative, presumably white South African eyes that 
“[cloud] over again, scales thickening on them, as the land-explorers, the colonist, prepare to return to the 
deep” (116).  
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The journey commences with a telephone call “[i]n the small hours of the night” (81) to 
Florence, Mrs Curren’s housekeeper, summoning her to the aid of her fifteen-year-old 
son, Bheki. “There is trouble” (81) says Florence. Mrs Curren offers to take her and her 
other children to Guguletu by car. “Full of misgivings” (83), she drives beyond the 
protective boundaries of her sleepy suburb, which she describes as “[a] closed universe, 
curved like an egg, enclosing us” (20), into a wholly different, somewhat surreal world. 
“Swirls of mist floated towards us, embraced the car, floated away. Wraiths, spirits. 
Aornos this place: birdless” (83) writes Mrs Curren to her daughter. This layer of mist, 
darkness and rain presses against the windshield and windows of her rundown “little 
green car” (88), separating the passengers from the dreamlike world of the suburbs 
behind, and the nightmarish reality that lies ahead. Then, in the contained space of the 
vehicle, they have to cross another boundary, a barricade of police cars, to reach 
Guguletu.  
 
On arrival, Florence’s cousin, a teacher named Mr Thabane, enlists the help of a boy, a 
“child of the times, at home in this landscape of violence” (85), to help navigate the vast, 
chaotic landscape of the township. In search of the missing Bheki, Mrs Curren and Mr 
Thabane leave the car, Mrs Curren’s last item of suburban security. While crossing the 
hellish “landscape of scorched earth” and “blackened trees” (86), Mrs Curren’s brittle 
body is exposed entirely to the elements, even as her white skin – the mark of her 
complicity in apartheid’s dying regime – renders her vulnerable to the residents’ 
“resentment” and “hatred” (99).  
 
Mrs Curren and Mr Thabane cross a “wide, flat pond” (87), a barrier of water, in the 
direction of the partially flooded shanties.24
                                                 
24 In her chapter on Age of Iron, Gallagher writes that “[l]ed by a black Virgil through water and fire, Mrs 
Curren, like Dante, enters hell” (197).  
 She writes that, while struggling up against a 
dune, “the noise we had heard, which at first might have been taken for wind and rain, 
began to break up into shouts, cries, calls, over a ground-bass which I can only call a 
sigh: a deep sigh, repeated over and over, as if the wide world itself were sighing” (87). 
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Here, on top of the dune, Mrs Curren encounters an anguished “scene of devastation: 
shanties burnt and smouldering, shanties still burning, pouring forth black smoke” (87).  
 
As the gangs of men responsible for the devastation advance on the gathering spectators, 
Mrs Curren flees amidst screams and gunfire. “There was nothing I longed for more than 
to get into my car, slam the door behind me, close out this looming world of rage and 
violence” (88-9), she notes. After recrossing the pool, Mr Thabane, the teacher, confronts 
her response to the reigning chaos in front of a curious crowd. He asks: “You want to go 
home … But what of the people who live here? When they want to go home, this is 
where they must go. What do you think of that?” (90).  
 
They retrieve the car on route to “a long, low building, a hall or school perhaps, 
surrounded by a mesh fence” (92-3), kept under surveillance by troop carriers. Here, at 
the end of her perilous journey, Mrs Curren finds Florence weeping at Bheki’s lifeless 
body. Mrs Curren responds to Mr Thabane’s condemnation: “‘Please listen to me,’ I said. 
‘I am not indifferent to this … this war. How can I be? No bars are thick enough to keep 
it out.’ I felt like crying; but here, beside Florence, what right had I? ‘It lives inside me 
and I live inside it,’ I whispered” (95). 
 
This brief description is intended to bring the variety of boundaries that enclose – or 
contain – the above quoted scene, to light. In order to reach Bheki’s deceased body, Mrs 
Curren has to cross a space of darkness, mist and rain, a police barricade, a hellish 
landscape of scorched earth, a barrier of water, then a dune subjected to gunfire, as well 
as the school’s mesh fence – not to mention the conceptual delimitation posed by the 
township and Mr Thabane’s judgment and censure – all the while enduring the harshest 
restriction of all, that imposed by her dying body. These boundaries create an acute sense 
of the concrete and conceptual distance that has to be traversed from sleepy suburbia to 
vigilant shantytown. 
 
Before considering the significance of these boundaries – the scene’s frame, if you will –
and what they include and exclude, a consideration of the scene’s realism must follow.  
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The Reality-effect 
 
David Macey observes: 
 
verisimilitude can be established by the reality-effect produced by the 
introduction into a narrative of details that do nothing to advance the 
narrative, and which are therefore redundant in structural terms, but which 
‘say’ to the reader ‘We are real’, and thus guarantee the verisimilitude of 
the narrative as a whole. (391) 
 
A number of narrative details clearly guarantee the ‘reality’ of apartheid as the principal 
context against or ‘inside’ of which Age of Iron’s narrative events unfold. First, particular 
references to South Africa, Africa, and a variety of regional locations, like Guguletu and 
Cape Town, plainly situate the narrative within a South African context. Secondly, the 
concluding contextualisation of the novel’s ‘times’, “1986-89” (181), gives a specific 
indication as to the narrative’s time frame: the era of the black youth’s intensified 
resistance to the apartheid regime’s oppressive reign.25 According to Head, “[t]he scenes 
of township violence evoke the Cape Town unrest of 1986, and this would appear to be 
the date of the novel’s setting” (Coetzee 131). Mrs Curren also makes frequent statements 
about the country’s oppressive government, its leaders being “Cetshwayo, Dingane in 
white skins” (26),26 and the resultant resistance of the black youth.27
 
  
In general, these narrative details do not appear to play a significant part in advancing the 
narrative. However, in the shantytown scene, they are brought to the foreground. 
Whereas Mrs Curren usually displays an awareness of the ‘reality’ of apartheid as 
                                                 
25 Note that the term ‘apartheid’ is never used in Age of Iron.  
26 “The new Africans, pot-bellied, heavy-jowled men on their stools of office: Cetshwayo, Dingane in white 
skins. Pressing downward: their power in their weight. Huge bull-testicles pressing down on their wives, 
their children, pressing the spark out of them. In their own hearts no spark of fire left. Sluggish hearts, 
heavy as blood-pudding” (26).  
27 “Children of iron, I thought. Florence herself, too, not unlike iron. The age of iron. After which comes 
the age of bronze. How long, how long before the softer ages return in their cycle, the age of clay, the age 
of earth? A Spartan matron, iron-hearted, bearing warrior-sons for the nation. ‘We are proud of them.’ We. 
Come home either with your shield or on your shield” (46).  
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something which is disconnected from the veracity of her dying body, here, in this scene, 
she encounters directly or, rather, enters into the reality of apartheid, experiencing it from 
within.  
 
For example, in the scene, there are specific references to the youth’s resistance in the 
midst of violence, chaos and confusion – a conflict which, in the reader’s mind, is played 
out against the background of Mrs Curren’s continuous condemnation of the loss of 
childhood innocence. Schoolchildren are everywhere. Initially, a confident ten-year old 
boy guides Mrs Curren’s party through Guguletu. Then, in the scramble to escape the 
gangs of men terrorising the shanties, Mrs Curren is shouldered out of the way by a “girl, 
an enormously fat teenager … glaring with naked animosity: ‘Get out! Get out!’” (89). In 
addition, Mr Thabane, it emerges, “was a teacher. But I have left the profession 
temporarily. Till better times arrive. At present I sell shoes” (92). This is related to the 
fact that the building where Bheki’s deceased body lies, still clothed in his school 
uniform, resembles a school. Lastly, Mrs Curren is confronted by another child: “A girl 
in an apple-green school tunic advanced on me, her hand raised as if to give me a slap. I 
flinched, but it was only in play. Or perhaps I should say: she forbore from actually 
striking” (93-4).  
 
All things considered, the shantytown scene engages with a specific or ‘real’ situation in 
a manner directly related to the representational approach of literary realism. Unlike most 
of Coetzee’s narratives, this scene, in a typically realist fashion, seems concerned with 
the “omniscient presentation of a mirror of empirical ‘reality’” (Hutcheon 138), 
“[bringing] social and historical reference to the fore” (Hutcheon xiii). As in the case of 
literary realism, here “[the realist or representational sign] effaces its own status as a sign, 
in order to foster the illusion that we are preceiving reality without its intervention. The 
sign as ‘reflection’, ‘expression’ or ‘representation’ denies the productive character of 
language” (Eagleton 136).28
 
  
                                                 
28 Interestingly, Eagleton uses ‘preceiving’ instead of ‘perceiving’. 
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The selected scene not only sustains the illusion of realism, but also appears to engage 
with a shared reality, the reality of apartheid, in an attempt to bear witness to its truth, its 
futility as embodied by Bheki’s fatality. This engagement resembles the approach 
adopted by the seemingly unmediated realist prose of other South African authors. 
Dominic Head, for instance, compares Age of Iron with the novels of Nadine Gordimer, 
stating that there exists “a surprising affinity” (Coetzee 132) between Coetzee’s novel and 
Gordimer’s Burger’s Daughter (1979). He also mentions Coetzee’s “interesting 
appropriation … of the motif of the buried black man” (133) as deployed also in 
Gordimer’s The Conservationist (1974). In other words, the scene appears to present a 
mirror of reality in a manner analogous to the style employed by (the South African 
variety of) oppositional realism.  
 
However, as the next section will argue, this style is contained by the variety of 
boundaries that separate the realist(ic) shantytown scene from Mrs Curren’s self-reflexive 
suburban existence. Two of Age of Iron’s characterising features are absent here, proving 
that this scene – along with a few others – is incongruous with the remainder of the 
narrative. 
 
The Other: John 
 
John is the friend of Bheki, Florence’s son. The two boys are involved in the South 
African youth’s struggle against apartheid and use Mrs Curren’s house as refuge from the 
conflict raging in Guguletu, often spending the night. “I cannot turn my home into a 
haven for all the children running away from the townships” she tells Florence after the 
boys’ struggle with Vercueil (49).  
 
Mrs Curren distrusts John intensely. “What a self-important child” (42), she exclaims:  
 
I did not like him. I do not like him. I look into my heart and nowhere do I 
find any trace of feeling for him. As there are people to whom one 
spontaneously warms, so there are people to whom one is, from the first, 
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cold. That is all. This boy is not like Bheki. He has no charm. There is 
something stupid about him, something deliberately stupid, obstructive, 
intractable. He is one of those boys whose voices deepen too early, who 
by the age of twelve have left childhood behind and turned brutal, 
knowing. A simplified person, simplified in every way: swifter, nimbler, 
more tireless than real people, without doubts or scruples, without 
humour, ruthless, innocent. While he lay in the street, while I thought he 
was dying, I did what I could for him. But, to be candid, I would rather I 
had spent myself on someone else. (71-2) 
 
When John is injured, ‘lying in the street’ after being chased by a police van, Mrs Curren 
keeps him from bleeding to death, visiting him in the hospital “to make sure [he is] all 
right” (71). Her unyielding (judg)mentality is clearly expressed in this passage.29
 
 
Whereas she finds it easy to love Bheki, this boy repels her feeling, her sympathy. It 
comes as no surprise that, during the visit, her reductive judgment is met with John’s 
“wall of resistance”: “I felt him stiffen, felt an angry electric recoil” (72). Ironically, Mrs 
Curren tells John: “Be slow to judge” (72). She then starts to lecture him on war in terms 
utterly foreign to him (she mentions Thucydides, for example), a speech which “[falls] 
off him like dead leaves the moment they were uttered. The words of a woman, therefore 
negligible; of an old woman, therefore doubly negligible; but above all of a white” (72).  
In “Speech and silence in the fictions of J.M. Coetzee”, Benita Parry considers “whether 
the reverberations of Coetzee’s intertextual transpositions, as well as the logic and 
                                                 
29 Mrs Curren has firm notions of what childhood should be and impresses these ideas, first, on Florence 
and, then, on Mr Thabane: “Last year, when the troubles in the schools began, I spoke my mind to 
Florence. ‘In my day we considered education a privilege,’ I said. ‘Parents would scrimp and save to keep 
their children in school. We would have thought it madness to burn a school down.’ 
‘It is different today,’ replied Florence. 
‘Do you approve of children burning down their schools?’ 
‘I cannot tell these children what to do,’ said Florence. ‘It is all changed today. There are no more mothers 
and fathers.’ 
‘That is nonsense,’ I said. ‘There are always mothers and fathers.’ On that note our exchange ended” (36). 
Also note the following: “Mr Thabane, let me make one thing clear to you. I am not trying to prescribe to 
this boy or to anyone else what he should do with his life. He is old enough and self-willed enough to do 
what he will do. But as for this killing, this bloodletting in the name of comradeship, I detest it with all my 
heart and soul. I think it is barbarous. That is what I want to say” (136). 
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trajectory of his narrative strategies, do not inadvertently repeat the exclusionary 
colonialist gestures which the novels also criticize” (150). To my mind, the realist 
depiction of the relationship between Mrs Curren and the black characters in the novel – 
specifically Florence, Bheki, John and Mr Thabane – does repeat this foreclosing gesture. 
Note how Mrs Curren sees John in her mind’s eye “in Florence’s room, in the growing 
dark, the boy, lying on his back with the bomb or whatever it is in his hand, his eyes wide 
open, not veiled now but clear: thinking, more than thinking, envisioning” (137). At 
another stage, she imagines a weekend in Florence and her husband’s life, concluding 
with the statement: “All of this happened. All of this must have happened … Almost it is 
possible to say: This is how life should be” (39). It appears that Mrs Curren is attempting 
to approach John as well as the strong-willed Florence somewhat ineffectually with 
sympathy and understanding. Nevertheless, these visions are fraught with appropriation 
and confinement and, therefore, typified by a lack of reciprocity.  
 
John is undoubtedly, in the words of Parry, “subjected to acts of ventriloquizing” and 
“situated as [an object] of representations and mediations which offer [him] no place 
from which to resist the modes that have constituted [him] as at the same time naked to 
the eye and occult” (151). However, Parry – along with many other critics – does not 
seem to consider the possibility that Age of Iron’s portrayal of the relationship between 
Mrs Curren and John may, in fact, be purposefully enacting the limitations of the literary 
genre, that is, realism.  
 
In imitating literary realism’s typical representation of the black other, Age of Iron 
illustrates how, in the words of Mike Marais, “the realist novel does not so much mask as 
deny entirely the existence of alterity” (Marais 3).30
                                                 
30 Marais writes: “[M]uch post-colonial fiction does not offer a satisfactory solution to the problem of the 
novel’s relation to otherness, a problem which has beset it since its emergence. It professes to be counter-
discursive but is actually always already implied by the very system which it purportedly challenges. It 
presupposes that which it seeks to transgress and in the very moment of criticizing it, restores it. 
Furthermore, its self-reflexive admission of implication in the order of the same is, if anything, more 
suspect than the realist novel’s profession of innocence: in claiming to represent an irruption of alterity into 
sameness, it masks what is simply another means of constituting otherness. In short, it claims to represent 
an otherness which is not other” (8).  
 In other words, in the realist novel 
“that which is presented as ‘other’ is simply the same masquerading as alterity” (Marais 
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7). As a medium that “[‘clarifies’] language” (Marais 2) and stabilises meaning, it, in 
fact, antagonises a freeplay, a plurality of meaning. Therefore, the realist novel is 
perceived as incapable of representing ‘true’ alterity – as demonstrated by Mrs Curren’s 
one-dimensional encounters with Florence and her family that bring them into the order 
of the same. These encounters eradicate their alterity, as well as their multi-
dimensionality in a performance of “the way in which [fictional and historiographic] 
representations routinely foreclose on otherness” (Marais 9). 
 
At a certain stage, however, Mrs Curren begins to repent. As her relationship with 
Vercueil intensifies, her deliberations on life and death begin to demonstrate an 
awareness of the impropriety of her obstinacy and inflexibility as well, borne of a sense 
of complicity with the regime that John is fighting, as well as of responsibility, sympathy, 
respect and even of a kind of love.31
 
 “Poor child! Poor child!” she thinks: “From 
somewhere tears sprang and blurred my sight. Poor John, who in the old days would have 
been destined to be a garden boy and eat bread and jam for lunch at the back door and 
drink out of a tin, battling now for all the insulted and injured, the trampled, the ridiculed, 
for all the garden boys of South Africa!” (138). In other words, Mrs Curren starts to 
acknowledge that she does not possess the authority to judge or restrict others through the 
reductive narrativisation of their lives. 
Interestingly, it appears that Vercueil’s presence is primarily responsible for the 
prompting of Mrs Curren’s self-doubt and her desire to enter into a reciprocal 
relationship with the other:  
 
Whose is the true voice of wisdom, Mr Vercueil? Mine, I believe. Yet who 
am I, who am I to have a voice at all? How can I honourably urge them to 
turn their back on that call? What am I entitled to do but sit in a corner 
with my mouth shut? I have no voice; I lost it long ago; perhaps I never 
                                                 
31 According to Gallagher, “[e]ven as she acknowledges that she feels no love for this black child, she 
admits that she played a part in making him unlovable. This paradox, so typical of the dilemma of white 
South Africans, adds to her feelings of impotence and guilt ... Again she is caught in an endless circle of 
will and volition, of intellect and feeling” (201). 
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had one. I have no voice, and that is that. The rest should be silence. But 
with this – whatever it is – this voice that is no voice, I go on. On and on. 
(149)  
 
Mrs Curren also tells Vercueil: 
 
But now I ask myself: What right have I to opinions about comradeship or 
anything else? What right have I to wish Bheki and his friend had kept out 
of trouble? To have opinions in a vacuum, opinions that touch no one, is, 
it seems to me, nothing. (148)  
 
The Other: Vercueil  
 
“His name is Mr Vercueil,’ I said. ‘Vercueil, Verkuil, Verskuil. That’s what he says. I 
have never come across such a name before. I am letting him stay here for a while” (34). 
Like Michael K’s name, ‘Vercueil’ – Mrs Curren twice calls him “Mr V” (75; 174) – 
projects a sense of indeterminate alterity, of that which is concealed (the Afrikaans word 
‘skuil’ means ‘to hide’).32
 
  
There is nothing seemingly redeeming about this man, an ungrateful if not indifferent 
alcoholic with vacant unhealthy green eyes. Yet, Mrs Curren offers the stranger work, 
food and shelter in exchange for his company, or rather his companionship. She shares 
her most intimate thoughts with him, even the plan to kill herself, an idea he ardently 
supports. At the time of John’s injury and hospitalisation, Mrs Curren flees the house and 
                                                 
32 There are many similarities between Michael K and Vercueil. Both are: handicapped (Michael K has a 
hare lip and Vercueil’s hand has only two working fingers); gardeners (although Vercueil’s attempt at 
gardening are marked by his lack of enthusiasm and characteristic indifference); workless, poor and 
homeless; comfortable with this homelessness; indifferent to societal codes and history; and both are 
subjected to a superior’s persistent attempts to appropriate their ‘stories’. In addition, the skin colour of 
both is omitted, a significant omission given the context of these narratives. In this sense, it almost seems as 
if Michael K, as a transworld identity, had wandered into Age of Iron’s space, introducing himself to Mrs 
Curren (and the reader) under a different name. However, there are subtle differences between the two 
characters. Michael K’s indifference, for example, is portrayed as a result of his naiveté, his innocence, 
simplicity and sincerity in contrast to Vercueil’s perceived cunning or shrewdness. In addition, Michael K 
shows an aversion to alcohol. Quite the opposite, Vercueil is drunk most of the time.  
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spends a night on the streets, where she is later found by her unearthly ‘angel’, her 
Vercueil, who sleeps on the ground next to her. After they return to her house, the text 
concludes with an intimation of Mrs Curren’s death at the hand of Vercueil’s cold, 
suffocating embrace.   
 
Vercueil, unlike John, strictly resembles the indeterminate other usually encountered in 
Coetzee’s fiction, a character that is partially (Michael K, for example) or entirely (like 
Friday) without voice. This forms part of Coetzee’s problematisation of the limits and 
limitations of narrativisation. Whereas Mrs Curren’s relationships with Florence, Bheki, 
John and Mr Thabane are concrete or ‘real’, Vercueil flutters in and out of her house, 
obscured by a haze of ontological uncertainty. For instance, whereas John bleeds 
copiously after his bicycle accident, Mrs Curren cannot imagine blood on Vercueil’s 
leathery face. Also, while the black characters have distinct opinions, Vercueil is wholly 
indifferent and, most of the time, “intoxicated” (41). Often he ignores Mrs Curren when 
she speaks to him: “He said nothing” (7).33
 
  
In addition, Mrs Curren frequently describes Vercueil, “this reconnaissance, this other 
annunciation” (4), in otherworldly terms, as a “marionette” (3), “a visitor” (3), “a lost 
soul” (13). She writes:  
 
A dry creature, a creature of air, like those locust-fairies in Shakespeare 
with their whipstock of cricket’s bone, lash of spider-film. Huge swarms 
of them borne out to sea on the wind, out of sight of land, tiring, settling 
one upon another upon another, resolving to drown the Atlantic by their 
numbers. Swallowed, all of them, to the last. Brittle wings on the sea-floor 
sighing like a forest of leaves; dead eyes by the million; and the crabs 
moving among them, clutching, grinding. (174) 
 
And: 
                                                 
33 Also note the following: “He sat relaxed, imperturbable” (14); “Like water against a rock my words 
thudded against his silence” (29); “Vercueil said nothing” (65); and “He did not answer” (181). 
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He is like one of those half-mythical creatures that come out in 
photographs only as blurs, vague forms disappearing into the undergrowth 
that could be man or beast or merely a bad spot on the emulsion: 
unproved, unattested. (177) 
 
Mrs Curren’s first judgment of this creature is met with his spitting on the ground: “‘You 
are wasting your life,’ I said. ‘You are not a child any more. How can you live like this? 
How can you lie around and do nothing all day? I don’t understand it’” (7). It is here, by 
means of Vercueil’s resistance to Mrs Curren’s attempts to ‘make sense’ of his 
indeterminacy and fix his ‘meaning’, that her ‘training’ in reciprocity begins. The novel 
tracks the oscillation between appropriation and reciprocity in her engagements with, 
specifically, Vercueil and his alterity, but with the other characters as well.  
 
Returning to the subject of the shantytown scene, the most significant element here is the 
absence of Vercueil, the initiator of Mrs Curren’s systematic realisation of her lack of 
authority. In his absence, Mrs Curren’s observations speak of a clear, rational and alert 
mind when the stark reality of the township breaks through the self-reflexive, self-
doubting suburban state of mind she assumes in Vercueil’s presence. The absence of the 
narrative’s indeterminate other furthers Marais’s claim that realism is unable to represent, 
explore and interrogate alterity.34
 
  
Mrs Curren’s self-reflexive eye/I 
 
The most obvious destabilising element of realism’s discursive techniques is Coetzee’s 
concretisation of the distance between the opinions voiced in the text and his own. With 
Mrs Curren’s narration, it becomes increasingly difficult to read ‘Coetzee’ between the 
lines of Age of Iron. Whereas realist fiction, in a deceptively objective manner, strives to 
unearth the ‘truth’, the ‘reality’ of a particular milieu, as witnessed by the implied author, 
                                                 
34 Attwell also alludes to the way in which Vercueil problematises the novel’s realist quality: 
“Commentators who – with the ‘literariness’ of Foe in mind – have remarked on the strongly ‘realist’ 
qualities of Age of Iron (referring to what I have called the novel’s social density, the graphic depictions of 
township violence, and so on) have played down the transformative role played by the novel’s mode of 
address and by Vercueil” (“‘Dialogue’ and ‘Fulfilment’” 174). 
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Age of Iron rather emphasises the subjectivity of Mrs Curren’s expression of her 
particular point(s) of view. Throughout the novel, Mrs Curren’s ‘I’ and subjective ‘eye’ 
are directly related: “A fly settles on my cheek. It cleans itself. It begins to explore. It 
walks across my eye, my open eye. I want to blink, I want to wave it away, but I cannot. 
Through an eye that is and is not mine I stare at it ... But it is upon me, it is here: it struts 
across me, a creature from another world” (24). Her letter’s persistent recollection of the 
eyes of those around her – Vercueil’s eyes, Florence’s eyes, the eyes of the two black 
boys – as well as her own, suggests a metafictional interest in the constitution of 
perspective, revelation and truth. This draws attention to the subjectivity of Mrs Curren’s 
gaze, destabilising the notion of omniscient representation.35
 
  
For example, after witnessing the death of Bheki, Mrs Curren writes: “This is the worst 
thing I have witnessed in my life. And I thought: Now my eyes are open and I can never 
close them again” (95). This evokes open eyes’ conventional association with awareness 
and insight. “I cannot have my eyes closed” (165), writes Mrs Curren. However, this 
association is challenged by three obscure references to open but not insightful eyes, eyes 
that are dead, blank or simultaneously shut: “If you so much as scuffled with your shoe 
you would uncover them: the faces, the dead eyes, open, full of sand” (114); “Her eye is 
open and is blank. She sees and does not see” (164); and “His eyes are unblinking … His 
eyes are open and mine, though I write, are shut. My eyes are shut in order to see” (159).  
 
Thus, it appears that the notion of the uninhibited, unmediated and ‘truthful’ observation 
of ‘reality’ is shown to be somewhat elusive and problematic. Mrs Curren’s attempts to 
bear witness and come to terms with the reality of apartheid emerge as singular 
evocations of her struggle to provide an adequate and ethical reading of the turbulent 
times. Consequently, the emphasis shifts from what Mrs Curren sees to how she sees or, 
otherwise stated, to her subjective interpretation of the world.  
                                                 
35 Although the scene is perhaps but a significant instance of Mrs Curren’s bodily confinement, allow me to 
venture a reading of the fly as the reader, as an explorer of the eye or the perspective of a fictional being. 
When the eyes of Michael K and the foreman lock, it appears that the stare transcends the page and meets 
the eyes, that is, the means of interpretation, of the reader. One could read the following extract as a like 
meeting between worlds. See Chapter Three, pages 70-3 for a discussion of this particular passage.  
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In other words, there is a sense that Age of Iron’s encounter with reality is mediated and 
shaped by a particular psyche – that of a singular, elderly, dying eccentric that regularly 
takes medicine. As a result, Mrs Curren’s psyche is by no means sound, stable or 
objective. Because of this, Age of Iron is infused with eccentric estimations and strange 
metaphors. Note, for example, how the descriptions of Mrs Curren’s suburb are 
sometimes obscured by the air of a drug-induced dream, a reverie frequented by Vercueil, 
her animal-like, ethereal companion and allegorical angel. 
 
It is significant that the shantytown scene itself, however, does not involve Mrs Curren’s 
usual inward focus on her pending death, her complicity in apartheid’s dying regime, as 
well as her consequent lack of authority. This time her gaze is directed outward. 
Although the scene is told in the first person, as in the case of the rest of the narrative, 
Mrs Curren’s voice acquires a somewhat omniscient quality in the shantytown scene, 
enabling the temporary, partial effacement of the subjectivity of her eye, her perspective. 
All the customary allusions to the subjectivity of her own gaze are omitted, which 
produces the illusion of an unmediated, truthful representation of reality.  
 
In conclusion, the self-reflexive and self-doubting statements that pervade the rest of the 
novel are missing from the shantytown scene, only reappearing at its edges. Therefore, 
the characteristic problematisation of objectivity and truth is significantly absent. It 
follows that the shantytown scene captures ‘reality’ in a manner incommensurable with 
the rest of the narrative’s approach.  
 
“The Word-mirror is Broken” 
 
The illusion of this scene’s reality is shattered, along with its containment, when, at the 
scene’s end, someone throws a rock at Mrs Curren’s windscreen. Like Elizabeth 
Costello’s mimetic mirror (Elizabeth Costello 19-20), the transparent window, the frame 
which Mrs Curren has produced to facilitate her daughter and the reader’s observation of 
the ‘reality’ of Bheki’s death, shatters. This alerts the reader to the mediating presence of 
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the frame. Significantly, the smash occurs immediately after Mrs Curren instructs her 
daughter to acknowledge the subjectivity, the particularity of her portrayal: 
 
I tell you the story of this morning mindful that the storyteller, from her 
office, claims the place of right. It is through my eyes that you see; the 
voice that speaks in your head is mine. Through me alone do you find 
yourself here on these desolate flats, smell the smoke in the air, see the 
bodies of the dead, hear the weeping, shiver in the rain …; your heart 
beats with mine. 
… I am the only one. I am the one writing: I, I. So I ask you: attend to the 
writing, not to me. If lies and pleas and excuses weave among the words, 
listen for them. Do not pass them over, do not forgive them easily. Read 
all, even this adjuration, with a cold eye. (95-6) 
 
The shattering of the windscreen, in conjunction with this statement, signals the end of 
the specific containment of realism in Age of Iron. Near its end, the conventions of 
realism are largely abandoned, allowing the narrative to assume its dominant style.  
 
Significantly, the somewhat surreal border of fog and rain, along with the shattered 
windscreen at its conclusion, creates the impression that the selected scene, this realist 
realm – as severed from the totalising space of the novel by borders as well as by 
differences in style and method – is virtually floating at Age of Iron’s centre. Other 
smaller, less significant scenes that also mimic realism’s conventions, like the previously 
mentioned descriptions of Florence’s life outside of Mrs Curren’s house and John’s state 
of mind prior to his arrest, can be perceived as similar enclosures within the narrative as a 
whole. 
 
The context of the selected scene should, therefore, be taken into account before 
proclaiming Age of Iron a paragon of realist literature. Given its dissimilarities with 
regard to the rest of the novel, the shantytown scene cannot be perceived as a microcosm 
of the entire narrative. However, this does not mean Age of Iron projects an “imitative 
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representation” (Head Coetzee 132) by means of which to condemn critical realism. 
Rather, it emphasises that the genre known as literary realism is a technique with insights 
as well as constraints. Realism as well as metafiction are (re)presented, rather, as vantage 
points that are played off against one another, neither of which is renounced or favoured. 
In “[projecting] himself or herself into the gap opened in the discourse by the presence of 
you” (McHale 224) in the letter, the reader circulates in these registers, never settling on 
one, encouraged to interrogate the fictional mode’s limitations.  
 
Therefore, it appears to be impossible to locate Coetzee’s desired denunciation of 
apartheid amongst the various approaches in the novel, given the manner in which Age of 
Iron weaves together different ways of writing, of accessing, constructing and 
experiencing reality. Accurately to represent reality, one would, in the words of Mrs 
Curren, “need the tongue of a god” (91).  
 
In a gesture characteristic of Coetzee’s fiction’s “subtle working together of different 
kinds of narratives” (Nuttall 734), realism’s conventions (its possibilities and limitations) 
are interrogated by means of the containment of the realist scene at Age of Iron’s centre. 
The scene’s frame, therefore, allows for a metafictional “re-examination of the 
possibilities of realism” (Nuttall 733) inherent in its style of representation. Accordingly, 
Age of Iron should be defined as a “self-referring or auto-representational” text that 
“provides, within itself, a commentary on its own status as fiction and as language, and 
also on its own processes of production and reception” (Hutcheon xii). 
 
A Solicited Context: The Debate on Realism 
 
This chapter has provided the textual substantiation necessary to refute the oft-assumed 
claim that Age of Iron can be categorised as an unproblematic or straightforward work of 
realist fiction. In order to demonstrate the particular importance of such a refutation, one 
of the novel’s contexts, that is, South Africa’s foremost literary debate of the 1980s, must 
be evoked.  
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Apartheid South Africa was an era characterised by “alienation” (Morphet 53), separate 
development and passes. The government controlled and inhibited the mobility of South 
African society by creating concrete as well as imaginary boundaries to establish and 
institutionalise various structures or modes of confinement.  
 
Drawing on Bauman, Tony Morphet examines the apartheid regime’s confinement of 
society as a response to modernity’s “construction of social space” (53). Morphet 
suggests that “the insulating boundaries of the premodern world” produced secure 
structures that are now being eradicated by the “expanding cores of the developed world” 
(53), reconstructing societal space in a radically different manner. In other words, as 
globalisation intensifies and development expands, borders are crossed and destroyed, 
leaving the individual and state vulnerable. As a solution to the problem of white 
vulnerability and disempowerment, apartheid’s “thrust”, writes Morphet, “was to produce 
what Graham Pechey has called a countermarch against modernity – driving blacks in 
particular, but whites also, backward into [the] premodern conditions” (54) that exposed 
South African society to the political organization of racial hatred (Reich 17). In response 
to the vulnerability of individual and state in an expanding world, the apartheid 
government constructed concrete and conceptual structures to simulate the illusion of 
insulation that characterised premodern society. 
 
In the mid-1980s, there was a “wave of nationwide unrest” in response to the acts of 
oppression and cruelty engendered by “the government’s ‘total strategy’, involving 
ideological as well as repressive control” (Head Coetzee 131). In the literary realm, this 
confinement instigated the attempts of anti-apartheid authors to “bear witness” (Attwell 
The Politics of Writing 11) and communicate the regime’s atrocities through their 
writing.  
 
In the foreword to Helgesson’s Writing in Crisis (2004), Marais speaks of the “[literary 
text’s] inevitable contamination by the discursive determinants of the cultural and 
historical context from which it emanates”, a contamination which forces one “to 
consider … the ways in which the South African ‘interpretative community’ of the 
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apartheid era was affected by historical forces” (ix). As Helgesson puts it: “we would be 
hard pressed to find any writer or critic at the time who is unaffected by the conflict” 
(12).  
 
Indeed, it is during the intensified pressures of the “siege mentality” (André Brink qtd. in 
Helgesson 1) that South African writers found their imaginative mobility increasingly 
restricted. As a result, oppositional fiction was “plunged … into its worst crisis in years” 
(Nkosi qtd. in Helgesson 1), a crisis that inspired the most prominent literary debate of 
the 1980s. Tony Morphet describes this debate as the “set of exchanges … even a kind of 
battle, over how the conditions of life in South African were (and indeed are) to be 
represented” (54). The heated critical dispute over which route of response should have 
been employed in the liberal novel – a debate essentially about “literary representation, 
artistic integrity and political responsibility” (Marais “Foreword” ix) – took place 
between two main groups. In fact, the majority of oppositional ‘white writers’ were 
divided into the “heavily polarized positions” (Marais “Foreword” ix) of either the 
oppositional realists who used works of ‘real’ fiction as “instruments of revolution in 
South Africa” (Monson 259) and the aestheticists who maintained that fiction belonged to 
a different order than that of witnessed ‘truth’. At the time, Gordimer’s fiction was 
proclaimed the foremost embodiment of South African realism, and Coetzee’s narratives, 
the epitome of self-reflexive aestheticism.36
 
  
As the discussion of realism in Age of Iron demonstrates, Coetzee’s fiction appears to be 
inclined toward a refutation of this genre’s attempted reconstruction of reality. Not 
surprisingly, given his fiction’s contrary manner of addressing the South African situation 
by means of a “non-realistic, self-referential fiction that constantly highlights its own 
unreliability” (Gallagher 44; Gallagher qtd. in Head Coetzee 9), Coetzee’s novels have 
given rise to somewhat resentful criticisms by the supporters of realism. Many such 
                                                 
36 Helgesson warns that the view of Gordimer and Coetzee’s positions “as a neat antithetical pair … risks 
eliding a crucial point of resonance: the fact that both of them address the relation between history and 
writing, and that both find this relation problematic as well as potentially rewarding” (15). In a similar 
sense, the heavy polarisation of the two factions “did not allow for much in the way of clear thinking – for 
a recognition, for instance, of the point … that is, that form has content, is always political, and that content 
is, in fact, constituted by form” (Marais “Foreword” ix).  
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critics specifically cite Gordimer’s critique of the fiction of “those South African writers 
who … failed to engage history in a like manner” (Gallagher 8), fiction that is perceived 
by “many writers, and many more readers … as a form of political and ethical evasion” 
(Attwell The Politics of Writing 11). According to Parry, “Coetzee’s fiction … might 
perhaps even be seen as turning its face from Africa” (162).  
 
The question of Age of Iron’s particular response to these contexts of confinement has 
been tackled by many literary critics. Does the novel turn its face from, or does it rather 
embrace South Africa and its history? One can argue that the text does indeed solicit such 
an interrogation, given Mrs Curren’s evident engagement with the reality of apartheid. 
However, in their eagerness to find traces of oppositional realism in Coetzee’s novels, 
many significant aspects, like Age of Iron’s particular interrogation of this discursive 
register, have been overlooked. 
 
Realism as Literary Ideology  
 
Instead of mirroring the stratagems of oppositional realism to ‘bear witness’ to the 
‘reality’ of apartheid, Coetzee’s fiction, in general, demonstrates a more nuanced 
“postmodern preoccupation with the violence of representation” (Jolly xiii), which can be 
related directly to “the suppression of difference” (Jolly 1). Writing from an environment 
characterised by concrete and conceptual confinement, Coetzee appears to have decided 
to engage with the concept of limitation (as a metaphor for narrativisation) itself, rather 
than risk reproducing and enforcing similar structures through his writing. The 
“ambiguity and ambivalence of the speaking positions of his narrators” (Kossew 4) and 
protagonists demonstrate an acute awareness of “the violations that established categories 
of thought can enact upon … a fictional body” (Jolly 2), especially with regard to a white 
writer’s potential suppression of (black) other’s difference. 
 
In a characteristic dismantling of fictional devices, Age of Iron, specifically, draws 
attention to the stratagems employed by literary realism in order to examine the 
“imposition of single, authoritative meaning” (Hutcheon xiii) that accompanies this 
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mode. Turning to a “self-conscious narrative form that enacts problems of authorship and 
authority, freedom and determination, and the colonizing nature of language itself” 
(Gikandi 118-9), Age of Iron suggests a concern with the manner in which realism, “a 
literary ideology” according to Barthes, “tends to conceal the socially relative or 
structured nature of language” (Eagleton 135-6). In the words of Terry Eagleton: 
 
[t]he ‘healthy’ sign, for Barthes, is one which draws attention to its own 
arbitrariness – which does not try to palm itself off as ‘natural’ but which, 
in the very moment of conveying a meaning, communicates something of 
its own relative, artificial status as well. The impulse behind this belief in 
the earlier work is a political one: signs which pass themselves off as 
natural, which offer themselves as the only conceivable way of viewing 
the world, are by that token authoritarian and ideological. Ideology seeks 
to convert culture into Nature, and the ‘natural’ sign is one of its weapons. 
(135) 
 
Kavanagh also emphasises realism’s ideological implications, stressing that “‘realism’ … 
can … be understood as the paradigmatic form of ideology … It has the function of 
producing an obvious ‘reality’ that social subjects can assume and accept, precisely as if 
it had not been socially produced and did not need to be ‘known’ at all” (311). In its 
general “resistance to the hegemonic oppression of imperial power, whatever form that 
may take” (Kossew 7), Coetzee’s fiction draws attention to the ideological implications 
of realism’s negation of the subjective mediation of its perspective.  
 
By bringing the shantytown scene’s frame, and consequently the subjectivity and 
constructedness of the perspective, into focus, Coetzee does not evade his responsibility 
as a South African writer as many critics have claimed, but, rather, reveals and 
problematises the limitations, in other words, the constraints and possibilities, of the 
responsible gesture itself.  
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The Solicited Frame: Containment versus Confinement 
 
In the preceding discussion, I have hoped to illustrate the importance of boundaries in the 
shantytown scene’s performance, especially in that this instance of realism brings the gap 
between reality and its epistolary representation, so often underscored by Mrs Curren’s 
self-reflexive eye/I, to a near close. Not only does Mrs Curren cross numerous borders to 
reach Bheki’s body, she is forced to expand her limited awareness of the reality of 
apartheid as well. When the shattering of the windscreen brings the shantytown scene to 
its end, it becomes apparent that Mrs Curren’s perspective has been altered irreparably. 
“[N]umb in body and soul” (99), she asks herself: “Have I ever been fully awake? … A 
doll’s life? Is that what I have lived?” (100). The expansion of the conceptual and 
concrete borderlines which confined her to a state of ignorance places Mrs Curren, then, 
in a position to start questioning the validity and authority of her narration. The 
experience, although it distresses and disheartens her, nevertheless prompts a comparison 
with Goethe’s vagabond: 
 
who, after his aimless migrations, returns home to his family, only to find 
with them the bliss he had sought throughout his wanderings. This migrant 
explorer has gained the ability to see his ‘home’ with new eyes and to 
experience his limited realm with new values, because he found that in his 
effort at overcoming the borderline which hemmed him in he was merely 
expanding it. (Von Molnar 230) 
 
Thus far, I have invoked the language of demarcation in order to demonstrate that Age of 
Iron deploys conceptual and concrete boundaries, at the level of plot and imagery, to 
enable its interrogation of realism’s limits and limitations. This interrogation employs and 
engages with the concept of delimitation, a concept which can be said to characterise 
Coetzee’s oeuvre in its entirety. It follows that this text, along with Life & Times of 
Michael K’s explicit imagery as will be identified in the next chapter, can be said to 
prompt a framework that foregrounds and problematises this concern with the productive, 
as well as reductive, manifestations of delineation in Coetzee’s fiction. The following 
41 
 
consideration of the shades of meaning contained by this concept will shape the frame, 
the lens, through which I shall read – and, in fact, already have read – Coetzee’s texts in 
the remainder of the thesis. 
 
The individual perceives the world as a constellation of defined objects, identified and 
rendered meaningful by being outlined. Definition is one of the essential components of 
perception. Given that to ‘define’ means to “give meaning of”, “describe scope of” or 
“outline; mark out the boundary of” (Elliott 189) one might say that without definition, 
without the individual’s ability to mark out the boundaries of the world and its objects, 
he/she would be unable to describe its scope and meaning. Without the ability to separate 
the world into objects, the individual would be lost in a fog of ignorance.  
 
The act of delimitation plays a crucial part in the reading and interpretation of the world, 
and one of its most intriguing embodiments; the literary text. Only by marking out the 
boundary of a text can its range and possibilities be determined; only by marking out the 
boundary of a word, distinguishing it from all others, can its meaning be established. One 
might infer that a text, in the words of Percy Bysshe Shelley, is “at once the centre and 
the circumference; the point to which all things are referred, and the line in which all 
things are contained” (476).  
 
As a cartographer’s imposition of boundaries turns a vast land into localities, the reader’s 
interpretation transforms the extent of the page’s potential meanings into a particular 
narrative. Given that every reading is located within a unique context, each interpretation, 
each evaluation yields a different narrative, a different bounded space or state. It follows 
that every literary critique perceives and generates a singular landscape, the boundaries of 
which may or may not coincide with other interpretations. Therefore, it is impossible to 
determine the precise borders of a novel’s landscape, given that it is the act of reading, 
the act of interpretation that defines the provisional, ever fluctuating margins of its textual 
localities.  
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Although literary realism, as a discursive register, imposes a fixed limit or boundary in its 
authoritative representation of reality, the metafictional strategies employed by Age of 
Iron as a whole, rather, have been shown to draw a more flexible delineation – given the 
manner in which these strategies bring the act of narrativisation, the fictional 
perspective’s frame – into focus. In order to distinguish these two types of delineation in 
Coetzee’s fiction, I have chosen to employ the terms, ‘containment’ and ‘confinement’.  
 
Defined (in other words, delimited and identified) by The Oxford Paperback Dictionary 
and Thesaurus as the “action or policy of preventing expansion of hostile country or 
influence” (Elliott 155), ‘containment’ (the act of containing) is more often than not 
employed to describe the destruction or the prevention of the movement or expansion of 
(1) a hostile country or influence, (2) a disease, (3) radioactive material, or (4) conflict or 
unrest. ‘Containment’ was initially employed as the name given to the overall theory 
underlying United States policy towards the Soviet Union China during the Cold War 
which aimed to isolate these countries and to block Communist expansion in the world. 
 
Taking this definition into account, ‘confinement’ (the act of confining) seems a 
straightforward synonym for ‘containment’. Confinement’s verb, ‘to confine’, can be 
defined as an action that “imprison[s]” or “keep[s] or restrict[s] within certain limits” 
(Elliott 149). Therefore, at first, a clear, unambiguous relation appears between 
definitions of ‘confine’, ‘confinement’ and ‘containment’. However, these denotations 
are problematised when one allows the varied meanings of containment’s verb, ‘to 
contain’, to come into play.   
 
Elliott demarcates ‘contain’ as an action that is capable of “holding within itself”, that 
“include[s], comprise[s]; prevent[s] from moving or extending” and “control[s]” or 
“restrain[s]” (155). Here, ‘contain’ appears to be not only a restrictive force but also an 
enabling influence. Does ‘flesh’ not contain body; womb, baby; wall, home; and 
sentence, significance?37
                                                 
37 Here, the term, ‘flesh’, is exercised in accordance with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the 
“intertwined layers of body and world” (Salamon 101).  
 The self, for example, can only exist as a container of 
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consciousness; similarly, the body owes its existence to its containment by an envelope of 
flesh; a child’s identity is reliant on the realisation that she is a whole and contained 
entity, disconnected from her mother (if one follows Lacan); a country is comprised of 
geographical boundaries, in the same manner that a society is dependent on laws to unite 
and contain individuals to maintain order; in addition, language is delineation. One of the 
most apparent examples of containment in Age of Iron can be found in the manner in 
which the novel contains or encloses realism as a register which enables a performance of 
its limits and possibilities. On the other hand, an instance of confinement in Age of Iron 
can be traced to the manner in which Mrs Curren’s judgments reduce and restrict the 
alterity of the other. 
 
Thus, whereas ‘confine’ presupposes an authoritative subject imposing a restrictive force 
upon a precarious object, ‘contain’ presupposes such an imposition but includes a 
subject’s fostering embrace of an object. Consider, for example, the manner in which a 
state power ‘contains’ its citizens, in both meanings of the term, in that it restricts, 
represses and forecloses (therefore, ‘confines’) but does so in order to uphold order and 
security (ideally).  
 
Therefore, although ‘confinement’ and ‘containment’ seem synonymous, ‘containment’ 
is the stronger of the two when the significances of the respective verbs, ‘to confine’ and 
‘to contain’, come into play. Otherwise stated, confinement is a type of containment. 
Whereas Elizabeth Curren’s body can be said to contain but also to confine her soul, for 
example, Anna K’s suitcase contains but does not confine its contents. 
 
Given this thesis’s deployment of ‘containment’ as a conceptual tool to facilitate its 
consideration of the concept of delimitation in Coetzee’s texts, the denotations of 
‘containment’ must be divided into two camps for the purposes of clarity. On the one 
hand, ‘confine’, ‘restrain’, ‘restrict’ and ‘imprison’ are grouped together under the 
subheading ‘confinement’. Henceforth the dissertation will refer to this group, in other 
words, as that which signifies containment’s destructive dimension, with the terms 
‘confinement’ and ‘confine’. On the other hand, ‘hold’, ‘include’, ‘comprise’ and ‘foster’ 
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will be grouped together, signifying ‘containment’s constructive dimension or, in the 
words of Von Molnar, “the positive values which may be derived from limitation” (226-
7), under the status of ‘containment’ and ‘contain’. It follows that ‘containment’ is now 
purged of its destructive dimension, a dimension which will henceforth be identified with 
‘confinement’. 
 
Having made the distinction between containment and confinement, I could only find one 
other article that draws a similar boundary, that is, Géza von Molnar’s “Confinement or 
Containment: Goethe’s Werther and the Concept of Limitation”, written in 1970. Von 
Molnar considers two forms of the German word, ‘Einschränkung’, using the English 
term, ‘confinement’, for “its negative implication” and ‘containment’ “for its positive 
complement” (226). According to Von Molnar, “[t]here is, to be sure, the expected 
negative version which emphasizes the purely restrictive aspects of limitation, but a more 
positive complement occurs with equal frequency” (226). As discussed by Forest Pyle 
with regard to Wordsworth’s poetry, a similar distinction can be made between “writing 
as enshrinement and writing as entombment” (60).  
 
These two terms are employed by this study, in the first instance, to identify two types of 
reading. The act of reading, as inevitably entangled in the workings of language, is an act 
of definition, referring to the manner in which delimitation – the establishment of 
concrete and conceptual boundaries – enables signification. These boundaries are 
responsible for the generation of the forces under discussion, that is, containment and 
confinement. The type of boundary determines the force exerted. Where a permeable 
boundary will contain the space it demarcates, given that it enables an interrelationship 
between the interior of the contained space and its exterior – in other words between text 
and context, text and intertext, text and reader, as well as text and author – an 
impermeable, rigid boundary will rather confine and restrict such an exchange. Von 
Molnar, for example, describes true containment as a “balanced interplay” (232) between 
“the finite and the unlimited” (231), subject and object (233), and “part and whole” (233), 
in other words, as a “free and harmonious equilibrium between the realms of human 
limitation and infinite longing” (233).  
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Timothy Francis Strode, in his development of “an interpretative framework for 
discerning ethical forms within territorial representations, including works of narrative 
fiction” (vii), supplements the distinction I am making between containment and 
confinement with a comparable differentiation between Levinasian and Heideggerian 
dwelling. The “totalizing horizon” (Strode 7) of Heidegger’s “enrooted dwelling or 
property” (Strode 6) “requires the shutting out of all that is foreign to its identity ... to 
maintain the clarity of its objects” (Strode 37). In other words, “in its relations with 
alterity”, Heidegger’s subject endeavours to confine or “possess alterity, to remove 
alterity’s resistance and otherness, and to convert this difference to samenesss” (Strode 
17). Levinas’s conception opposes the notion of Heideggerian dwelling with “an essential 
uprootedness” (Strode 4) or “dwelling-as-wandering” (Strode 5) that “situate[s] ethics at 
the heart of intersubjective relations”, a stance which can be aligned with containment. 
 
As one reads, delimits and identifies, one is presented, especially with reference to 
Coetzee’s writing, with an ethical imperative: a choice between limits which will 
determine either the confinement (the possession) or the containment (an intersubjective, 
reciprocal engagement with the alterity) of the text; either the imprisonment or the 
problematisation and intensification of its play of meaning.38
 
 Speaking in extremes, one 
might say that, ultimately, the act of reading will either leave the text in the “geography 
of … variety” (Easton 5), or drive it into the order of the same.  
This chapter has endeavoured to illustrate the extent to which a close analysis can give 
rise to the frame that facilitates the examination of that same text. Whereas certain critics 
frame their arguments with the textually unsubstantiated assumption that Age of Iron is a 
realist representation of apartheid, this section has enclosed its consideration of realism 
within a frame constituted instead by textual substantiation. In proving that this work of 
fiction actually interrogates the stratagems of certain discursive registers, of which 
realism is the primary instance, it does allow for a different, more responsible 
interpretation than that of a study framed by a presupposed context.  
                                                 
38 Marais also associates the act of reading with choice (The Novel 15).  
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Criticism as Containment   
 
It must be noted that I do not denounce contextualisation in the least. My introductory 
chapter offered a critique of various contextualisations in order to differentiate between 
two main types of introductory delimitation: a predetermined, unsubstantiated 
framework, on the one hand, and a responsible, reciprocal engagement that is prompted 
by the text itself, on the other. As suggested by this discussion, a literary analysis should 
not feel the need to explain, reduce or dilute the indeterminacy of Coetzee’s singular 
works of fiction. This thesis proposes a style of reading – from a range of other 
alternatives – that, rather, hopes to supplement and intensify the text’s freeplay of 
meaning in accordance with the internal logics or codes of that same text. The interaction 
between the critic and Coetzee’s fictional text, if read closely and responsibly, can 
generate the framework that will facilitate its interpretation. In the words of Von Molnar 
“[s]uch free interaction without usurpation characterizes the positive aspect of limitation; 
it characterizes the concept of containment” (229). Of course, as this chapter has argued, 
a boundless encounter between critic and text is impossible. Nevertheless, the critic can 
choose which type of boundary to draw in his/her conversation with the narrative. 
 
The concept of delimitation can be extrapolated fairly unproblematically from Life & 
Times of Michael K given the explicit images of confinement that will be examined in the 
following chapter, initially drawn attention to by Graham’s paper on the concentration 
camps in Life & Times, “‘It is hard to keep out of the camps’: Areas of confinement in the 
fiction of J.M. Coetzee” (2005). Though not as overt in Life & Times, Age of Iron also 
appears to engage with this concept at the level of plot, especially, as this chapter has 
demonstrated by way of a close reading of the enclosed shantytown scene. Elizabeth 
Costello, on the other hand, will be shown to resist my framework’s attempts at 
translating some of its concerns into the language of the limit, forcing this paradigm to 
encounter its own limits and limitations. Finally, a consideration of four critical essays in 
Doubling the Point’s “Poetics of Reciprocity” will conclude the consideration of 
containment in Coetzee’s fiction with an examination of the strategies deployed by his 
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criticism. All of the ensuing chapters relate the concept of limitation deployed in the 
fictional texts to the style of reading, the type of delineation, solicited by these texts. As a 
result, the study aims to delineate a way in which literary criticism can, without becoming 
obsolete, embrace the sense of bewilderment that accompanies any type of engagement 
with Coetzee’s texts.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
“A LIFE LIVED IN CAGES”: THE READER AND  
CONFINEMENT IN LIFE & TIMES OF MICHAEL K 
 
[People] want me to open my heart and tell them the story of a life lived in 
cages. They want to hear about all the cages I have lived in, as if I were a 
budgie or a white mouse or a monkey. (Life & Times of Michael K 247) 
 
I first encountered the term, ‘confinement’, in relation to Coetzee in an unpublished 
conference paper by Lucy Graham, “‘It is hard to keep out of the camps’: Areas of 
confinement in the fiction of J.M. Coetzee” (2005). Opening with a similar quotation 
from Life & Times of Michael K, “What I have learned of life tells me that it is hard to 
keep out of the camps”, Graham’s paper considers the different camps, the “different 
circles of hell” (4), in Life & Times of Michael K especially, mentioning that “images of 
the camp resonate throughout Coetzee’s most recent fiction” (5). Although this thesis 
considers a variety of concrete and conceptual camps as well, it rather places 
predominant emphasis on the relationship between reader and literary text, which is 
examined in terms of two forms of delimitation, confinement and containment. While, in 
the paper’s conclusion, Graham draws a link between “public speech and (en)closure … 
between confession and incarceration” (5) and, therefore, could perhaps be taken to hint 
at the relationship between language and confinement, she does not develop this notion 
further. In addition, given the paper’s explicit examination of confinement, the 
constructive aspect of delimitation, what I call containment, is not acknowledged. 
 
The title of my thesis, “A Life Lived in Cages”, derives inspiration from the pivotal 
passage (quoted above) in J.M. Coetzee’s fourth novel, Life & Times of Michael K 
(1983), where, near the end of the novel, the protagonist, Michael K, “is made to reflect” 
(Dovey 271) on the question of putting a life, a history, a reality into words, and 
transforming it into a story about perpetual imprisonment in a variety of concrete and 
conceptual cages. 
 
Michael K compares himself to three pet (and caged) animals, known for their 
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performances of entertaining tricks: budgies, white mice and monkeys. This comparison, 
importantly, associates the act of reading, the act of receiving the story, with the reader’s 
requirement of a caged performance from the story’s characters, reducing the act of 
reading to a degrading and ridiculing voyeurism.  
 
According to Teresa Dovey, “[i]n Life & Times of Michael K there are repeated 
references to this need to translate the random and chaotic quality of the lived experience 
of the victim into the form of a story” (271). The quotation expresses Michael K’s 
opposition to such a translation, given that the conversion of life into story will imprison 
and confine his immeasurable life to a linguistic cage. As a result, Michael K’s elusive 
life resists delimitation and “eludes representation”, whilst his body “refuses to be 
‘embodied’ in the meaning of the text” (Dovey 301).39
 
 It appears that K is the victim of 
textual confinement, forced to sacrifice his agency, his significance and his ‘being’ to the 
desires of the text:  
[i]f, in the mode of realism, Michael K is the victim of an oppressive and 
exploitative system, in the mode of text construction he is the victim of a 
hierarchy of authorities, which range from the structural needs of the 
narrative and the prescribed codes of the genre, to the desire of both writer 
and reader, and to the ultimate author-ity of the discursive context, of 
language as Other. (Dovey 267) 
 
However, as will be explained in this chapter, Life & Times solicits such a confining 
interpretation from the reader as part of a performance of delimitation’s reductive 
dimension, that is, confinement. The performance of confinement, in fact, alerts the 
reader to the dangers of imposing rigid limits on the text and, in the process, reveals the 
                                                 
39 Of course, Michael K’s struggle, like his being, is of a textual nature. Yet, the more K resists 
narrativisation, an act which exists as, or in the, text only, the more ‘real’ or extratextual he seems to 
become in the reader’s mind.  
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potential for containment instead.40
 
 Therefore, although Michael K is continuously 
subjected to the reader’s act of delimitation, he does not have to be confined by it.  
In the previous chapter, I discussed the extent to which interpretation (which I equate 
with the act of reading) can be related to the establishment of the boundaries that enable 
signification.41 Here, it becomes apparent that the act of reading inevitably necessitates 
delimitation. The text, however, can present the reader or critic with a choice between 
types of reading: types of delimitations which either reductively confine or productively 
contain and enable the text’s depth, fullness and vibrancy.42
  
To be precise, Life & Times of Michael K brings into play the reader’s choice between 
confinement and containment. The novel produces an ethical imperative by 
simultaneously exploiting and exposing the manner in which textual indeterminacies 
solicit numerous interpretations. Thus, what attests to Life & Times’s particular relevance 
to an examination of the nature of Coetzee’s oeuvre is, in fact, the manner in which it 
solicits such decisions by means of indeterminacy at the level of character and 
narrative.
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40 The ‘reader’, here, is “a function implicit in the text, an element of the narrative situation. No specific 
real person is meant; the reader has only a diegetic identity and an active diegetic role to play” (Hutcheon 
139). In Life & Times, “the reader or the act of reading itself … become thematized parts of the narrative 
situation, acknowledged as having a co-producing function” (Hutcheon 37). 
 Otherwise stated, the reader is compelled either to confine the text’s potential 
in preferring one above all other interpretations or, rather, to contain, celebrate and 
amplify the text’s ambiguous dimensions. 
41 Paul de Man describes reading as “an act … that separates from the undifferentiated mass of facts and 
events, the distinctive elements susceptible of entering into the composition of a text. This occurs by means 
of a process of elision, transformation, and accentuation that bears close resemblance to the practice of 
critical understanding” (Allegories of Reading 57, my emphasis). Reading, therefore, necessitates a choice, 
a foregrounding of one or a couple of interpretations above others.  
42 This thesis does not suggest that there are two types of interpretation only. In terms of the study’s 
conceptualisation of reading as delimitation – which, it must be noted, is only one aspect of the act of or 
one way of considering reading – only two categories emerge: containment and confinement. The 
discussion of these two concepts should also not be taken as an establishment of a binary opposition. 
Firstly, both concepts are subdivisions of delimitation and should not be perceived as polar opposites. 
Secondly, in their rigid polarisation, binaries lead to confinement. The thesis employs these concepts not to 
confine the text’s potential, but, rather, to arrive at a manner in which a critical analysis can contain a text.  
43 Helgesson also observes that the “‘open-endedness’ of K is precisely what invites us to produce new 
readings”. He goes even further to “claim that the only way to be ‘true’ to Life & Times is to continually 
produce an array of heterogeneous readings and thus obstruct the construction of a singular truth about the 
novel” (187). 
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In other words, it is the invitation of a delimiting, constitutive choice that involves the 
reader in the staging of one of the novel’s motifs, that is to say, reading as a choice 
between containment and confinement. In addition, the reader’s choice, my choice, can be 
perceived as an extension or manifestation of this significant concern. All readings of Life 
& Times are, therefore, extensions of and supplements to the text, partaking in the novel’s 
problematising performance of interpretation. All readings of the novel, in being 
interpretations solicited by the text that perform one of its motifs, are contained by its 
framework, its cage. Otherwise stated, given the manner in which the text solicits certain 
readings and manipulates interpretation in its generation of meaning, the reader is 
subjected to its wishes, its literary codes. In a post-colonial context, a reading that, in a 
sense, colonises this specific novel could, then, be perceived as a colony of its (master) 
narrative. My chapter on Life & Times is as much a textual construction, an extension of 
the text’s performance of interpretation and meaning, as the figure of the protagonist, 
Michael K – each signifying a brief ‘life lived in cages’. This study thus implicates me in 
the text’s performance.  
 
The novel achieves this subtle yet powerful consideration of the various guises of 
limitation by exploiting not only the constative but also the performative faces of 
language.44
                                                 
44 I use the terms, ‘constative’ and ‘performative’, as employed by Derrida.  
 Constatively, the text expresses a concern with the concept of limitation. 
Performatively, in the interpretation of the text, the reader is invited to concretise this 
concern by, in fact, defining and delimiting that same text. This aids the development of 
the narrative’s subtle yet powerful interrogation of the means of interpretation. As stated, 
Life & Times bears, as one of its motifs, the problematisation of the act of interpretation 
or, more specifically, the difficulties inherent in the relationship between signification 
and delimitation. In particular, the medical officer’s confinement of Michael K’s meaning 
and being, as represented by the section on Michael K’s stay in the infirmary of the 
Kenilworth rehabilitation camp, Section II, guides the reader into a moment of self-
reflexivity regarding his own interpretation of Michael K, the novel, as well as Michael 
K, the character. 
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Consequently, this chapter, following the style of reading elaborated in the previous 
chapter, will argue for a critical containment of Life & Times that accounts for the manner 
in which the reader is implicated in the performance of one of its motifs, that is to say, 
reading as an act of delimitation. I embark on this journey, this reading of the novel, by 
examining the manner in which Michael K experiences these spaces of confinement (as 
well as of containment) through his senses, through his skin, to arrive at an understanding 
of the nature of K’s intense internalisation of the restrictive forces that surround him. 
This is but one constituent of K’s elusive character as the ensuing subsection illustrates in 
its initial identification of the main types of indeterminacy located in the novel and a 
corresponding explanation of how each style generates opposing interpretations that lend 
the novel its air of elusiveness. Furthermore, the particular manner in which textual 
indeterminacies solicit an interpretation from the reader is considered in accordance with 
the medical officer’s conceptual confinement of K’s significance. The argument then 
draws a link between the medical officer’s interpretation of K in the narrative and the 
reader’s interpretation of the narrative in its explication of the self’s choice between 
containment and confinement in the face of the elusive other. In conclusion, the 
interpretative choice is considered in terms of Derrida’s notion of supplementarity to 
place conclusive emphasis on the text’s performance of the act of definition and the 
ethical gesture it solicits.  
 
Defining the Spaces in and of the Narrative  
 
In the words of Dominic Head, the title of Life & Times of Michael K:  
 
alludes directly to a tradition of thinking about individual identity in 
relation to history – ‘The Life and Times’ – which is represented in a 
variety of genres, including the historical novel and the Bildungsroman … 
Life and Times of Michael K proclaims itself as having an involvement 
with this tradition in which the individual life is held to interact intimately 
with social and political development. (Coetzee 93) 
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With this statement in mind, the title, as the reader’s first engagement with the text, 
prepares the reader for a fictional biography, an account of a significant individual life 
intimately shaped by its social and political milieu. In terms of my frame of reference, 
this novel tells the story of singular man’s quest for containment in an era fraught with 
conflict and confinement. Schooled in Huis Norenius, a strict institution for unfortunate 
children in Faure, Michael K is taught silence and obedience, character traits he hides 
behind when faced with unyielding authority. 
 
Indeed, K’s life can be defined as a series of encounters with the persistent and invasive 
onslaught of power in its various guises. For example, after Huis Norenius, during his 
journey to Prince Albert and, then, in his evasion of the authorities, K faces a 
constellation of actual or concrete structures of confinement, such as the Somerset, 
Stellenbosch, Prince Albert and Kenilworth hospitals, Anna K’s room under the stairs at 
the Côte d’Azur, forced labour at Touws River, the Jakkalsdrif resettlement camp, and 
the rehabilitation camp at Kenilworth. These camps or confinements can all be read as 
manifestations or embodiments of the military, the police, and the government, and even 
medical personnel’s wielding of state power. According to Graham, “[w]hat is 
remarkable about Michael K, whose increasingly skeletal protagonist finds himself twice 
interned in concentration camps, is the linking of mere life and the space of the camp to 
colonialism, war, and state racism” (3). 
  
Michael K’s life is thus represented as intricately entwined with the conditions of war and 
its forms of confinement. At the novel’s conclusion, K mentions the manner in which war 
has divided the landscape into a variety of camps: 
 
Now they have camps for children whose parents run away, camps for 
people who kick and foam at the mouth, camps for people with big heads 
and people with little heads, camps for people with no visible means of 
support, camps for people chased off the land, camps for people they find 
living in storm-water drains, camps for street girls, camps for people who 
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can’t add two and two, camps for people who forget their papers at home, 
camps for people who live in the mountains and blow up bridges in the 
night. Perhaps the truth is that it is enough to be out of the camps, out of 
all the camps at the same time. Perhaps that is enough of an achievement, 
for the time being. How many people are there left who are neither locked 
up nor standing guard at the gate? (249) 
 
As suggested by this meditation on the confined state of being and life that accompanies 
times of war, Life & Times of Michael K does indeed tell ‘the story of a life lived in 
cages’. In reading the novel, the reader accompanies K through and consequently delimits 
a variety of concrete and conceptual spaces, some of which resemble confined cages, 
others, contained enclosures. It appears, therefore, that the novel is saturated with images 
of confinement, as well as of containment, which will be discussed shortly. However, 
before I launch my examination of the most significant concrete and conceptual spaces in 
and of Life & Times, allow me first to clarify the concepts, ‘concrete’ and ‘conceptual’, in 
terms of this thesis’s vocabulary.  
 
I use the term ‘concrete spaces’ to refer to structures that are constituted by material, 
tangible boundaries: actual buildings composed of walls, camps composed of fences, and 
gardens composed of furrows. As revealed in Chapter One, it is the type of boundary that 
determines the nature of the space. Where limits are impermeable and rigid, a destructive, 
restrictive and thus confined space comes into being. The various concrete cages that 
confine K, of which the Jakkalsdrif and Kenilworth camps are leading examples, are 
defined by their impenetrable, oppressive borders. Permeable limits, on the other hand, 
produce a constructive, nurtured and, in other words, contained space. K’s cave in the 
mountains, as well as his burrow on the farm, for example, serve as a demonstration of 
delimitation’s enabling and fostering capabilities. 
 
‘Conceptual spaces’ refer to configurations constituted by abstract, intangible boundaries. 
Conceptual spaces of confinement are established by unyielding delimitations which 
exert power in various guises. In the novel, tradition, wealth and legislation, for example, 
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define the patriarchal power of Visagie, the white grandson, whilst violence and 
legislation define the authority of the military. Conceptual spaces of containment, on the 
other hand, are defined by flexible, accommodating boundaries. Privilege and sympathy, 
for example, can be said to put forth or define the fostering faculty that is charity: “His 
heart was full, he wanted to utter his thanks, but finally the right words would not 
come”.45
 
 As stated, conceptual spaces are somewhat entangled with their concrete 
counterparts, given that material spaces like Jakkalsdrif can often be perceived as the 
concretisation or manifestation of conceptual spaces like the military’s authority.  
As the discussion of his movement through a variety of such spaces of confinement will 
demonstrate, K resists in a singular manner the different categories of captivity, whether 
imposed by other characters, the medical officer or the reader. Where he is unable to find 
or create a constructive space of containment – of which the Karoo vegetable garden is a 
moving example – he transforms his body into an impermeable solitary and secret 
structure of containment. In other words, where he is unable to escape confinement in all 
its guises, he transforms his body into an indeterminate element which resists attempts at 
delineation. At the pivot of these confining spaces stands K, his body, mind and soul 
compressed by confinement: “I am becoming smaller and harder and drier every day” 
(93) he thinks in the Karoo cave. It follows that K is defined not only by the concrete and 
conceptual spaces in the narrative, but also by the reader’s interpretation of the entire 
narrative itself. 
 
The following subsection, “Sensing Space”, explores K’s fabled journey through concrete 
and conceptual, confined and contained spaces in the narrative, calling specific attention 
to the manner in which his character is shaped by these environments. A later section, 
“The Power of Supplementation”, on the other hand, considers the manner in which K 
also travels through the conceptual space of the narrative where he is exposed to the 
reader’s decisive act of delimitation.  
                                                 
45 Although K accepts some acts of charity with gratitude, there are similar gestures he considers but 
another form of confinement: “I have escaped the camps; perhaps if I lie low, I will escape the charity too” 
(249). Helgesson mentions Marais’s claim “that Michael K … is ultimately ‘held hostage’ by the ethical 
imperative of caring” (188).  
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Sensing Space  
 
Confinement and containment have been shown to resemble forces or influences exerted 
by different types of boundaries. Although some of the structures of containment or 
confinement might be concrete or material, the forces their borders exude are as 
intangible yet perceptible as the following three metaphorical pairs deployed in the novel: 
sound and silence, light and shadow, and heaviness and lightness. According to Graham, 
Life & Times displays “an intense focus on bodily sensations” (3). Michael K does indeed 
perceive or rather senses the spaces through which he moves instinctually, intuitively 
and, above all, corporeally. His body is portrayed as an accumulation of all five senses – 
vision, audition, tactition, gestation and olfaction – which develop as the narrative 
progresses. In fact, the teaspoon – the definitive image of containment because of its 
striking facilitation of K’s independence, as founded on his reciprocal relationship with 
the land – is directly related to assimilation and taste: 
 
And if the old man climbed out of the cart and stretched himself (things 
were gathering pace now) and looked at where the pump had been that the 
soldiers had blown up so that nothing should be left standing, and 
complained, saying ‘What are we going to do about water?’, he, Michael 
K, would produce a teaspoon from his pocket, a teaspoon and a long roll 
of string. He would clear the rubble from the mouth of the shaft, he would 
bend the handle of the teaspoon in a loop and tie the string to it, he would 
lower it down the shaft deep into the earth, and when he brought it up 
there would be water in the bowl of the spoon; and in that way, he would 
say, one can live. (250)46
 
 
                                                 
46 According to Graham, the teaspoon “gives [K] sustenance … and by the end of the novel in K’s 
imagination the teaspoon has been retrieved to become the meagre tool by which ‘one can live’, asserting 
humanity and life (however spare), over the negations of the camp and the work of death perpetrated by 
war” (2). She also states that it is the teaspoon that, in pointing to the harelip, “makes [K] ‘other than’ fully 
human” (2). 
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This section will trace the manner in which K seems to feel confinement, to absorb it 
through his skin, by way of his senses: 
 
‘There was music all afternoon and all evening, till eight o’clock. It was 
like oil over everything.’ ‘The music was to keep you calm, … to soothe 
your savage breast.’ … ‘The music made me restless,’ he said. ‘I used to 
fidget, I couldn’t think my own thoughts. … I used to think about flying. I 
always wanted to fly. I used to stretch out my arms and think I was flying 
over the fences and between the houses. I flew low over people’s heads, 
but they couldn’t see me. When they switched on the music I became too 
restless to do it, to fly.’ (182) 
 
This extract uses music as a metaphor for the intangible yet influential force of 
confinement as orchestrated by the concrete walls of Huis Norenius. Because of his 
disfigurement and supposed slow mind, Michael spends his childhood confined to this 
school. Within its concrete walls, he is also subjected to an accompanying conceptual 
structure of confinement: “the list of rules on the door of the dormitory” he calls his 
“father” (143), a rigid and unforgiving disciplining authority that terrifies him into 
numbness.47
 
 This authority, aimed at taming, disciplining and restricting self-
determination, is oppressive and stifling ‘like oil over everything’. It weighs down K’s 
daydreams of flying freely over the concrete and conceptual fences that enclose him.  
At fifteen, K leaves the school and works, first, for the Parks and Gardens division of the 
municipal services of the City of Cape Town as Gardener and, then, at Greenmarket 
Square’s public lavatories as a night attendant. The lavatories are described in terms of 
the oppressive “brilliant neon light that shone off the white tiles and created a space 
without shadows” (5). Later in K’s life, in Touws River, he again faces an oppressive 
                                                 
47 “He remembered Huis Norenius and the classroom. Numb with terror he stared at the problem before 
him while the teacher stalked the rows counting off the minutes till it should be time for them to lay down 
their pencils and be divided, the sheep from the goats. Twelve men eat six bags of potatoes. Each bag holds 
six kilograms of potatoes. What is the quotient? He saw himself write down 12, he saw himself write down 
6. He did not know what to do with the numbers. He crossed both out. He stared at the word quotient. It did 
not change, it did not dissolve, it did not yield its mystery. I will die, he thought, still not knowing what the 
quotient is” (151). 
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light as he is made to work “in the glare of the locomotive’s headlight” (57). Like music, 
glaring light is engaged as a metaphor for the manner in which the concrete boundaries of 
the lavatories, on the one hand, and the conceptual borders of K’s forced labour on the 
railway, on the other, exude an inescapable and imprisoning force. As the music’s ‘oil’ 
encumbers K’s dreams of freedom, the merciless glare blinds or stuns him into silence, 
stupidity and lethargy: 
 
Every spadeful he lifted cost him an effort; when he stood erect there was 
a stabbing in his back and the world spun. He laboured more and more 
slowly, then sat down at the trackside with his head between his knees. 
Time passed, he had no idea how much time. Sounds grew faint in his 
ears. 
He was tapped on the knee. ‘Get up!’ said a voice. He scrambled to his 
feet and in the faint light faced the gang overseer in his black coat and cap. 
‘Why have I got to work here?’ K said. His head swam; the words seemed 
to echo from far away.  
The overseer shrugged. ‘Just do what you’re told,’ he said. He raised his 
stick and prodded K in the chest. K picked up his shovel. (57-8) 
 
K demonstrates an intense physical reaction to captivity. Whereas he initially “baulked, 
like a beast at the shambles” (55), his resistance is now turned inward, causing his body 
to react instinctively to the imposed labour, as indicated by this excerpt. Not only is “his 
body … so stiff that he [can] barely stand” (58), but he is unable to “finish the lukewarm 
slab of mealie-porridge” (59). In addition, K barely says a word: “‘You don’t talk,’ said 
the man” (59). 
 
It appears that K instinctively tries to counter the harsh lights and sounds of confinement 
by hiding, figuratively and literally, in the silent shade where he is “out of the way” 
(144). Note how K acquires a habit of sleeping or lying down in cages of captivity. 
Whenever he is forced to work, as in the aforementioned case, his body gains a heaviness 
that is irreconcilable with his slight, emaciated frame. In confinement, he seems to 
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gravitate perpetually downward, as if pulled towards ‘mother’ earth, earth being the 
location of his mother’s remains:  
 
Then he lay down in the warm grey sand with his beret over his face and 
fell asleep. He awoke sweating. He lifted the beret and squinted into the 
sun. Striking all the colours of the rainbow from his eyelashes, it filled the 
sky. I am like an ant that does not know where its hole is, he thought. He 
dug his hands into the sand and let it pour through his fingers over and 
over again. (114)48
 
 
The Jakkalsdrif resettlement camp, enclosed by “a three-metre fence surmounted with a 
strand of barbed wire” (100), is a concrete space of confinement associated with the 
“stifling heat” (101) of the sun: “Over his shoulder the sun made its appearance like a ball 
of fire” (126). On K’s first day at the camp, a place he never thought would house people 
(100), he says to himself, lying on his bed in the oppressive heat: “This is like Huis 
Norenius, he thought: I am back in Huis Norenius a second time, only now I am too old 
to bear it” (101). Later that same day he yet again reflects that “[i]t is like going back to 
childhood, he thought: it is like a nightmare” (105). 
 
During his confinement, K reacts to the imprisonment and forced labour as he did at 
Touws River. He retreats into himself, refusing to interact with the camp’s community, to 
visit town, to work and, subsequently, to eat: “I don’t need to eat all the time. When I 
need to eat, I’ll work” (116). A farmer comments on his skeletal frame – an obvious 
consequence of his starvation – as well as his inability to work: “He’s half-dead! They’ll 
be digging up corpses for us next!” (119). Robert also observes K’s silent and sleepy 
detachment from society: “‘I have never seen anyone as asleep as you,’ Robert said. 
                                                 
48 The following excerpt is another example of how sleeping allows K to detach himself from the 
confinement of imprisoning spaces. This is associated with a sense of heaviness, as opposed to the lightness 
K experiences when residing in a contained space: “With nothing to do, he slept more and more. He 
discovered that he could sleep anywhere, at any time, in any position: on the sidewalk at noon, with people 
stepping over his body; standing against a wall, with the suitcase between his legs. Sleep settled inside his 
head like a benign fog; he had no will to resist it. He did not dream of anyone or anything” (46).   
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‘Yes,’ replied K, struck that Robert too had seen it” (115). “You’ve been asleep all your 
life,” Robert says to K at a later stage, “It’s time to wake up” (121). 
 
K’s experience of Jakkalsdrif testifies to an impression of a harsh, ineffective and, above 
all, unnatural space of confinement. It is not surprising that, afterwards, K remembers the 
earth in Jakkalsdrif as “baked so hard by the sun ... that nothing would ever grow there 
again” (143). Not only is K exposed to harsh heat and light in the camp, he is also 
subjected to the noises of the community. For example, “in the middle of the night he was 
woken by the crying of a baby” going through “cycles of whimpering, wailing, and 
shrieks” (120). With his body tired and heavy after a hard day’s labour, “K felt anger 
mount inside himself. He lay with his fists clenched against his breast wishing the child 
annihilated” (120). Sound is associated with the clamour of society, and K shows a strong 
aversion to both. Even the physical proximity of his mother in her confined room under 
the stairs at the Côte d’Azur disconcerts him: “Michael K did not like the physical 
intimacy that the long evenings in the tiny room forced upon the two of them. He found 
the sight of his mother’s swollen legs disturbing and turned his eyes away when he had to 
help her out of bed” (8). 
 
It follows that, when K reaches the farm, he remains inclined to avoid the exposure that 
daylight brings, tending his garden at night, in silence, like “a blind person” (158), a 
“creature of twilight and night” (158). Daylight becomes invasive: “Indeed, waking 
sometimes in the daytime and peering outdoors, he would wince at the sharpness of the 
light and withdraw to his bed with a strange green glow behind his eyelids” (142).  
 
Thus, like a ghost, K cultivates his patch of earth under the blanket of night. In contrast to 
harsh and oppressive light, shadow is shown to foster and contain K’s body. He is said, 
for example, to prefer the shadows of the “tall pine trees and dim agapanthus walks” (5) 
to the bathroom’s brilliant glare. Like a reptile or insect, thus a creature of the earth, “a 
lizard under a stone” (159), “a termite boring its way through a rock” (91) and “a worm” 
(147) or “an ant” seeking its “hole” (114), K desires an isolated, shadowy sanctuary or 
containment within the earth. “Let darkness fall soon, let the earth swallow me up and 
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protect me” (148) he says on the farm when faced with potential exposure. Although K 
has lost his love for the earth of the Cape peninsula in preferring the dry, hard, yellow 
and red soil of the Karoo, he, nevertheless, describes the peninsula as a sanctuary with 
earth “so soft that one could dig and never come to the end of the softness; one could dig 
to the centre of the earth from Wynberg Park, and all the way to the centre it would be 
cool and dark and damp and soft” (92).  
 
According to K, “to live in times like these a man must be ready to live like a beast. A 
man who wants to live cannot live in a house with lights in the windows. He must live in 
a hole and hide by day” (135). On two occasions, K finds or fashions such a ‘hole’ of 
containment; the first being the cave in Prince Albert’s mountains and the second the 
burrow he builds between two low hills on the Karoo farm. These residences in the veld 
are characterised by an intense silence: “Sometimes the only sound he could hear was 
that of his trouser-legs whipping together. From horizon to horizon the landscape was 
empty. He climbed a hill and lay on his back listening to the silence” (63). Also, in the 
cave, “[i]nstead of listening to the crying of his body he tried to listen to the great silence 
about him” (90).  
 
In addition, it is suggested that, as time goes by, K becomes more weightless and 
insubstantial in his quest for freedom: “Sometimes spells of airiness came over him” 
(46); “Roaming from one empty room to another [K] felt as insubstantial as air” (80); and 
“So light now that he could not even be sure his feet were touching the ground, he passed 
from the last daylight into the shade of the passageway” (245). To be sure, K’s fragile 
frame loses a lot of weight and this creates a sense of freedom and weightlessness. Yet 
the lightness of being (to borrow from the title of Kundera’s novel, The Unbearable 
Lightness of Being)49
                                                 
49 Kundera’s novel, with two of the chapters named “Lightness and Weight”, prompted my consideration of 
lightness and heaviness in Life & Times. A comparative study might yield interesting results, especially if 
passages like the following are taken into account: “[T]he absolute absence of a burden causes man to be 
lighter than air, to soar into the heights, take leave of the earth and his earthly being, and become only half 
real, his movements as free as they are insignificant”(Kundera 5). In Elizabeth Costello’s eighth lesson, “At 
the Gate”, Costello, floating between beliefs, between opposites (213) wonders if she is a light soul (215).  
 he experiences outside the camps supplements this sense of 
insubstantiality: “His clothes, tattered already, hung on him without shape. Yet as he 
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moved about his field he felt a deep joy in his physical being. His step was so light that 
he barely touched the earth. It seemed possible to fly; it seemed possible to be both body 
and spirit” (139). When K imagines freedom, he sees himself flying over fences; in other 
words, being weightless. Note how, in the following dream, K finds salvation in his 
lightness:  
 
In his wild gesturing, in the great windmill sweeps of his arms, he realized 
he was in danger of losing his footing and being carried over the edge of 
the rock-face into the vast airiness of space between the heavens and the 
earth; but he had no fear, he knew he would float. (163) 
 
In conclusion, the novel usually portrays these contained spaces – K’s holes for example 
– as dark, cool, solitary, safe, silent and earth-bound. Confined spaces, on the other hand, 
are often depicted as blindingly bright, stifling, communal, noisy, exposed and man-
made.50
 
 These spaces tend to compress K downward, towards the earth, assigning him an 
uncharacteristic heaviness.  
There exists an impression that the reader has access to K’s thoughts and emotions in the 
novel. Although this is true to a certain extent, critical commentary often overlooks how 
these feelings are the internalisation of his acute sensory experiences, of absorbing 
confinement through the skin.51
                                                 
50 It would be fallacious to argue that every reference to light, lightness and sound in the novel is directly 
associated with confinement. Sunlight, in some cases, is shown to be an enabling, constructive influence in, 
for example, its ripening of K’s vegetables and the pleasant thawing of his body in winter: “From horizon 
to horizon the landscape was empty. He climbed a hill and lay on his back listening to the silence, feeling 
the warmth of the sun soak into his bones” (63). Similarly, shadow, heaviness and silence are not always 
related to containment. The Jakkalsdrif hut, as an example of a silent space of confinement, is dark and 
stifling: “It was dark inside, there were no windows” (101). 
 In conclusion, this section has shown how Michael K 
experiences and responds to contained and confined spaces predominantly at a sensory 
level. The following section will examine K’s indeterminacy in terms of the evasions of 
51 By means of his “notion of the world as a prolongation of the body” (Salamon 102), Merleau-Ponty came 
“to posit perception not just as a capacity of the body but as the body itself, as an extension of the body. He 
suggests that perception itself is that sensate border, thus establishing a model in which perception is 
something akin to a skin” (Salamon 102). The nature of an object is therefore “an expression of the original 
dynamic unity and 'overlapping' between subject and world” (Breeur 430). It might be interesting to 
consider Michael K’s internalisation of his concrete and conceptual surroundings in terms of Merleau-
Ponty’s theory of embodied meaning.  
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the abovementioned cages of significance in and of the narrative: spaces he reads or 
interprets through his body.  
 
Enabling Art through Indeterminacy 
 
As K “moves in space, experiencing and remaking the meaning of spaces initially 
constituted to speak of power” (Robinson D7), it becomes apparent that the novel refuses 
to treat these “experiences of spaces as one-dimensional” (Robinson D7).52
 
 Indeed, K not 
only moves through various spaces (or places) in the story, but also through the various 
textual spatialities of the story. Each reading of K, whether by other characters, the 
medical officer, or the reader of the novel, subjects K’s body to one of many overlapping 
spatialities, realms or ‘cages’ of meaning. Each reading, each interpretation, confines him 
to a prison of particularised signification that he can never remake, even though he 
dreams of “flying over the fences and between the houses” (182) to the “blank spaces in 
between” the bars of signification (Robinson D7).  
It is ironic that most readers are somewhat unaware of the cage that their own 
interpretation frames and “the possibilities for alternative spatialities” it represses 
(Robinson D7). Each reading produces a new interpretative spatiality that supplements 
the narrative’s dimensionality and performance of interpretation, in the sense that it 
‘(re)makes’ or ‘(re)imagines’ (Robinson D7) the spaces, the ‘life’ and ‘times’ of the 
narrative. The type of space, however, depends on the type of interpretation. The space of 
the novel can either be recognised as a heterogeneous “source of potentially new 
spatialities” (Robinson D7) or be understood in terms of an absent centre or space which 
needs to be supplemented by a homogenising meaning. The novel thus draws attention to 
K’s subjective “experiences of mobility, interaction and the dynamism of spaces” 
(Robinson D7). It is interesting to note that K’s interest in “picture-books of the Ionian 
Islands, Moorish Spain, Finland Land of Lakes, Bali, and other places in the world” (23) 
partially defines reading in terms of spaces that are exotic and other.  
 
                                                 
52 The format of this book does not allow for the provision of page numbers.  
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In addition, this performance of interpretative spatiality – the manner in which the 
indeterminacy of K invites the reader to participate in the novel as event – blurs the 
distinction of what De Man calls the “inside/outside metaphor that is never being 
seriously questioned” (Allegories of Reading 5).53
 
 In performing one of the text’s themes 
and, so doing, becoming, in a sense, one of its characters, the reader is positioned by the 
narrative in such a way as to challenge “the metaphorical model of literature as a kind of 
box that separates an inside from an outside, and the reader or critic as the person who 
opens the lid in order to release in the open what was secreted but inaccessible inside” 
(De Man Allegories of Reading 5).  
There is “an ontological tension” at work here, “inducing a flicker between presence and 
absence of this world, between tropological reality and ‘literal’ reality. For what this 
flicker foregrounds above all is the textuality of the text” (McHale 145-6). And it is the 
textuality of the novel that signals its engagement with the problematics of a text’s being 
– and, accordingly, with the overlapping encounters between the realm of the text and the 
world of the reader. Consequently, the reader is positioned as a mediator, a negotiator 
between worlds or spaces, caught within a purgatorial space, not unlike a vast farm and 
its “grey thornbushes, the rocky soil, the ring of hills, the mountains purple and pink in 
the distance, the great still blue empty sky, the earth grey and brown beneath the sun save 
here and there, where if you looked carefully you suddenly saw a tip of vivid green, 
pumpkin-leaf or carrot-bush” (249). 
 
This ontological flicker is kindled by the various types of indeterminacy in Life & Times. 
I will now investigate the possibility that the various indeterminacies of the novel in 
question – like K’s name, for example – solicit potential interpretations that not only 
challenge each other, but the reader and literary critic as well. As an aside, what I find 
particularly interesting is that as two critics dispute the precise meaning of Michael K’s 
elusive hare lip, for example, each adopting a different stance, these critics seem unaware 
                                                 
53 Although De Man is here referring to the reconciliation of form and meaning, his hypothesis is also 
applicable to the reconciliation between the realm of the text and the realm of the reader. 
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that their dispute is, in fact, emulating the struggle the novel’s indeterminacy generates 
between potential interpretations.  
 
Like the ‘times’ in the title of the novel, the ‘life’ in Life & Times of Michael K evokes a 
sense of fullness, of completion that anticipates a comprehensive narrative about a proper 
or ‘real’ life – a life in progress as the absence of a definitive article implies. 
Accordingly, the title promises to answer the following questions: Who is this individual? 
When, where and how is his life taking place? This expectation is somewhat thwarted, 
however, by the emergence of the hint of incompleteness, of deficiency and 
insubstantiality that Michael K’s peculiar, acronymic surname, ‘K’, suggests. The 
impression of incompleteness is advanced in the first sentence of the novel which informs 
the reader of Michael K’s physical deficiency: “The first thing the midwife noticed about 
Michael K when she helped him out of his mother into the world was that he had a hare 
lip” (3), a lip that could not close, and a lip that could not succeed in stirring a mother’s 
love. Michael K’s incomplete name and his incomplete lip are just two examples of 
textual indeterminacies that generate an atmosphere of deficiency or lack, of 
incompleteness and indeterminacy that pervade the narrative. Dovey states that “the use 
of the initial in the names [Kafka’s] K, [Kafka’s] Josef K and Michael K suggests that 
what we have in these figures is an incomplete, or partial, representation” (277). 
 
In exploiting and exposing the elusive and bewildering correspondence between text and 
reality, Life & Times of Michael K embraces written language’s susceptibility to 
ambiguity and misinterpretation. In terms of K’s times, the unspecified era in which the 
story unfolds mystifies the reader whilst K himself is an unconventional, uninvolved 
other that resists the frequent attempts at defining his person. His indistinctness is 
constituted by a variety of aspects: his acronymic surname, unspecified race, asexuality, 
ethereality, inarticulacy and awkwardness; his lethargy; his detachment from the social 
and political world; his stubborn starvation; as well as the conflicting deep-seated or 
embedded will to live. K’s portrayal as an impenetrable individual is assisted by the 
novel’s exclusion of other characters’ judgments. These characters are shown not only to 
ignore or refuse K’s requests; their impressions of K are omitted. In addition, K’s 
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judgments of others are rarely shown. Instead, his physical reaction to a specific space is 
described.  
 
In general, textual indeterminacy puzzles the reader, evoking (to borrow the title of 
Greenberg’s book on Kafka and modern literature) ‘the terror of art’ which may result in 
the eradication of this uncertainty by means of imposing a defining, delimiting 
interpretation on the text. According to Kossew, there are indeed many obvious elements 
to the story of Life & Times that evade closure and thus “[provoke] the reader into 
signification” (140). In this case, regarding the role it plays in the text’s performance of 
the act of definition, indeterminacy can rather be said to enable rather than terrorise art. 
Attridge’s The Ethics of Reading, for one, emphasises “the crucial role of that experience 
of bewilderment in [the fictional work’s] achievement as a work of art” (xi). 
 
According to Graff, “‘indeterminacy’ denotes a property of a text that enters into and 
infects the interpretation of the text, so that it is not just literature but also the 
interpretation of literature that is fraught with uncertainty” (165). To illustrate how 
textual indeterminacies generate a variety of uncertain interpretations which then 
inevitably provoke the reader into delimitation, I will now discuss three such types of 
indeterminacy as contained by Life & Times, namely, ambiguity, rhetoricity, and 
ellipsis.54
 
  
Life & Times’s use of ambiguity as a central method in the solicitation of a variety of 
interpretations necessitates a careful consideration of the interaction of these 
interpretations in that they give rise to the textual tensions which ultimately grant the 
novel its multi-dimensionality. In considering how ambiguity generates opposing 
interpretations, I return to the opening sentence of Life & Times of Michael K.55
                                                 
54 Similarly, Helgesson distinguishes three types of ‘blankness’ which he relates to K’s subjectivity, the 
story and the narrative (189-92). 
 The first 
thing the midwife and subsequently the reader notice about K is his hare lip. In addition, 
this hare lip is immediately cast as a sign when, at K’s birth, the midwife interprets it as a 
symbol of good luck. Anna K, on the other hand, reads it as a bad omen. Their faith in the 
55 See Dovey, pages 283-4, for her discussion of the first sentence of the novel. 
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hare lip’s ability to signify or symbolise K’s meaning, essence and character associates 
K’s physical disfigurement with the defects or anomalies of his character. This notion is 
emphasised by the manner in which the novel then progresses from Michael’s physical 
“disfigurement” (4) to his ‘disfigured’ mental state: “his mind was not quick” (4). 
“Because their smiles and whispers hurt her, [Anna K] kept it away from other children” 
(4, my emphasis) by taking Michael along to her place of employment. Here, she teaches 
him silence, a personality trait he embraces given that his handicap complicates speaking 
at any rate. Because K is never taught to express himself fully, he is often thought of as 
unintelligent. Consequently, K’s handicap, his inarticulacy, and his supposed slow mind 
are all associated in this section of the novel.  
 
As a result the novel’s opening passage has established two possible readings of K’s hare 
lip: either as a sign of his slow mind or, alternatively, as a constituent of his personality. 
It is indeed K’s appearance which shamed Anna K, compelling her to hide him from the 
world. A similar tension is established with regard to K’s otherness. On the one hand, K’s 
strange appearance and name can be read as indicators of his peculiar personality; on the 
other, K’s childhood can be identified as the primary cause of this strangeness.  
 
According to Head, “[t]he problem the novel sets is the significance of K” (Coetzee 95). 
As indicated, K’s lack of significance is established by his resistance to the external 
influences of his times. The novel repeatedly accentuates how various characters interpret 
K as insignificant – as one of the many “nuisances”, “parasites” and “unwanted souls” 
that inhabit the camps (Graham 4) – and thus unworthy of attention and aid: “‘There’s 
nothing special about you,’ said the man (59)” and “There is nothing special about you, 
you can rest easy about that” (186) says a fellow worker and the medical officer, 
respectively. 
 
To use the term ‘insignificance’ in relation to Michael K in this context necessitates an 
awareness of the term’s two primary denotations, that is to say, a lack of importance as 
well as lack of meaning. With regard to K’s ‘insignificance’, the term, ‘immateriality’ 
also comes to mind: firstly, in its suggestion of irrelevance and inconsequentiality and, 
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secondly, in its apt designation of K’s ethereality or antireality. Aside from his profound 
relationship with land and earth, K is generally portrayed as a strangely unaffected and 
impermeable creature, both character and ‘real’ person, fiction and fictionalisation. 
Drowsy and wraith-like, he wanders intuitively and instinctively in and out of contained 
and confined spaces – the conceptual space of the narrative included. Though shown to 
be quite practical and adept on the farm, K appears to lack common or rather communal 
sense. His disengagement from society is further underscored by the novel’s 
demonstration of his lack of ambition and materialism (in both meanings of the word) as 
well as an atypical asexuality. The medical officer, for example, remarks that K “is not of 
our world. He lives in a world all his own” (194) and that he seems to be “made of air” 
(221), an “unbearing, unborn creature. I cannot really think of him as a man, though he is 
older than me by most reckonings” (185). Also note his choice of words when he asks K 
the following question: “Did you think you were a spirit invisible, a visitor on our planet, 
a creature beyond the laws of nations? Well, the laws of nations have you in their grip 
now: they have pinned you down” (206, my emphasis).  
 
At the beginning of the novel, Anna K also wonders “what had been growing in her all 
these months” (3, my emphasis). It is here, at K’s birth, that Anna K asks the question 
that I also pose: What is Michael K? The “what” and “it” introduce the novel’s 
problematisation of K’s ontological status. The novel continues to grapple with this 
problematic throughout the progression of its narrative, establishing a tension between 
K’s ‘real’-ity (the ‘Who’) and his textuality (the ‘What’ ‘gathering’ above the sleeping 
K). Whereas the first section establishes K predominantly as a fictionalisation of a real 
person, in other words as a ‘Who’, a “being with a life of his … own outside the text” 
(Dovey 276), the second section, narrated by the medical officer, takes the “it” and the 
“what” posed in the novel’s introductory sentence further, raising the question of K’s 
fictional or constructed existence by means of a myriad of references to his significance. 
This demonstrates the manner in which K’s elusive and indeterminate ambiguity 
provokes the medic’s obsessive attempts to extract K’s story: 
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This is not my imagination … This sense of a gathering meaningfulness is 
not something like a ray that I project to bathe this or that bed, or a robe in 
which I wrap this or that patient according to whim. Michaels [the medical 
officer’s name for Michael K] means something, and the meaning he has 
is not private to me. (226)  
 
From this consideration of Michael K’s ‘meaning’, the medical officer proceeds to testify 
to his attempts to delimit or restrict K’s indeterminacy, confining it to one such 
significance.56 Like Mrs Curren’s frustrated attempts at extracting the story of Michael 
K’s ‘successor’, Vercueil, (“A tipsy anger flared up in me against his crudity, his 
indifference” [115]), the medical officer, “piece by piece” also tries to “put together a 
story of a life as obscure as any on earth” (Age of Iron 172).57
 
 In the following excerpt 
from Age of Iron, the interpreter or reader is likened to a source of blinding light; and the 
act of interpretation or reading, to the confinement of the protagonist within its glare: “He 
looks like a prisoner torn from the darkness of a cell, thrust into a room full of blinding 
lights, shoved against a wall, shouted at to stand still. His image raped from him, taken by 
force” (177). Regarding Life & Times, the following extract illustrates the manner in 
which the medical officer tries to ‘rape’ K’s image from him:  
‘It is time to deliver, my friend. You’ve got a story to tell and we want to 
hear it. … Tell us what we want to know, then we will leave you alone.’ 
I paused; he stared stonily back. ‘Talk, Michaels,’ I resumed. ‘You see 
how easy it is to talk, now talk. Listen to me, listen how easily I fill this 
room with words.’ … ‘Give yourself some substance, man, otherwise you 
are going to slide through life absolutely unnoticed. You will be a digit in 
                                                 
56 According to Head, the medical officer’s “sense of urgency to interpret K gives him, on the one hand, the 
hue of an ‘overpowering’ reader. Yet, on the other, his understanding that K has a meaning that is somehow 
beyond the ‘system’ he seems to inhabit, is a redeeming feature. In this sense he shows an incipient 
understanding that his apparent frustration is inappropriate: he is on a journey, it seems, to the sight 
inhabited by Attridge’s responsible reader” (“Belief” 106), a journey, which one could argue, is continued 
by Mrs Curren in her attempt to forge a reciprocal relationship with Vercueil or, otherwise stated, approach 
him on his own terms. 
57 Both Mrs Curren and the medical officer provide their charges with shelter. In addition, whereas Vercueil 
is proclaimed an angel, Michael K is deemed a life-altering prophet. See pages 75-6, 165 and 177 in Age of 
Iron for examples of Mrs Curren’s attempts to come to terms with Vercueil’s alterity. 
70 
 
the units column at the end of the war when they do the big subtraction 
sum to calculate the difference, nothing more. You don’t want to be 
simply one of the perished, do you? You want to live, don’t you? Well 
then, talk, make your voice heard, tell your story!’ (191-2)58
 
 
With regard to the medical officer’s reduction of his meaning, K is an “allegory” (228) of 
“the residual, the irreducible, the unclassifiable, the inassimilable” ‘digit’ or meaning in a 
system (Foucault 228).59 He is perceived as an independent entity, moving untouched and 
unseen through his milieu in an almost ghost-like manner. “Did you not notice how, 
whenever I tried to pin you down, you slipped away?” (228), asks the medical officer. 
Furthermore, K’s preservation of a sense of sovereignty in the face of confinement is 
described in terms of “how outrageously a meaning can take up residence in a system 
without becoming a term in it” (228).60
 
a stone, a pebble that, having lain around quietly minding its own business 
since the dawn of time, is now suddenly picked up and tossed randomly 
from hand to hand. A hard little stone, barely aware of its surroundings, 
enveloped in itself and its interior life. He passes through these institutions 
 This can be related to a preceding observation, 
equating K’s being with an indecipherable stone:  
                                                 
58 Also bear in mind the following two instances of confinement: “He closed his mouth obstinately, the 
mouth that would never wholly shut, and glowered back” (191) and “‘Tell us the truth, tell us the whole 
truth, and you can go back to bed, we won’t bother you any more.’ 
Now he crouched perceptibly, clutching the blanket about his throat, glaring at the two of us. 
‘Come on, my friend!’ I said. ‘No one is going to hurt you, just tell us what we want to know!’ 
The silence lengthened. … 
At last he spoke: ‘I am not in the war.’ 
Irritation overflowed in me. … ‘Of course you are in the war, man, whether you like it or not!’ … 
‘You must co-operate.’ 
Still crouching, ready to evade me if I should spring, he made his reply. ‘I am not clever with words,’ he 
said, nothing more” (189-90).  
59 Foucault writes that “[d]isciplinary systems … which classify, hierarchize, supervise, and so on, come up 
against those who cannot be classified, those who escape supervision, those who cannot enter the system of 
distribution, in short, the residual, the irreducible, the unclassifiable, the inassimilable” (52). Given K’s 
indeterminacy, he proves to be unassailable not only by the systems of power he encounters in the story, 
but also by the reader. 
60 However, K is defined by the concrete and conceptual spaces he inhabits, as previously argued. 
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and camps and hospitals and God knows what else like a stone. Through 
the intestines of war. (185)61
 
  
The extracts from the medical officer’s narration shed light on the questionable reality, 
the significance, of Michael K’s character. By way of the “already fractured hermeneutic 
regime” (Helgesson 186) that constitutes the medical officer’s consideration of K’s 
meaning, “our attention is distracted from the projected world and made to fix on its 
linguistic medium” (McHale 148). McHale also quotes Maureen Quilligan, saying that 
“at some point in the play of the narrative the action fades, as if the lights were to go off 
behind the scrim, so that the audience is left facing the curtain on which are printed the 
author’s words” (147). It appears that, throughout Section II, the reader is reminded that 
K is, in fact, a fiction “made out of text – letters, words, connected discourse”. In reality, 
he “is text” and not a representation of a ‘real’ person, a fact that his acronymic surname 
“never permits us to forget” (McHale 147).62
 
 Kafka, Coetzee’s precursor in many 
respects, experimented with the exposition of the textuality of his characters. It seems 
that Coetzee is concerned with that same tension between textuality and reality in Life & 
Times of Michael K.  
To clarify, at the time of the novel’s publication in 1983, the confining grip of South 
Africa’s apartheid regime was loosening. This resulted in the escalation of the 
government’s oppression of movements of resistance, which, in turn, gave rise to 
intensified opposition. Both parties resorted to violence which heaved the country into a 
state of unrest. As most readings of Life & Times’s milieu indicate, the ‘times’ seems to 
allude to “the future, projected state” (Kossew 139) of this conflict. This creates a tension 
between the narrative’s realist underpinnings and its fabricated fictions. To clarify, the 
narrative events are staged against a fictional backdrop: the imaginary future of a country 
in ruins. However, as constituted by future spaces which are founded upon ‘real’ 
landscapes and cities, the Karoo and the city of Cape Town for example, the novel 
                                                 
61 In contrast, this description interestingly evokes the following statement in Dusklands: “America will 
swallow me, digest me, dissolve me in the tides of its blood” (9). 
62 In this sense, one might even venture a (confining) reading of the title Life & Times of Michael K, as an 
allusion to the life and times of a linguistic medium or, otherwise stated, to the ‘reality’ of a sign’s 
existence as it is brought to ‘life’ through the ‘times’ of its reading. 
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appears to oscillate between myth and mimesis. This aspect lends an air of surrealism to 
K’s environments. As K is intimately entwined with the spaces he inhabits, it is not 
surprising that he is also portrayed in terms of an amalgamation of fiction and 
fictionalisation. 
 
These straightforward examples demonstrate how Life & Times refuses to offer definitive 
reasons or clear explanations of how narrative events come to pass. Traces permeate the 
text, soliciting discovery and deliberation. For clarity’s sake, I distinguish this type of 
elusiveness from the other two categories with the label ‘ambiguity’, given that the text 
creates the impression of not being able to decide between defining K as a fiction or a 
fictionalisation; a textual sign or a ‘real’ being. However, it is precisely this 
indeterminacy which generates a struggle, a pervasive textual tension between opposing 
interpretations. If the reader acknowledges this tension, contains it in other words, he/she 
will come to know K not as a ‘What’ or a ‘Who’ but as a singular, multi-dimensional 
figuration of potentialities of being.  
 
An examination of another type of indeterminacy, rhetoricity – a text’s rhetorical nature, 
according to De Man (Blindness and Insight 136) – sheds more light on the nature of this 
textual tension. To demonstrate the inner workings of the production of rhetoricity in this 
regard, I evoke De Man’s discussion of the grammatical pattern, ‘What’s the 
difference?’, in Allegories of Reading given its strong resemblance to the pattern 
contained in the sentence, ‘What am I to him?’, in which K’s existence and subsequent 
significance is interrogated:  
 
A short distance away, out of earshot, sat the gang foreman on a little 
folding stool. K watched him pour coffee out of his vacuum flask. His 
long flat fingers could not all find a place on the ear of the mug. With two 
fingers in the air, he raised it and drank. Over the rim his eyes met K’s. 
What does he see? thought K. What am I to him? The foreman set down 
the mug, raised his whistle to his lips, and, still sitting, blew a long blast. 
(113, my emphasis)  
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and 
 
I ask myself, What am I to this man? I ask myself, What is it to this man if 
I live or die? (203)63
 
 
To adapt De Man, “we cannot even tell from his grammar whether [Michael K] ‘really’ 
wants to know ‘what’” he is to him “or is just telling us that we shouldn’t even try to find 
out” (9-10). As in the case with De Man’s own example, ‘What’s the difference?’, the 
grammatical pattern, ‘What am I to him?’ similarly “engenders two meanings that are 
mutually exclusive” (9). Literally, K is ‘really’ asking himself, as well as the implied 
reader, what he means or signifies to the foreman in the first case and the medical officer 
in the second. Figuratively, K is asking a rhetorical question, stating rather than 
questioning his belief in his perceived insignificance. In other words, “the literal meaning 
asks for the concept … whose existence is denied by the figurative meaning” (De Man 9). 
This concept is ‘being’, existence or perhaps even significance (given the term’s 
denotation of both ‘importance’ and ‘meaning’). The concept of ‘being’ as invited by the 
literal concept is therefore denied by the answer of a lack of being implied by the 
figurative meaning: Nothing, I am nothing to him. 
 
It appears that “two entirely coherent but entirely incompatible readings can be made to 
hinge on one line”, “meanings that exist side by side” and “engage each other in direct 
confrontation” given that “none can exist in the other’s absence” (De Man 12). This 
statement evokes Derrida’s hypothesis that “[o]ne can shift back and forth between … 
two perspectives which never give rise to a synthesis. Each perspective shows the error of 
the other in an irresolvable dialectic. This alteration Derrida terms différance … ‘a 
differing or a deferring’” (Culler 165). 
 
                                                 
63 The following excerpt also raises the question of K’s significance: “This morning when I tried to be 
friendly he shook me off. ‘Do you think if you leave me alone I am going to die?’ he said. ‘Why do you 
want to make me fat? Why fuss over me, why am I so important?’ […] ‘You ask why you are important, 
Michaels. The answer is that you are not important. But that does not mean you are forgotten. No one is 
forgotten’” (185-6, my emphasis). 
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According to De Man: 
 
the grammatical model of the question becomes rhetorical not when … it 
is impossible to decide … which of the two meanings (that can be entirely 
incompatible) prevails. Rhetoric radically suspends logic and opens up 
vertiginous possibilities of referential aberration. And although it would 
perhaps be somewhat more remote from common usage, I would not 
hesitate to equate the rhetorical, figural potentiality of language with 
literature itself. (10) 
 
In both cases, it is impossible to decide which of the two meanings should prevail. They 
are indeed, as De Man claims, mutually exclusive. This irresolvable struggle between or 
play of possible significations, a notion related to De Man’s ‘vertiginous possibilities of 
referential aberration’, produces an inescapable tension. This tension is in a sense a 
conceptual space, a structure of containment in which all potential significations clash 
and converge. Such a space, it should be noted, can only come into being through the act 
of reading, the act of defining and reawakening the ambiguity of a phrase like ‘What am I 
to him?’  
 
“The point is as follows”, writes De Man:  
 
A perfectly clear syntactical paradigm (the question) engenders a sentence 
that has at least two meanings, of which the one asserts and the other 
denies its own illocutionary mode. It is not so that there are simply two 
meanings, one literal and the other figural, and that we have to decide 
which one of these meanings is the right one in this particular situation. 
The confusion can only be cleared up by the intervention of an extra-
textual intention. (10) 
 
In the case of Life & Times of Michael K, the intervention of an extra-textual intention is 
undoubtedly solicited by the text’s various indeterminacies. In addition, I regard the 
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reader’s act of delineation – the means by which the confusion of the syntactical 
paradigm is partially or wholly resolved – as such an intervention.  
 
To elucidate, the reader and/or critic are presented with a choice regarding the phrase’s 
indeterminacy: on the one hand, he/she can embrace the phrase’s solicitation of a variety 
of irreconcilable significations and discover the text’s rich depths or, on the other, he/she 
can give preference to one meaning, disregard the other possibilities and confine the 
text’s dimensionalities. Of course, it must be noted, most if not all readings do a bit of 
both. 
 
However, ambiguity and rhetoricity are not the only types of indeterminacy which force a 
decision upon the reader. The ellipsis or the omission of significant detail plays an 
integral part in the constitution of Life & Times’s perplexing character. Consider the 
manner in which the omission of K’s surname, as well as the omission of the precise 
causes and conditions – especially the ‘times’, the era – of the war in which he is 
confined, solicits the reader’s defining interpretation. In addition, Life & Times of 
Michael K never explicitly categorises Michael K in terms of race. This evasion is an 
example of one of the many indeterminacies which may plague the reader and induce 
him/her to racialise K’s body. This is but one of the ways in which the narrative alerts the 
reader to society’s obsession with rigid categorisation, a fixation which prevailed during 
apartheid, an era of confinement. 
 
Note, for example, how the grammatical pattern, ‘What am I to him?’, implicates the 
reader in yet another sense. In the first extract, the eyes of the reader meet those of the 
foreman, through the focalisation of K. ‘What do you see?’, ‘What am I to you?’ K 
indirectly asks the reader. Interestingly enough, the foreman is not given the opportunity 
to answer, like so many others, leaving the significance of K undecided and exposed to 
appropriation by the reader. I deduce that the intention of this question is not only to 
evoke K’s problematic ontological status, his significance, but also to emphasise the 
power the reader possesses in defining and thus making a potential decision regarding 
this status.  
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Like the omission of the foreman’s answer, the thoughts and opinions of many other 
characters in the novel are excluded in their contact with K. Characters are thus generally 
prevented from passing judgment on his character. Accordingly, the narrator omits the 
thoughts not only of such characters, but also of K to a certain extent. As discussed, the 
narrative rather reveals the manner in which K’s body responds to his environments. The 
partial omission is a consequence of the third-person narrator’s “principle of ‘limited 
omniscience’” (in Sections I and III) that “is very cautious in offering interpretations of 
K” (Head Coetzee 100). The partial omission of K and the other characters’ inner lives, if 
you will, can therefore be said to indicate the implied author’s caution with regard to 
fixed definitions. It is this lack of predetermined, fixed delimitations that lend the novel 
an air of elusiveness. The sporadic omission of K’s thoughts and emotions also draws 
attention to his impermeability, a quality which problematises other characters’ attempted 
interpretations of his embodied meaning. 
 
Allegory 
 
The question now arises as to the critic’s particular management of the various textual 
indeterminacies in Life & Times of Michael K. To be precise, many critics have attempted 
to project the novel’s true or proper meaning by perceiving the elusive elements in Life & 
Times of Michael K as constituents of its allegory of apartheid’s oppression. As the 
following discussion of Derek Attridge’s essay on allegory will demonstrate, a critical 
allegorisation may confine and supplant instead of supplementing the fictional text. 
Although the novel seems to solicit a confining or, in Attridge’s conception, ‘allegorical’ 
interpretation from the reader, it is the task of the literary critic to recognize the manner 
in which his/her critical response is directed by these narrative gaps.64
                                                 
64 In “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence”, Merleau-Ponty describes language in terms of silence, 
of gaps and fissures that are perpetually soliciting supplementation: “all language is indirect or allusive – 
that it is, if you wish, silence” (43). As a result, the complete expression or direct representation of the 
world is impossible. He writes that “[t]here is thus an opaqueness of language. Nowhere does it stop and 
leave a place for pure meaning; it is always limited only by more language, and meaning appears within it 
only set in a context of words” (42). 
 A critical 
containment of the novel requires the critic to embrace or contain the alterity of the text 
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instead of supplanting indeterminacies, whether ambiguous or omitted, with extratextual 
significance.65
 
  
In his chapter on Life & Times of Michael K and Waiting for the Barbarians in The Ethics 
of Reading, “Against Allegory”, Attridge differentiates between two types of readings: 
allegorical and literal. An ‘allegorical’ reading “[looks] for meanings beyond the literal, 
in a realm of significance which the novel may be said to imply without directly naming” 
(32), whereas a ‘literal’ reading concentrates only on the words themselves. In other 
words, such a distinction is all the more important given the frequent allegorising or 
generalising readings of these particular novels, readings that regard ‘the words on the 
page’, thus the reality of the text itself, as subordinate to the external reality to which the 
text is supposed to refer. Attridge gives preference to ‘literal’ readings of Coetzee’s 
fiction, given the manner in which such interpretations explore the singularity of the text 
without confining its freeplay of meaning. Although Attridge’s important distinction 
inspired the subject matter of this thesis, it contains some limitations. To my mind, both 
‘allegorical’ and ‘literal’ readings can either confine the text’s discursive dimensions or 
contain its multi-dimensionality. To clarify, allow me to consider how an allegorical 
reading can either confine or contain a literary text.  
 
Attridge expresses what McHale would call an “overly narrow sense of the possibilities 
of allegory” (141). When referring to an allegorical reading, Attridge is only referring to 
traditional allegory which is “the direct translation of abstract concepts into a 
transparently-motivated narrative” (McHale 143). Allegory’s “indeterminate”, 
“destabiliz[ing]” (McHale 142) postmodern relativity is overlooked.66
                                                 
65 Attwell writes that “[w]e traduce the purposes of Life & Times of Michael K if we make claims for either 
its political percipience or its predictive power without substantially refining the argument. Its intensity lies 
not in social representation but in the creation of a protagonist of extraordinary symbolic power who 
becomes, in turn, the focus of a struggle for control over the resources of fictionality itself” (The Politics of 
Writing 92). 
 McHale offers a 
66 There subsists some disagreement with regard to the particular location of Coetzee’s fiction in terms of 
contemporary theory. See Attridge’s The Ethics of Reading, pages 2 to 6, for a discussion of Coetzee’s 
modernist foundations; and Attwell’s The Politics of Writing, pages 20 to 23, for a consideration of 
Coetzee’s employment of postmodernism and post-colonialism. To my mind, Coetzee’s fiction contains 
modernist, postmodernist, and post-colonial features, to name a few. The confinement of his narratives to 
one of these rigid categories is not conducive to the ethics of delimitation considered by this thesis. 
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relevant exploration of the “elusiveness of postmodernist allegory relative to what we 
usually think of as the unequivocalness of traditional allegories” that is directly 
applicable to different readings of Life & Times of Michael K:  
 
The elusiveness is an inheritance from the founding texts of postmodernist 
allegorical practice …: Kafka in his novels and stories … [seems] to 
promise allegorical meaning, soliciting an allegorical interpretation from 
the reader, yet withholding any indication of specific allegorical content. 
Everything is potentially allegorical, but nothing is actually an allegory; 
the trope seems to lack a specific literal level or frame of reference. 
(McHale 141) 
 
Attridge’s hypothesis does not account for allegory’s potential to liberate the text’s 
potential play of significances. Is an elusive textual element, a name like ‘Michael K’, for 
example, not, in fact, allegorical, given the manner in which it solicits a variety of 
interpretations? Is an allegorical reading truly a reading that denies a text’s singularity or, 
rather, a style of reading that embraces its play of potential meanings? I argue in favour 
of the latter.  
 
McHale also goes on to state that in Joyce’s Finnegans Wake, for example:  
 
nothing is literal, everything is tropological. Every expression belongs 
simultaneously to several frames of reference, none of them identifiable as 
the basic world of the text, relative to which the other frames are 
metaphorical; instead, there is a perpetual jostling and jockeying for 
position among a plurality of simultaneously present (and therefore 
simultaneously absent) worlds. (McHale 142) 
 
This ‘perpetual jostling for position’ and “tendency to slip back and forth between literal 
fiction and allegory” (McHale 181), this freeplay of meaning is exactly what Life & 
Times seems to be generating. The variety of jostling and jockeying interpretations 
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solicited by textual indeterminacies presents the reader and the critic with a choice: the 
interpreter can either contain the text by means of acknowledging that it is soliciting more 
than one interpretation, or the reader can confine the text by means of imposing one, 
fixed interpretation. McHale discusses the temptation to read the texts, “Order of Insects” 
in the volume In the Heart of the Heart of the Country (William Glass) – which of course 
evokes Coetzee’s In the Heart of the Country (1978) – and L’Arrêt de mort (Maurice 
Blanchot), in such a manner:  
 
Allegorical reading is possible here, perhaps even tempting, but it is not in 
any sense necessary: the literal level of both these texts seems perfectly 
self-contained, quite able to do without an allegorical level. We may well 
wonder whether an allegorical reading here would not be an imposition of 
our own. In short, these texts hesitate between the literal and the 
allegorical – just as, from another perspective, they hesitate between the 
representation of a world and the anti-representational foregrounding of 
language for its own sake. These are ontological oppositions, ontological 
hesitations … Hesitation has been displaced … to the confrontation 
between different ontological levels in the structure of texts. (82-3) 
  
If the reader chooses to put forth a reading that contains the text, he/she is thus 
acknowledging the manner in which the text hesitates between the literal and the 
allegorical. A text’s allegorical dimension – in other words, its ability to contain more 
than one meaning – can, therefore, offer itself “as a tool for exploring ontological 
structure and foregrounding ontological themes” (McHale 141). On the other hand, a 
text’s allegorical dimension may solicit a confining interpretation from the reader, a type 
of interpretation which is ultimately proven problematic in Life & Times of Michael K. 
 
Attridge’s following acquiescence to the likelihood that a literary work may invite 
allegorisation can therefore be read, rather, in terms of the likelihood that a literary work 
like Life & Times may invite confinement – and this is exactly what the novel does in its 
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performance of the “appropriating function of interpretation” (Attwell The Politics of 
Writing 97):  
 
If reading a work as literature means making the most of the event of 
reading, an event by which our habits and assumptions are tested and 
shifted (if only momentarily), then part of the literary experience may be 
the event of the allegorizing [read: confining] reading … In other words, 
one may be doing justice to the singularity and inventiveness of a literary 
work by responding to its invitation to allegorize [read: confine] … 
because in so doing we are working through the operations of its meaning 
– irrespective of whether we arrive at some stable allegorical scheme … 
The reader may become conscious of the power and allure of allegory 
[read: confinement], of the temptation to generalize or codify meaning, 
and at the same time gain a heightened awareness of the specificity and 
contingency of language and human experience as these resist such 
generalizations and codifications. (61) 
 
To summarise, it would be fallacious to associate Attridge’s allegorical reading with 
confining interpretation. As demonstrated, an allegorical reading can either contain or 
confine. It follows that a ‘literal’ reading, a reading that focuses on the words on the page 
in front of you, can either confine a text by ignoring the variety of interpretations it 
solicits or contain it by celebrating its rich depth and variety of meaning as well. It 
follows that this chapter has chosen to engage with or contain the text by acknowledging 
its potential play of significances. It realises this engagement by means of the two 
conceptual tools, containment and confinement, as inspired by Attridge’s distinction 
between ‘allegorical’ and ‘literal’ interpretation. 
 
The Power of Supplementation 
 
All the spaces discussed thus far exist within the topography of the narrative. They are 
places and situations within the story. However, taking a step back and holding the novel, 
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the book itself in hand, I realise that Life & Times of Michael K is primarily a material 
space. The two-hundred-and-fifty pages are bound – or bounded – by two covers which 
can be opened and closed like doors, allowing the reader access to the narrative. Thus, 
this book, any book, can be described as a contained space.  
 
The pages of Life & Times are divided into three subspaces: Sections I, II and III. Each of 
these subspaces can be perceived as a material enclosure which contains and generates a 
conceptual counterpart.67
 
 Without these sections, Life & Times would have provided an 
uninterrupted narrative. The narrative flow is further interrupted by the second section’s 
change in style and perspective. Whereas Sections I and III are written in the third-
person, Section II, as told in the first-person, has “a wholly different narrative ambition” 
(Helgesson 190). In fact, Coetzee has been criticised for disrupting the flow of the 
narrative by way of Section II, which is the medical officer’s personal account of Michael 
K’s stay in the Kenilworth rehabilitation camp.  
However, it is precisely this disruption which shatters the mimetic mirror and alerts the 
reader not only to the constructedness of the fiction that is Michael K’s life and times, but 
consequently to the act of delimitation, the drawing of potentially confining boundaries 
which accompany this story’s construction. In tracing the medical officer’s interpretative 
confinement of Michael K’s meaning, this section guides the reader into a moment of 
self-reflexivity with regard to the confinement imposed by his/her own particular reading 
of Michael K, the character, and Michael K, the novel. In other words, this section is 
crucial in that the medical officer’s choice of ‘reading’, a reading that reduces K’s multi-
dimensionality, alerts the reader to delimitation’s reductive dimension, that is, 
confinement.  
 
Like the shantytown scene in Age of Iron, this section, also located at the text’s core, is 
contained or enclosed by the remainder of the narrative. In both cases, the contained 
                                                 
67 Not only do these concrete and conceptual subspaces border one another, they also overlap. Although 
they are separate enclosures, the reader – as well as Michael K – moves effortlessly from one to the other, 
sometimes inhabiting all simultaneously. For example, when reminiscing about Wynberg Park, K can be 
said to conceptually occupy both the space of the park and the space of the cave.  
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section allows for a new perspective or vantage point that brings to light the conditions of 
the discursive registers employed by the text. In this context, Parry’s critique that “the 
reverberations of Coetzee’s intertextual transpositions, as well as the logic and trajectory 
of his narrative strategies, … inadvertently repeat the exclusionary colonialist gestures 
which the novels also criticize” (150, my emphasis), also cited in Chapter Two (page 26-
7) loses force. As argued in the previous chapter, some of Coetzee’s fictions, specifically 
Life & Times, purposefully solicit such foreclosing gestures in its performance of 
confinement. According to Sue Kossew, the reader’s “active” role in the performance of 
the text’s meaning “has not yet been systematically investigated in the context of post-
colonial reader-mobilization” (3), in this regard.68
 
 The two following excerpts serve as a 
starting point from which to discuss the active, authoritative position of the reader with 
regard to the allocation of meaning: 
Always, when he tried to explain himself to himself, there remained a gap, 
a hole, a darkness before which his understanding baulked, into which it 
was useless to pour words. The words were eaten up, the gap remained. 
His was always a story with a hole in it: a wrong story, always wrong. 
(150-1)  
 
And:  
Do you want the story to end with you? That would make it a sad story, 
don’t you think? There was a silence so dense that I heard it as a ringing in 
my ears, a silence of the kind one experiences in mine shafts, cellars, 
bomb shelters, airless places. (191) 
 
Head states that “[t]here is an obvious parallel with Derridean notions of textuality in the 
elusiveness of Michael K, a character who eludes final meanings and whose story 
                                                 
68 “[B]efore consolidating [his] own hermeneutic capture of Michael K”, Attwell demonstrates the 
awareness that “the novel does inscribe interpretation as a contest and an exercise in power” (The Politics 
of Writing 92). Head also writes that “the simultaneous reliance on and distrust of allegory in Coetzee’s 
work puts his readers through the experience of being enticed to overlay a work with a template of meaning 
before realizing the incompleteness or even complicity of such readings ... Like the colonizer, armed with 
his own inflexible codes for understanding the world, the reader must balk at his or her own inclination to 
order, simplify, explain, in the face of the alterity of the text” (“Belief” 104). 
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challenges the power of interpretation” (Coetzee 97). Dovey also writes that “[w]e shall 
see that in Life & Times Coetzee is concerned, precisely, to demonstrate that ‘the sum is 
supplemented by a precious remainder’” (Barthes qtd. in Dovey 276). The manner in 
which the text’s indeterminacy invites the reader’s concluding delineation, what Dovey 
expresses as “filling up the name with a meaning that is ultimately closed off” (276) does 
indeed resemble what Derrida calls the process of supplementarity.69
 
  
Michael K is told by two doctors that he can have his lip ‘corrected’, or, to be more 
precise, closed. Like the two doctors wanting to complete K’s mouth, the reader of the 
novel attempts to fill the empty or elusive spaces in the narrative (the ‘gaps’, the ‘holes’, 
the ‘darkness’) with his/her supplementation of its meaning. The correction of K’s 
defective lip can serve as a metaphor for the medical officer’s obsessive imposition of a 
final, closed meaning, as portrayed by the manner in which he tries to force K to yield his 
story and his ‘gathering meaning’: “I appeal to you, Michaels: yield!” (208). This 
coercion perceptibly confines K and his starving body, in a manner not unlike putting K’s 
labelled possessions in a museum: “We ought to value you and celebrate you, we ought 
to put your clothes on a maquette in a museum, your clothes and your packet of pumpkin 
seeds too, with a label” (208).  
 
Michael K reflects that his story is always one with a hole in it – a story that lacks a 
centre. Derrida writes that “it has always been thought that the centre, which is by 
definition unique, constituted that very thing within a structure which governs the 
structure, while escaping structurality” (224). The perceived absence of such a centre, the 
absence of a moral, lesson or theme, requires the reader and the critic to fill this empty 
space, this dense silence, to ‘correct’ and supplement it “by a process of giving it a centre 
or referring it to a point of presence, a fixed origin” (224). However, it is “useless to pour 
words” into this indeterminate or blank space; they are “eaten up” and the “gap 
[remains]” (Life & Times 150-1). 
 
                                                 
69 According to Derrida, the logic of supplementarity “is powerful and pervasive; it makes possible 
everything which we think of as human: language, passion, society, art. Once alerted to it, we can find it at 
work in the most diverse contexts” (Culler 168).  
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The absence of a centre is primarily achieved by positing an unstable relationship 
between signifier and signified, between which “there is never any final or complete 
coincidence or correspondence” (Derrida qtd. in Macey 99). The allegorical aspect of Life 
& Times relies on the manner in which a signifier, like Michael K’s hare lip, invites not 
one but various opposing signifieds or referents – and, in the words of Derrida, “where 
the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present” 
except within a system of differences, this “absence … extends the domain and the 
interplay of signification ad infinitum” (225). 
 
Such a “lack, the absence of a centre or origin” therefore permits the infinite interplay of 
signification, or the “movement of freeplay” and of “supplementarity” (Derrida 236). In 
other words, the “superabundance” (emphasis removed) of potential meaning in Life & 
Times is “the result of a lack” (Derrida 238) which solicits the supplementation of the 
reader. However, the supplemented meaning is swallowed by the darkness and becomes 
but one of various signifieds struggling to prevail. “One cannot determine the centre”, 
says Derrida (236-7). He concludes: 
 
[t]here are thus two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, 
of freeplay. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering, a truth or 
an origin which is free from freeplay and from the order of the sign, and 
lives like an exile the necessity of interpretation. The other, which is no 
longer turned toward the origin, affirms freeplay. (240)  
 
Culler describes these two “irreconcilable” (Derrida 241) views of interpretation – which 
can be related directly to the concepts of confinement and containment respectively – as 
being either “retrospective, which attempts to reconstruct and original meaning or truth” 
or “prospective, which explicitly welcomes the indeterminacy of meaning” (158).  
 
Another important aspect of the text’s establishment of elusiveness is the third-person 
narrator’s principle of limited omniscience in Section I and III, that “indicates a refusal to 
impose a unifying framework, at least not without questioning the validity of such an 
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imposition” (Head 100). Whereas this caution is usually interpreted as the author’s 
awareness that the “too-hasty filling of [the] silence … of the Other … can itself become 
a colonizing activity” (Kossew 146), it can also be interpreted as the text’s invitation to 
the reader to exercise control over the text and realise that the ‘life’, the ‘being’ of 
Michael K, is dependent on his/her interpretation of the story. According to Head:  
 
[j]ust as K eludes interpretation, so does the novel. The effect of this … is 
… to elucidate more clearly the hegemonies that are involved in the 
reading exchange. Interpretative assumptions are themselves held up to 
question, just as the function and definition of allegory is self-consciously 
examined. (106) 
 
Certain textual indeterminacies, therefore, invite the reader “to assign a ‘meaning’ and a 
voice to Michael K” in order, I would argue in accordance with Kossew, to perform the 
“the dangers of imposing an inauthentic voice upon the Other” (139-40).  
 
Consequently, one could interpret K’s evasion of meaning as a performance of the text’s 
concern with interpretative confinement. The narrative establishes K as a textuality, a 
meaning that “is always in motion or in transit” (Derrida qtd. in Macey 93). The reader 
follows, chases this meaning in transit, trying to make sense of its significance (like the 
medical officer at the end of Section II) whilst “working in conjunction with the 
structures of the text” (Macey 324). K unsuccessfully tries to “escape” this “imposed 
meaning, the process of signification” (Kossew 149). As a result, it would seem that the 
reader and Michael K are both constructions of the text’s structures or design; the one’s 
epic pursuit of the other is staged in the novel’s performance of interpretation. 
 
In conclusion, through the medical officer’s confinement of K, among others, the novel 
reveals how not to approach the other. Although the narrative does not provide an explicit 
alternative to interpretative confinement, the text does give certain clues, as interwoven 
with particular images, which have lead to my conception of containment as such a 
substitute: K’s general lack of judgment, the presence of enabling structures of 
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containment like the teaspoon, and the paradoxical impression that even a ‘free’ space 
owes its existence to permeable borders. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the 
notion of containment is a partial imposition on the text which facilitates my 
consideration of its performance of the act of delimitation.  
 
‘The Moral of the Whole Story’ 
 
This chapter has examined the various ways in which the concrete and conceptual spaces 
in and of the narrative either contain or confine Michael K’s body. A critical containment 
of Life & Times of Michael K has been shown to acknowledge the manner in which 
textual indeterminacies generate an ontological flicker that is founded on the following 
understanding of interpretation:  
 
interpretation of the sign is not … a meaning but another sign; it is a 
reading, not a decodage, and this reading has, in its turn, to be interpreted 
into another sign, and so on ad infinitum. Pierce calls this process by 
means of which ‘one sign gives birth to another’ pure rhetoric, as 
distinguished from pure grammar, which postulates the possibility of 
unproblematic, dyadic meaning, and pure logic, which postulates the 
possibility of the universal truth of meanings. (De Man Allegories of 
Reading 9) 
 
Life & Times is located within this realm of infinitely deferred meaning – and so is its 
criticism. My interpretation of the ‘sign’ that is Michael K is but another sign that will be 
translated into yet another sign by the readers of this thesis. In other words, my 
delimitation of Life & Times of Michael K is one of many. Every act of reading is, 
inevitably, an act of delimitation. Accordingly, this chapter has attempted to draw a 
flexible and permeable rather than a rigid and impenetrable boundary, in order to 
establish a reciprocal relationship with the novel. By means of this critical containment, 
the chapter has chosen to interrogate the manner in which Life & Times solicits a choice 
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between interpretations that either confine and limit, or contain and multiply the text’s 
discursive dimensions.  
 
To be precise, the chapter has examined the medical officer’s ‘reading’ of Michael K as a 
conceptual space of confinement akin to K’s imprisonment in actual and conceptual 
camps. In addition, just as Michael K’s indeterminacy is shown to puzzle the medical 
officer, forcing him to delimit K’s being, Life & Times of Michael K’s various types of 
indeterminacy are taken to bewilder the reader, compelling him/her into delimitation. In 
soliciting the reader’s supplementation of the ‘gaps’, ‘holes’ or ‘darkness’ in and of the 
text, these indeterminacies are presented as the novel’s primary means of performing the 
ethics of delimitation, which is this thesis’s primary concern.  
 
I could conclude by extracting a moral from the narrative, all the while shouting, “‘Am I 
right?’ … ‘Have I understood you? If I am right, hold up your right hand, if I am wrong 
hold up your left!’” (229), the idea of a moral prompted by Michael K himself:  
 
Is that the moral of it all, he thought, the moral of the whole story: that 
there is time enough for everything? Is that how morals come, unbidden, 
in the course of events, when you least expect them? (249) 
 
And:  
 
Is this my education? he wondered. Am I at last learning about life here in 
the camp? It seemed to him that scene after scene of life was playing itself 
out before him and that the scenes all cohered. He had a presentiment of a 
single meaning upon which they were converging or threatening to 
converge, though he did not know yet what that might be. (122)70
 
  
                                                 
70 Also note the following example: “The lesson, if there was a lesson, if there were lessons embedded in 
events, seemed to be not to kill such large animals” (78). 
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However, I disagree with Dovey’s definition of Michael K, “the victim”, as “the … 
vehicle for a … form of moral instruction”, her delimitation of the genre as “a fable … 
with a lesson or a moral embedded in events” (285), and, thus, with the idea that Life & 
Times conveys a lesson, a moral, or some inherent truth. Although my discussion of the 
novel’s performance of interpretation “remains restricted to the act of reading and of 
writing, and to the process of subject constitution this involves” (Dovey 287), it 
nevertheless suggests an underlying moral. It seems that Michael K, the character, and 
Life & Times of Michael K, the text, can never wholly escape the critic’s delimitation; 
even a critical containment draws boundaries. As keenly observed by Graff in his essay 
on indeterminacy, “[i]t is noteworthy that critics who insist on the indeterminacy of 
literature are usually just as sure of their interpretations, and write in just as confident a 
fashion, as critics who believe in determinate meanings and correct interpretations” 
(175).  
 
As a concession to K’s singularity – an attribute inevitably forsaken by this chapter’s 
emphasis on his textuality – I shall, for the moment, leave the moral, the lesson, the 
single meaning, in all its indeterminacy, to speak for – or perform – itself.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
“RECORD OF AN ENGAGEMENT”: RECIPROCITY IN  
ELIZABETH COSTELLO: EIGHT LESSONS  
With Hughes it is a matter – I emphasize – not of inhabiting another mind 
but of inhabiting another body. That is the kind of poetry I bring to your 
attention today: poetry that does not try to find an idea in the animal, that 
is not about the animal, but is instead the record of an engagement with 
him. (Elizabeth Costello 97-8) 
 
1 
 
Like the poet, Ted Hughes, gazing at the caged jaguar, I stand before Elizabeth Costello: 
Eight Lessons (2003) “mesmerized ... entranced ... and overwhelmed”, my “powers of 
understanding pushed beyond their limit” (95). This chapter will discuss not only 
Costello’s preferred mode of engagement, but also my own particular conversation with 
the text to emphasise the manner in which it has problematised the concept of limitation 
deployed in Coetzee’s earlier works, as well as by this thesis’s paradigm.  
 
Elizabeth Costello is a collection of texts that describes eight experiences in the late life 
of the aging Australian author, Elizabeth Costello. In five of the eight lessons, each 
describing a specific event in Costello’s life, the reader accompanies her to various 
locations – Pennsylvania (“Lesson 1: Realism”), a fifteen-day cruise to the Ross Ice Shelf 
(“Lesson 2: The Novel in Africa”), Appleton College (“Lessons 3 & 4: The Lives of 
Animals”), rural Zululand (“Lesson 5: The Humanities in Africa”), Amsterdam (“Lesson 
6: The Problem of Evil”) and even to a Kafkaesque purgatory (“Lesson 8: At the Gate”). 
Except for Lessons 5, 7 and 8, she is invited in her capacity as the world-famous author 
of The House on Eccles Street (1969), in which she has given voice to Marion Bloom 
from Joyce’s Ulysses. A ninth chapter, a postscript in the form of a letter, “Letter of 
Elizabeth, Lady Chandos”, provides the necessary retrospection.  
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Eight of these experiences are somewhat ironically called ‘lessons’ (Attridge “A Writer’s 
Life” 259). These ‘lessons’ presumably refer to the papers Costello delivers within the 
respective chapters. Moreover, each paper bears a similar title to the chapter that contains 
it. Chapter or “Lesson 1: Realism”, for example, encloses the lecture, “What is realism?”, 
as well as the context or story of that lecture, in other words, the events and commentary 
that precede and follow it.  
 
The protagonist, Elizabeth Costello, was conceived by Coetzee for the purpose of a 
presentation or, rather, a performance at Bennington College on realism. The first chapter 
was, therefore, initially performed as or in the place of a paper. It describes in acutely 
realist fashion the fictional events preceding and following, as well as, most importantly, 
including a seminar on the same topic by the character, Elizabeth Costello. In other 
words, instead of expressing Coetzee’s thoughts as was expected by the audience, the 
lectures rather communicated the thoughts of a fictional character. Not only is there a 
certain semblance between Costello and Coetzee’s surnames, but both are renowned 
authors “from the Southern Hemisphere” (Attridge “A Writer’s Life” 255). Just as 
Coetzee presents a seminar on realism at an American college, Costello delivers a paper 
on the same topic at a similar institution as well. In the same manner that Coetzee’s 
second lecture ensues the following day, Costello’s seminar also comes to pass the day 
after the first.71
 
  
As Attridge notes, Coetzee’s lectures – or stories – therefore appear to mirror the 
circumstances of their presentation. With regard to Coetzee’s second paper, he describes 
his surprise when Professor John Coetzee opens the first of the two 1997 Tanner Lectures 
on Human Values – under the general title “The Lives of Animals” – with the words: “He 
is waiting at the gate when her flight comes in” (“A Writer’s Life” 254). “No preliminary 
explanation,” writes Attridge:  
 
                                                 
71 Although there are many similarities between Coetzee and Costello, the differences are somewhat 
underplayed by critics who are eager to equate the two personas and their opinions. 
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no introduction to prepare us for this clearly fictional statement, couched 
in the third-person present tense familiar from The Master of Petersburg 
(his most recent novel at the time), and for those of us who thought this 
might be the familiar lecturer’s strategy of beginning with a quotation 
from another author, no break in the fictional tissue from henceforward to 
the end of the presentation. What made the event in which we were 
participating all the more disquieting was our gradual realization that it 
was being mirrored, in a distorted representation, in the fiction itself. (“A 
Writer’s Life” 254-5) 
 
In comparison to Coetzee’s Life & Times of Michael K, which, though interrupted by 
Section II, is still fairly recognisable as a narrative, Elizabeth Costello problematises the 
question of narration on a structural or formal level. It follows that the text does not allow 
for a linear unpacking of a logical, consequential argument. Whereas two or three main 
discursive registers (like allegory and realism) can be extrapolated from Life & Times of 
Michael K and Age of Iron, in Elizabeth Costello a variety of different and conflicting 
events or registers are staged and juxtaposed, bringing to light the limits and possibilities 
of each perspective. The relationships between these vantage points are further 
complicated in that certain positions are promoted more than others through the careful 
interplay of lecture, response, and interpersonal dialogue (as in Lessons 1 to 6). The ideas 
in this text, therefore, are lifted to the level of argumentation. Attridge describes the 
arguments within these stories:  
 
arguings, utterances made by individuals in concrete situations – wholly 
unlike the paradigmatic philosophical argument, which implicitly lays 
claim to a timeless, spaceless, subjectless condition as it pursues its logic. 
They are, that is, events staged within the event of the work: and they 
invite the reader’s participation not just in the intellectual exercise of 
positions expounded and defended but in the human experience, and the 
human cost, of exposing convictions, beliefs, doubts, and fears in a public 
arena. (“A Writer’s Life” 259) 
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It follows that the reader circulates through different beliefs, doubts, fears and opinions, 
of which some are more convincing than others. In oscillating between varieties of 
stances, passing from belief to belief, the text appears to test each perspective’s 
conditions for a reciprocal relationship against the rest. This challenging text frustrates 
the critic who, in search of a solution to the problematic staged by the text, then tries to 
reduce its indeterminacy by means of the reasonable encounter contested by Costello 
(even though she herself employs reason in the refutation of this totalising system). Given 
that some of the ‘lessons’ consider a sympathetic engagement with the other that seems to 
elude the grasp of reason, this presents a challenge to the critic.  
 
Although the range of ideas and impression voiced in the eight lessons (or nine, if one 
includes the postscript) eludes categorisation, I will attempt, nonetheless, to trace the 
relations between the most prevalent ideas of this singularly resistant text.   
 
2 
 
In “Lesson 1: Realism”, the reader is introduced to the notion that realism, as a genre, 
requires the writer to imagine or think herself into the embodied being, the existence, of 
an other. When asked by an interviewer whether she finds it easy to write from the 
position of a man, Costello replies, “Easy? No. If it were easy it wouldn’t be worth doing. 
It is the otherness that is the challenge. Making up someone other than yourself. Making 
up a world for him to move in” (12). John additionally underscores that his “mother has 
been a man … She has also been a dog. She can think her way into other people, into 
other existences. I have read her; I know. It is within her powers. Isn’t that what is most 
important about fiction: that it takes us out of ourselves, into other lives?” (22-3). In the 
words of Emmanuel Egudu in “Lesson 2: The Novel in Africa”, it appears that by means 
of her writing, Costello inhabits “fleeting identities” to “pick up and wear and discard 
like clothing” (43). In a related passage in “Lesson 8: At the Gate”, Costello comes to the 
following realisation:  
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now that she thinks of it, she lives, in a certain sense, by belief. Her mind, 
when she is truly herself, appears to pass from one belief to the next, 
pausing, balancing, then moving on. A picture comes to her of a girl 
crossing a stream; it comes together from a line from Keats: Keeping 
steady her laden head across a brook. She lives by belief, she works by 
belief, she is a creature of belief. What a relief! Should she run back and 
tell them, her judges, before they disrobe (and before she changes her 
mind)? (222) 
 
In Costello’s conception, it appears that the writer moves from one body to the next. 
Costello is a woman of principle, of conviction. Although she contests this claim in “At 
the Gate”, given the manner in which she passes from one belief to another, all her 
preceding lectures testify to an unwavering belief in the imagination’s ability to inhabit 
‘fleeting identities’ – whether of humans, animals or inanimate objects – and their 
fleeting beliefs, if they possess any. In fact, when facing the judges of the last lesson’s 
tribunal for the second time, Costello gives corresponding evidence of a ‘buried’ belief in 
the imagination in her description of the manner in which the torrential rain awakens the 
seemingly lifeless bodies of the little frogs of the Dulgannon:  
 
Silent until the next rains come, rapping, as it were, on thousands of tiny 
coffin lids. In those coffins hearts begin to beat, limbs begin to twitch that 
for months have been lifeless. The dead awake. As the caked mud softens, 
the frogs begin to dig their way out, and soon their voices resound again in 
joyous exultation beneath the vault of the heavens. (216) 
 
In this singular evocation, Costello, in fact, demonstrates to the judges that she is able to 
imagine herself into the being of an other. In other words, she performs an act of the 
imagination. This act is not merely a matter of “inhabiting another mind but of inhabiting 
another body” (96, my emphasis). In describing the life cycle of the frog, Costello 
attempts to inhabit the being of the frog to such an extent that, for a moment, she feels as 
if she is the frog. Thus, what we have in Costello’s demonstration of her implicit 
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conviction is an instance of the power of the imagination to bridge the distance between 
self and other or, otherwise stated, writing, in this case poetry, “that does not try to find 
an idea in the animal, that is not about the animal, but is instead the record of an 
engagement with him” (96). The reader is thus introduced to the act of writing as an 
active and arduous exertion of the imagination that brings together two beings. 
 
Although Costello’s vivid evocation of realist detail can be aligned with literary realism, 
it is also tempting to read this portrayal in allegorical terms. An interpretation of this life 
cycle as an allegory of, for example, the manner in which the writer’s imagination brings 
the other to life, seems solicited by the ensuing discussion between Costello and the 
judges with regard to its allegorical nature. However, Costello emphasises that although 
“the life cycle of the frog may sound allegorical …, to the frogs themselves it is no 
allegory, it is the thing itself, the only thing” (217). As implicitly demonstrated in the 
previous two chapters, allegory requires realism to fix the signifier in place and, thus, to 
imbue it with the necessary stability. On the other hand, whereas realism may appear, in a 
certain context, to possess stable, single meaning, as the contexts of reading change, what 
seemed to be a stable realist text is suddenly opened to allegorical reinterpretation. 
Costello’s evocation of the Dulgannon frogs, in other words, does not present either a 
straightforward allegory or an unproblematic realist representation, but the dialectic 
between these discursive registers. In fact, Elizabeth Costello as a whole can be described 
as interplay between divergent positions.  
 
3 
 
The first lesson, “Realism”, is set in motion with two significant paragraphs that display 
the manner in which this register fixes the signified to the signifier. The passage deals 
with the notion of imagination as a bridge between the reality of the reader and the reality 
of the text:  
 
There is first of all the problem of the opening, namely, how to get us 
from where we are, which is, as yet, nowhere, to the far bank. It is a 
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simple bridging problem, a problem of knocking together a bridge. People 
solve such problems every day. They solve them, and having solved them 
push on. 
Let us assume that, however, it may have been done, it is done. Let us take 
it that the bridge is built and crossed, that we can put it out of our mind. 
We have left behind the territory in which we were. We are in the far 
territory, where we want to be. (1) 
 
In the first place, this passage sheds light on the fissure between the writer and the 
narrativised other. Accordingly, distance refers not only to the dissimilarity between the 
two territories but also to the gap between signifier and signified which realism attempts 
to close.  
 
Secondly, the passage expresses fiction’s main concern, or ‘problem’, that is to say, the 
bridging of this gap between the world of the writer and that of his characters. The 
writer’s implied purpose is to carry the reader from the territory in which she was, the 
extratextual reality, into the far territory where she wants to be, the intratextual, fictional 
reality. In a practical portrayal, this passage likens the writer’s imagination to a bridge 
that transports the reader from one world to the next. “What intrigues [Costello] is less 
the metaphysics than the mechanics, the practicalities of congress across a gap in being” 
(184), explains the narrator in “Lesson 7: Eros”. The relation to sexual congress will be 
discussed in a moment.  
 
The passage’s location, at the outset of “Realism”, adds force to the metaphor of the 
bridge in that, yet again, the form emulates the content. The passage is itself a bridge that 
accompanies and introduces the reader to the reality of the text; itself a performance of 
the mechanics, the practicalities of such a journey. In a similar sense, like Costello’s 
evocation of the Dulgannon frogs, the fictional text, “Realism”, stages an 
interrelationship between realism and allegory or, in other words, the bridge between 
these two registers. A variety of statements open themselves to allegorical interpretation, 
especially when Costello is described as a “mouthpiece for the divine … a god incarnated 
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in child” (31), a description that refers to “the powers that animate her” (26), her creator 
or her god, which could point to Coetzee himself.  
 
To yet again refer to the gap between word and world, it should be noted that the narrator 
of “Realism” (a text that is performed by Coetzee during his live delivery of the text) 
regularly draws attention to the gaps in the narrative in a self-reflexive gesture: “We 
skip” (2, 15, 16, 17, 24) and “A gap” (27, 28).72
 
 With regard to these ‘gaps’, the narrator 
writes/says:  
[i]t is not a good idea to interrupt the narrative too often, since storytelling 
works by lulling the reader or listener into a dreamlike state in which the 
time and space of the real world fade away, superseded by the time and 
space of the fiction. Breaking into the dream draws attention to the 
constructedness of the story, and plays havoc with the realist illusion. 
However, unless certain scenes are skipped over we will be here all 
afternoon. The skips are not part of the text, they are part of the 
performance. (16) 
 
Note that a couple of pages – or a couple of hours – later, the narrator uses a sentence 
similar to the previous citation’s last: “We skip ahead again, a skip this time in the text 
rather than in the performance” (24). Breaking into the dream, the illusion of the story’s 
realism, these two statements which are in themselves interruptions of or gaps in the 
narrative, also underscore the constructed nature of ‘realism’ itself. It is shown to be a 
discursive register that relies on the text’s ability to bridge the gap between two realities 
in its suspension of disbelief. “Remove your gaze for but an instant, and the mirror falls 
to the floor and shatters” (20), warns Costello. The distance between the extratextual 
reality and the intratextual world is further emphasised in that narrative time and narrated 
time, in other words the text and its performance, are revealed as distinct. The text 
executes this underscoring of distance and difference to expose the manner in which the 
                                                 
72 These gaps are not unlike the textual indeterminacies encountered in Life & Times of Michael K: elusive 
elements which solicit supplementation and, consequently, draw attention to the reader’s participation in 
the generation of the narrative.  
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genre, realism – the subject of the chapter’s ‘lesson’ – cloaks the text’s distance from the 
reality it claims to reflect and represent. As in the case of Age of Iron, Elizabeth Costello 
appears to contain and perform the discursive register, realism, in order to problematise 
its limits and possibilities. “The word-mirror [of the text] is broken, irreparably, it seems” 
(19), says Costello.  
 
Thus far, this chapter has examined the manner in which Elizabeth Costello describes 
imagination as a bridge between self and other. I wish to elaborate on such possession in 
the sections that follow, exploring the implications of such imaginative possession, 
beginning with the question of the erotic.  
 
4 
 
Realism has never been comfortable with ideas. It could not be otherwise: 
realism is premised on the idea that ideas have no autonomous existence, 
can exist only in things. So when it needs to debate ideas, as here, realism 
is driven to invent situations – walks in the countryside, conversations – in 
which characters give voice to contending ideas and thereby in a certain 
sense embody them. The notion of embodying turns out to be pivotal. (9)73
 
  
Here, the narrator of “Realism” calls attention to the genre’s reliance on the embodiment 
of ideas. The passage may also suggest that the genre itself is an embodiment of reality, 
giving it shape and structure in the textual realm of the Symbolic. In “Lesson 7: Eros”, 
Costello’s conception of the mechanics of the possession of an other body is vulgarly 
literalised and thus emphasised by descriptions of sexual encounters between the bodies 
of gods and men. The fissure between dissimilar corporealities (the corporeal reality of 
beings) is here examined in terms of a literal distance and difference between two 
radically dissimilar bodies: that of a god (perhaps the author, allegorically speaking) and 
that of a human being (presumably a character, like Costello). This distance is related to 
                                                 
73 John describes realism’s method in terms of his mother’s appearance: “The blue costume, the greasy hair, 
are details, signs of a moderate realism. Supply the particulars, allow the significations to emerge of 
themselves” (4).  
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desire, and the merging of the two bodies, “the physical mingling of two orders of being” 
(185), with the erotic realisation of that desire: “Bad enough to have a full-grown swan 
jabbing webbed feet into your backside while he has his way, or a one-ton bull leaning 
his moaning weight on you” (184), Costello writes of the intercourse between two 
dissimilar beings. In the context of this examination of ‘interpenetration’, Susan 
Moebius’s following question to John acquires a whole new meaning: “If there were no 
difference, what would become of desire?” (23).  
 
One might even conclude that the intercourse, the interpenetration between the body of 
the author-as-god, and the body of the character-as-human, gives birth to or generates the 
text itself:  
 
Appetency and chance: a powerful duo, more than powerful enough to 
build a cosmology on, from the atoms and the little things with nonsense 
names that make up atoms to Alpha Centauri and Cassiopeia and the great 
dark back of beyond. The gods and ourselves, whirled helplessly around 
by the winds of chance, yet pulled equally towards each other, towards not 
only B and C and D but towards X and Y and Z and Omega too. Not the 
least thing, not the last thing but is called by love. (192, my emphasis) 
 
The postscript, “Letter of Elizabeth, Lady Chandos”, plays with this notion of 
interpenetration. In her letter to Francis Bacon, this Elizabeth writes of her husband’s 
“craving to enter [sirens and dryads’] naked, glistening bodies” (227). This expresses a 
desire not only to penetrate the body of an other, but also to interpret, to inhabit and 
understand that other. The terms ‘penetration’ and ‘interpretation’ are thus entangled to 
demonstrate the extent that a writer ‘penetrates’ the being of an other by means of her 
imaginative possession or ‘interpretation’ of that being’s body. In likening writing – and 
its creation of a cosmology – to sexual intimacy, the manner in which the imagination 
brings together or merges corporealities, is underscored.  
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In “Lesson 5: The Humanities in Africa”, Costello writes a letter to her sister, describing 
how she once posed for a nude portrait, painted by the dying Mr Phillips. The memory 
suggests the manner in which desire, a consequence of the distance and difference 
between two bodies, energises the act of the imagination, the act of art. Whilst posing, 
Costello recalls Renoir’s statement, “I paint with my penis – didn’t Renoir say that, 
Renoir of the plump, creamy-skinned ladies?” (148, emphasis removed). This evokes the 
manner in which art attempts to close the gap, to realise the desire, between dissimilar 
corporealities – in other words, to interpenetrate.  
 
In Costello’s words, “[t]here are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination” (80). But the 
postscript of the text significantly underscores the dangers, and indeed impossibility, of 
the unbounded imagination. A careful examination of the text demonstrates that 
imagination is not likened to the total realisation of the self’s desire to merge with the 
other. Imagination should rather be considered in terms of a desire which can never fully 
be realised. If the desire is, in fact, realised, the differentiation between self and other 
disappears. Lady Chandos’s husband, for example, loses his mind because of the inability 
to separate himself from his surroundings. The self’s total and boundless union with the 
world, in the subsequent absence of delineation, is shown to be the cause of insanity – 
and delineation, therefore, deemed necessary. As argued in previous chapters, 
boundedness is indeed the basis of meaning and relation. Although Costello’s notions of 
the sympathetic imagination, as the essay will demonstrate, appear to promote a 
boundless communion between the self and the animal, she retains differentiation 
throughout her imaginative encounter with the little frogs of the Dulgannon, Kafka’s ape 
and Hughes’s jaguar.  
 
Significantly, erotic possession is juxtaposed in the text with possession by evil, the 
subject of my next brief elucidation.  
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5  
 
As Elizabeth argues in “Lesson 5: The Humanities in Africa” and “Lesson 6: The 
Problem of Evil”, there should be a limit, a boundary to one’s interpenetration of an other 
being. The notion of writing as a potential threat to the harmony and sanity of the soul is 
explored in these two fictions. In “Lesson 5: The Humanities in Africa”, Costello for 
example criticises her sister Blanche for having allowed, or even having driven, a simple 
man, Joseph, to spend most of his life carving crucifixes from wood:  
 
‘Why didn’t you get [Joseph] to make something else besides crucifixes, 
crucifications? What does it do to a person’s – if I dare use the word – soul 
to spend his working life carving a man in agony over and over again? 
When he isn’t doing odd jobs, that is.’ (137)74
 
 
In carving Jesus in agony, Joseph has to momentarily inhabit or possess his (His) 
suffering body. This passage suggests that when an artist like Joseph imagines his way 
into the embodied being of another, an aspect of that being remains, affecting or tainting 
his soul.  
 
Costello persists with this train of thought when, in “Lesson 6: The Problem of Evil”, she 
delivers a paper, “Witness, Silence, and Censorship”, at an Amsterdam conference that 
warns the audience of the dangers associated with the imagination, in other words, with 
an attempt of the unbounded possession of the other. Costello specifically engages with 
the manner in which Paul West’s novel, The Very Rich Hours of Count von Stauffenberg, 
                                                 
74 Linking suffering to salvation, Blanche replies that Joseph has spent “thirty years of his earthly existence 
representing, for the eyes of others certainly but principally for his own eyes, Our Saviour in his agony. 
Hour after hour, day after day, year after year, he imagined that agony and, with a fidelity you can behold 
for yourself, reproduced it, to the best of his ability, without varying it, without importing new fashions into 
it, without injecting into it any of his own personality. Which of us, I now ask, will Jesus be most 
gladdened to welcome into his kingdom: Joseph with his wasted hands, or you, or me?” (138). 
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introduces the reader to torture, suffering and the “obscene” (169),75
 
 stating explicitly 
(and somewhat eccentrically):  
certain things are not good to read or to write. To put the point another 
way: I take seriously the claim that the artist risks a great deal by 
venturing into forbidden places: risks, specifically, himself; risks, perhaps, 
all. I take this claim seriously because I take seriously the forbiddenness of 
forbidden places. The cellar in which the July 1944 plotters were hanged 
is one such forbidden place. I do not believe we should go into that cellar, 
any of us. I do not believe Mr West should go there; and, if he chooses to 
go nevertheless, I believe we should not follow. (173) 76
 
 
According to Costello, certain things should be left unsaid; certain experiences should be 
left forgotten – lest they taint the soul. “Through Hitler’s hangman a devil entered Paul 
West”, Costello thinks to herself, “and in his book West in turn has given that devil his 
freedom, turned him loose upon the world. She felt the brush of his leathery wings, as 
sure as soap, when she read those dark pages” (167-8).  
 
Aside from forms of erotic possession and possession by evil, the text devotes much 
space to what one might call possession across species. Whereas the concept of limitation 
has been deployed fairly unproblematically in the previous sections with regard to the 
sympathetic imagination (which provides the means for communing with other species), 
Lessons 3 and 4 problematise this concept by opposing reason and imagination in such a 
manner as to compel this thesis to rethink the limitations of its chosen paradigm. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 “Obscene. That is the word, a word of contested etymology, that she must hold on to as talisman. She 
chooses to believe that obscene means off-stage. To save our humanity, certain things that we may want to 
see (may want to see because we are human!) must remain off-stage” (169). 
76 In “Lesson 3: The Philosophers and the Animals”, Costello, accordingly, refuses to invoke the terror of 
the slaughterhouses. 
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6 
 
The two lectures that constitute “The Lives of Animals” confront the reader with a 
multitude of arguments for and against particular aspects of the animal rights debate. The 
fictional nature of the text allows for the juxtaposition of various opinions, some more 
ludicrous than others, in a complex and sophisticated manner. These arguments prompt 
an examination of the various ways in which the subject can attempt to engage with and 
understand animals. Specifically two opposing arguments regarding this approach are 
presented. The first presents the role of the poetic imagination, enabling humanity to 
share rather than appropriate a realm of being with animals (“The Poets and the 
Animals”). The second presents the necessity of appropriation because of the irreducible 
delimitation of the human gaze (“The Philosophers and the Animals”).  
 
In “Capturing Animals”, a chapter in Ted Hughes’s Poetry in the Making, the poet writes 
that “[t]here are all sorts of ways of capturing animals and birds and fish” (15). Hughes 
likens poetry, one such method, to his childhood “pursuit of mice … snatching them from 
under the sheaves as the sheaves were lifted away” (15). In the fourth lesson of Elizabeth 
Costello: Eight Lessons (2003), “The Lives of Animals: The Poets and the Animals”, 
Costello presents a lecture at Appleton College, in which she compares Rainer Maria 
Rilke’s poem, “The Panther”, with Ted Hughes’s “The Jaguar” and “Second Glance at a 
Jaguar”. 
 
Given Costello’s concern with the confinement and maltreatment of animals, as 
expressed in her previous lecture (or lesson), “The Lives of Animals: The Philosophers 
and the Animals”, it seems fitting that she chooses two poems in which the animals are 
caged – or captured. Whereas the bars, the limits of Rilke’s cage are said to “[leave] the 
will stupefied, narcotized” (95), Hughes’s cage “has no reality” to the jaguar. “He is 
elsewhere” (95).  
 
As the two “Lives of Animals” lectures demonstrate, Costello is trying, somewhat 
ineptly, to engage with animals without subjecting them to the concrete cage of science 
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or the conceptual cage of reason. What seems to attract Costello’s preference is the 
manner in which Hughes’s poem succeeds in negating the jaguar’s capture, or 
delimitation, in opposition to Rilke’s panther who thoroughly succumbs to his 
imprisonment. Whereas Rilke’s poem is “about” (96) the idea of a somewhat allegorical 
panther, which is “a stand-in for something else” (95), Hughes’s poem is a singular 
“record of an engagement” (98), a realist evocation of a corporeal being’s kinetic 
consciousness. “The Jaguar” mobilises poetic devices – or, in Kristeva’s terminology, the 
semiotic as opposed to the symbolic dimension of language – in such a way as to 
generate a sense of a physical being that, like Kafka’s ape, is embedded in a system of 
relations. Hughes explains that his “words have made a body for [the animal] and given it 
somewhere to walk” (20).  
 
Costello further argues that “we know the jaguar not from the way he seems but from the 
way he moves. The body is as the body moves, or as the currents of life move within him. 
The poems ask us to imagine our way into that way of moving, to inhabit that body” (96). 
In other words, “[w]ith Hughes it is a matter … not of inhabiting another mind but of 
inhabiting another body” (96). In fact, Costello believes that the animal’s “whole being is 
in the living flesh” (110, my emphasis).  
 
In Lesson 4, Costello discusses Hughes’s poem as an instance of the manner in which the 
poet can capture and convey “a feel for the [animal’s] experience” (74), a sense of the 
jaguar’s “fullness, embodiedness, the sensation of being” (78). According to Costello, 
this is “a heavily affective sensation – of being a body with limbs that have extension in 
space, of being alive in the world” (78), in other words, of being a ‘living soul’, a ‘body-
soul’ or an ‘embodied soul’. This sense of harmony and unity is called joy, the feeling of 
boundless elation that stems from the dissolution of the boundary between the body, the 
seat of being, and the mind, the seat of “thinking, cogitation” (78). In the preceding 
lecture, as contained by Lesson 3, Costello tells the audience: “[T]here is no limit to the 
extent to which we can think ourselves into the being of another. There are no bounds to 
the sympathetic imagination” (80). Costello views reason as the bounded realm of ideas, 
a totalising system or camp that has confined Kafka and Köhler’s apes or “biological 
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automations” (66) in a “labyrinth of constraint, manipulation and duplicity” (74). This 
“narrow self-regenerating intellectual tradition” (69) “repudiates the primitive and 
celebrates the Western bias towards abstract thought” (97).  
 
7 
 
Within the discourse of modernity – a discourse that pervades many of the arguments 
cited in “The Lives of Animals” – the animal, to adapt Giroux’s description of the 
colonial relation, “is often defined within totalizing and universalistic theories that create 
a transcendental rational white, male, Eurocentric subject that … occupies the centers of 
power” (455). In this sense, “The Lives of Animals” is not just about animal rights, but 
also about the “[reproduction] [of] the distance between the centres [the humans] and 
margins [the animals] of power” (Giroux 455). According to Giroux, “[r]ead against this 
Eurocentric transcendental subject, the Other” (the animal) is “reduced to the imagery of 
the colonizer” (445). “The Lives of Animals” can be seen, therefore, as a text located 
within “the wider discourse of power and powerlessness” (Giroux 459). By challenging 
the fixed categories of human self and animal other, Coetzee is participating in a “healthy 
suspiciousness of all boundary-fixing and the hidden ways in which we subordinate, 
exclude and marginalize” (Bernstein qtd. in Giroux 468). 
 
The two lectures make an effort to free the categories of human self and animal other 
from their explicit oppositional delineations, and practices what might be described as a 
more heterogeneous approach, “signaling … difference at the very heart of similarity” 
(Hutcheon and Natoli “Preface” 444). Identity and difference are consequently rendered 
“at once ‘near to’ and ‘counter to’ each other” (Hutcheon qtd. in Hutcheon and Natoli 
“Preface” 444), problematising the notion of fixed categories. 
 
With regard to the subversion of what essentially constitutes the totalising metanarrative 
of the human species – in contrast to the petites histories of the various species of animals 
– in a text founded on a vast array of overlapping narrative frames, poetry is attributed 
considerable significance. Poetry is one of the mechanisms through which 
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“heterogeneous performance”, in the words of Baker, “worries” “the linear, empty space 
of homogeneity” (546). It expresses these decentred narratives, these petites histories, as 
part of a quest of “not seek[ing] to substitute one truth for another, one standard of beauty 
for another, one life ideal for another”, but of “brac[ing] itself for a life without truths, 
standards, ideals” (Bauman qtd. in Hutcheon and Natoli “Introduction” 3). 
 
According to Costello, poetry can subvert the habit of appropriative observation and 
categorisation, as employed by masters of the grand recits. To understand the true nature 
of the animal, one should try and imagine oneself into the position of the animal, she 
lectures. Specifically poetic engagement is mentioned as an ethical instance of trying to 
understand the animal as a being in its own right, with significance that is unique and 
autonomous. Costello states that the question to ask should not be: “Do we have 
something in common – reason, self-consciousness, a soul – with other animals?” (79) – 
a question that rigidly conforms to the modernist notion of fixed categories. Rather, the 
individual should look to the poetic imagination, to “poetry that does not try to find an 
idea in the animal, that is not about the animal, but is instead the record of an 
engagement” (Elizabeth Costello 97-8) with its embodied being: 
 
To be a living bat is to be full of being; being fully a bat is like being fully 
human, which is also to be full of being. Bat-being in the first case, 
human-being in the second, maybe; but those are secondary 
considerations. To be full of being is to live as a body-soul. One name for 
the experience of full being is joy. 
To be alive is to be a living soul. An animal – and we are all animals – is 
an embodied soul. (33)  
 
The notion of full being can be related to Egudu’s notion of the living voice. In the 
second lesson, Costello embarks on a cruise to the Ross Ice Shelf in her capacity as the 
famous writer, on which she delivers a seminar on “The Future of the Novel” to the 
cruise liner’s guests. She is joined by an old acquaintance, a fellow writer from Africa, 
Emmanuel Egudu, whose lecture, “The Novel in Africa”, follows hers. Egudu is the 
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embodiment of virile African masculinity: “He is dark, he is exotic, he is in touch with 
life’s energies” (53). In his lecture on orality as the African novel’s main characterising 
trait, “[h]e has spoken with force, perhaps even with passion” (45), as opposed to 
Costello’s hesitant, doubtful delivery on the novel as “an exercise in making the past 
coherent” (39).  
 
Egudu believes that “Africans need the living presence, the living voice” (50). In effect, 
he is the embodiment of this ‘living voice’, the orality of the African novel. With his 
“effortlessly booming voice” (40), he is said to make one “[s]hudder. The voice makes 
one shudder. Probably does, when one is breast to breast with it” (57). Another African (a 
character in “Lesson 5: The Humanities in Africa”), Father Msimungu is also endowed 
with a “baritone voice, surprising in so young a man” that “seems to come from 
effortlessly deep in the chest” (142).  
 
Egudu criticises the manner in which “literature has consolidated itself, prospered, and 
become what it is – one of the hugest dimensions of mankind – by denying the voice” (45, 
my emphasis), and consequently denying corporeality. He opposes the African novel’s 
embrace of the body to the Western novel’s practice of disembodiment: “The African 
novel is thus”, he claims, “in its very being, and before the first word is written, a critique 
of the Western novel, which has gone so far down the road of disembodiment” (45).  
 
Costello’s most famous novel, The House on Eccles Street, engages with James Joyce’s 
Ulysses and is thus associated with the (Western) tradition of disembodying the narrative. 
She is highly critical of Egudu’s emphasis on the African novel’s corporeality, stating 
that “there is something about the talk she does not like, something to do with orality and 
the mystique of orality. Always, she thinks, the body that is insisted on, pushed forward, 
and the voice, dark essence of the body, welling up from within it” (46). She concludes:  
 
all of Emmanuel’s talk of an oral novel, a novel that has kept in touch with 
the human voice and hence with the human body, a novel that is not 
disembodied like the Western novel but speaks the body and the body’s 
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truth, is just another way of propping up the mystique of the African in the 
last repository of primal human energies. (53) 
 
Interestingly, Costello, first, criticises the notion of the living voice (in Lesson 2) and, 
second, then proposes a similar concept, the concept of full being and the living 
embodied soul (Lessons 3 and 4) which also ‘insists on’ or ‘pushes forward’ the ‘dark 
essence of the body’:  
 
[t]he way that people live in their bodies. The way they move their hands. 
The way they walk. The way they smile or frown. The lilt of their speech. 
The way they sing. The timbre of their voices. The way they dance. The 
way they touch each other; how the hand lingers; the feel of the fingers. 
The way they make love. The way they lie after they have made love. The 
way they think. The way they sleep. (44) 
 
In a method that corresponds in many ways to Egudu’s notion of a fictional mode that 
engages with ‘the way that people live in their bodies’, Hughes’s poem serves as a record 
of the subject’s attempt to bring into appearance and share the jaguar’s kinetic 
consciousness. This attempt is born from the subject’s limited capacity to connect with its 
own, as well as the animal’s embodied being – ‘limited’ because the human has a 
different body than that of animals, a body that is endowed with the faculty of reason. On 
the other hand, given that the human body shares a similar substance and, also, is situated 
or embedded similarly in the world, the human is able to imagine the animal’s 
interrelationship with and in the world. It is the relationship between the human and the 
animal, where both phenomena are present, which provides, not complete, unbounded 
access to the animal’s ‘living soul’, but an engagement with its singular being. 
 
With this in mind, Hughes’s poem can be considered as an attempt to transcend the 
boundaries of reason, as well as the boundaries of the body, in the face of alterity, an 
endeavour that “remain[s] a matter of complete indifference to [its] objects” (96). Note 
that the poet, like the crowd, “stands mesmerized, and among them the man, the poet, 
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entranced and horrified and overwhelmed, his powers of understanding pushed beyond 
their limit” (95, own emphasis).  
 
According to Costello, it is “[t]he heart … the seat of a faculty, sympathy, that allows us 
to share at times the being of another” (79) or this “different kind of being-in-the-world” 
(95) separated from the realm of rational understanding. Such an engagement, a “mixture 
of shamanism and spirit possession” (98), cannot arise within the boundaries delineated 
by reason: “Fullness of being is a state hard to sustain in confinement” (78), notes 
Costello. On the other hand, the encounter is not devoid of reason. Costello, importantly, 
remarks: “If I do not subject my discourse to reason, whatever that is, what is left for me 
but to gibber and emote and knock over my water glass and generally make a monkey of 
myself?” (68). In addition, the philosophical and theoretical natures of the cited 
arguments lend themselves to intellectual, or rather, reasonable speculation. This 
emphasises that, although it is an interrelationship with or embeddedness in the world 
that is shared between humans and animals, it is still the faculty of reason that facilitates 
the engagement.  
 
It seems that, through its refutation of reason, Costello interrogates categorisation itself. 
“The Lives of Animals” problematises categorical distinctions and targets the notion of 
the fixed categories of the human self and the animal by demonstrating the manner in 
which these categories shift according to the type of approach or engagement. By calling 
into question the themes of “degraded Otherness”, Coetzee’s text problematises “notions 
of exclusionary identity, dominating heterogeneity, and universality” (Giroux 468) or, in 
other words, destabilises these “monolithic and homogeneous” categories “in the name of 
diversity, multiplicity and heterogeneity” (Hutcheon and Natoli “Preface” 444).  
 
What is of importance here is not whether these arguments can be resolved, but rather 
that these questions are being asked in a manner that sheds light on the problematic 
nature of reason’s confining yet necessary delimitation of the other. In addition, the body 
is presented as that which enables the engagement, but disables the full communion with 
the animal. To my mind, it would appear that the primary condition for a reciprocal 
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relationship with the other is the co-operation between opposites, a dialectic between the 
faculty of the imagination (which is presented as a space without limits), on the one hand, 
and that of reason (a total and totalising space), on the other.  
 
Costello, therefore, succeeds in founding an argument in favour of animal rights on the 
idea of reciprocity between animals and humans by transcending the objectifying 
relationship that perpetuates the categories of the human self and the animal other. She 
embraces a type of animism, sensing that even though the human individual does not 
have complete access to the animal’s being, it can be respected and valued, as well as 
apprehended through the sympathetic imagination which, along with reason, stabilises a 
relationship of sorts, one that acknowledges what Merleau-Ponty called the flesh of the 
world. 
 
8 
 
Given my consideration hitherto of delineation in Coetzee’s fiction, I was tempted to 
highlight two predominant concepts in Elizabeth Costello, like poetry and philosophy, 
and align them with ‘containment’ and ‘confinement’. However, as argued in the 
previous chapters, the enforcement of a predetermined framework would result in an 
inevitable confinement of the text. Confinement, in the guise of reason, is a strong 
presence in the text. With regard to containment, however, none of Elizabeth Costello’s 
variety of positions or perspectives on the relationship between self and other can be 
reduced to the category of containment which, in the context of this fictional text, 
assumes a rather rigid form.  
 
As the previous two chapters have demonstrated, Coetzee is concerned with the 
problematic of delimitation. His fictional works consider the ramifications of 
containment and confinement, of the significance it enables and the alterity it disables. 
Life & Times of Michael K elicits the paradigm explicitly. The text is permeated with 
images of confinement and containment, of which the concentration camps are the most 
prominent. Though not as prominent in Life & Times, the concept of delimitation features 
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quite strongly at the level of plot in Age of Iron, as discussed in previous chapters. 
However, the subject of this chapter’s delimiting gaze, Elizabeth Costello, has proved 
increasingly resistant to my attempts at translating its consideration of a non-rational 
engagement with the other into this essay’s rational vocabulary. The more I struggled to 
extrapolate the concept of enabling delimitation from the text’s notion of the sympathetic 
imagination, the more it pressed back, withstanding my attempts at confinement. The 
reason lies therein that the imaginative aspect of the sympathetic encounter (as opposed 
to its reasonable dimension) transcends the language of the limit. Containment, as an 
instrument of reason, proved incapable of engaging with this notion on its own terms.  
 
This brought to light that the framework deployed by this thesis, a framework which 
initially succeeded in drawing permeable boundaries, had become regularised within the 
frame of this study, a totalising system that would impose the terms deemed significant 
by its standards. I considered the possibility, then, that the text could be opposing totality 
or ‘confinement’ (having usurped ‘containment’ into its fabric) to infinity, in other words, 
opposing restrictive boundaries to limitlessness. The condition for reciprocity would, in 
this instance, entail a dialectical relationship between the infinite imagination and finite 
reason. For example, although Costello deems reason a totalising system, in her 
performance of the sympathetic engagement with the other (in Lessons 3, 4 and 8), she 
does not achieve a boundless communion but retains differentiation between herself and 
the animals as demonstrated by her encounter with the little frogs of the Dulgannon. In 
addition, the postscript emphasises the impossibility of a unity with the world.  
 
The ensuing conclusion was that Elizabeth Costello resides in a space between, even 
beyond, oppositions, refuting attempts, including my own, at subjecting it to reasonable 
understanding. With regard to the notions of full being and the transcendental 
imagination, the text appears to surpass the vocabulary, the language of the limit (which 
Costello relates to reason), exposing the categorical nature even of a framework that 
allows for the interrogation of categorisation. Costello’s ideas about full being and 
sympathetic possession transcend the limits of the language of limitation and, so doing, 
defy my assimilation. It follows that Elizabeth Costello provides a vantage point on 
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Coetzee’s earlier works in driving the concept of limitation to its own limits in order to 
engage with the alterity of the other. This repositioning is consistent with Coetzee’s 
general problematisation and destabilisation of conventions, including that of his own 
fiction. 
 
It seems, then, that, in Elizabeth Costello, Coetzee “report[s] from the far edges” (15) of 
his own oeuvre, destabilising the discursive devices of his earlier works. Costello’s belief 
in beings that are indifferent to her belief or understanding is reminiscent of the 
impenetrability of Michael K, Vercueil, Friday and the barbarian girl, a characteristic 
feature of Coetzee’s fiction that expresses his awareness of the confining aspect of 
delineation. Marais writes, for example, that Coetzee’s narratives “evince an awareness 
of the novel’s complicity in western tradition’s universalizing drive, its reduction of the 
other to the same. Hence the emphasis in both these modes on the marginalized, on that 
which has been excluded by the discourses of the same” (“The Novel” 6). Instead of 
attempting to impose a meaning on the other, like the medical officer or Mrs Curren does, 
the strategy of containment is intended to result in the embrace of the indeterminacy of 
the other, but perhaps it does not altogether succeed, for reasons to which I have alluded.  
 
The difference between Coetzee’s earlier narratives and Elizabeth Costello lies in the 
text’s relation to the other. Whereas Michael K’s containment, for example, entails a 
detached acceptance of his indeterminacy and impenetrability, Elizabeth Costello’s 
notion of sympathetic engagement or possession is said to bring the self face-to-face with 
the other. In this sense, Elizabeth Costello suggests a way in which the self can engage 
with the animal other without subjecting it to reasonable delimitation and without 
bringing it into the order of the same. Of course, this engagement is not devoid of reason 
– or language, for that matter. This other, like Michael K and Vercueil, is but a gesture to 
the alterity that lies beyond the borders of the text.  
 
Recalling that Costello’s statements are the product of an aging, somewhat irrational 
mind, it, ironically, seems reasonable – within the context of the eight lessons – that ideas 
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and impressions are ill defined and often contrasted and compared in contradicting ways. 
In John’s words, “[h]is mother could do with some clarity” (81).  
 
Postscript  
 
Elizabeth Costello: Eight Lessons suggests that a reciprocal relationship, a mutual 
exchange, with the other can only occur by means of an interrelationship between mind 
and heart, between reason and sympathy. The paradigm of containment and confinement 
deployed by this thesis has proved incapable of engaging fully with Costello’s notion of 
the sympathetic imagination, given the manner in which this idea appears to transcend the 
language of delimitation. Although containment is concerned with the establishment of a 
reciprocal encounter between self and other by means of a permeable boundary, the body, 
through its sheer materiality, resists such a conceptual containment. Elizabeth Costello’s 
notion of the sympathising imagination, the embodied experience of an interrelationship 
between self and other, does not operate within the confines of the Symbolic system.  
 
The encounter with this fictional text brings to light that containment is but an instrument 
of reason, incapable of engaging with the alterity of the living body. What defines the 
text as a literary work of art is the manner in which it “mingles breath and sense in a way 
that no one has explained and no one ever will” (98), engaging both reason and sensation. 
In this series of fiction-as-criticism or criticism-as-fiction, Coetzee gestures toward the 
text’s traces of alterity, its full being and coherent unity that generate the singular 
dimension which eludes the critic perpetually. In conclusion, it seems that contemporary 
criticism finds itself challenged by the task at hand, that is, to engage with Elizabeth 
Costello, the individual, and Elizabeth Costello, the text, in a full, responsible and 
reciprocal manner.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
“AN EQUAL MARRIAGE?”: COETZEE’S CRITICAL RESPONSE 
 IN “THE POETICS OF RECIPROCITY” 
 
What is missing is a passion that quite answers to Achterberg’s passion. In 
that sense the essay is a betrayal of Achterberg. But what is criticism, what 
can it ever be, but either a betrayal (the usual case) or an overpowering 
(the rarer case) of its object? How often is there an equal marriage? 
(Doubling the Point: Essays and Interviews 61) 
 
In “The Humanities in Africa”, the fifth lesson of Elizabeth Costello: Eight Lessons 
(2003), Elizabeth Costello writes a letter to her sister, Blanche, describing how she once 
posed nude for a portrait. The painter, “old Mr Phillips” (150), was a friend of their 
mother’s who, only recently, had undergone an operation, a laryngectomy. Costello 
describes this gesture of generosity as an “[act] of humanity”: “Nothing compels us to do 
it … But out of the overflow, the outflow of our human hearts we do it nevertheless: drop 
our robes, reveal ourselves, reveal the life and beauty we are blessed with” (150). In the 
letter, Costello omits the particulars of a second meeting between her and Mr Phillips, 
during which she resumes the pose of the painting, “the last of the bosom-offering, the 
last of the blessing” (153) even though radiation therapy has left Mr Phillips unable to 
paint. Costello describes the two encounters in terms of “caritas” (154): 
 
For that, in the end, is what she is convinced it is. From the swelling of her 
heart she knows it, from the utter, illimitable difference between what is in 
her heart and what Nurse Naidoo would see, if by some mischance Nurse 
Naidoo, using her pass key, were to fling open the door and stride in. 
(154)77
                                                 
77 This passage is reminiscent of the following extract from Age of Iron that evokes the materiality of 
language. Staring at the word ‘gratitude’, Mrs Curren comes to sense its meaning. The word is felt; it swells 
or bursts with life: “I write these words sitting in bed, my knees pressed together against the August cold. 
Gratitude: I write down the word and read it back. What does it mean? Before my eyes it grows dense, 
dark, mysterious. Then something happens. Slowly, like a pomegranate, my heart bursts with gratitude; like 
a fruit splitting open to reveal the seeds of love. Gratitude, pomegranate: sister words” (51).  
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This term, “caritas” (Age of Iron 20), also surfaces in a letter written by another E.C., 
Elizabeth Curren. Age of Iron’s narrator, Mrs Curren, writes that ‘care’ is “the true root of 
charity. I look for [Vercueil] to care, and he does not. Because he is beyond caring. 
Beyond caring and beyond care” (20).  
 
The two moments provide a point of departure for a concluding discussion of J.M. 
Coetzee’s notion of an (unlikely or impossible) equal marriage between critic and literary 
text. According to Levinas, “if communication and community is to be achieved, a real 
response, a responsible answer must be given” from the self (the critic) to the other (the 
text). “There can be no free interchange without something to give. Responsible 
communication depends on an initial act of generosity” (14), writes Levinas in Totality 
and Infinity. Costello’s act of caritas, of generosity, can be perceived as an attempt at 
forging a reciprocal relationship with another human being by offering something of 
herself to Mr Phillips.78
 
 Significantly, her gift is of the body, which relates the act of 
generosity to the heart, the body and to passion – the realm of alterity that, through its 
sheer materiality, resists the Symbolic system.  
Strode describes Coetzee’s narrative style as a “gift” (viii). This chapter will argue that 
Coetzee’s critical commentary can be perceived in the same light, that is, as a ‘gift’ given 
to the literary text. Returning to “the problem of the opening” (Elizabeth Costello 1), this 
conclusion will consider the style of reading that Coetzee’s fiction engenders, as well as 
the manner in which this particular style supplements and amplifies the literary text’s 
freeplay of meaning.  
 
I have chosen to conclude my critical containment of three of Coetzee’s texts – my 
attempt at providing a space for these texts that respects their singularity, their acts of 
gift-giving – with a consideration of “The Poetics of Reciprocity”, a section in Doubling 
                                                 
78 A similar passage in Age of Iron describes Mrs Curren’s letter in terms a gift – specifically something of 
herself, of her body – to her daughter: “But in this world, in this time, I must reach out to you in words. So 
day by day I render myself into words and pack the words into the page like sweets: like sweets for my 
daughter, for her birthday, for the day of her birth. Words out of my body, drops of myself, for her to 
unpack in her own time, to take in, to suck, to absorb. As they say on the bottle: old-fashioned drops, drops 
fashioned by the old, fashioned and packed with love, the love we have no alternative but to feel toward 
those to whom we give ourselves to devour or discard” (8). 
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the Point: Essays and Interviews (1992). The section consists of an interview and four 
essays, “Achterberg’s ‘Ballade van de gasfitter’: The Mystery of I and You” (1977), “The 
First Sentence of Yvonne Burgess’s The Strike” (1976), “A Note on Writing” (1984), and 
Coetzee’s Jerusalem Prize Acceptance Speech (1987). These critical works deploy a 
methodology which resembles the style of reading solicited by Coetzee’s narrative 
fictions – an intersubjective approach that expands the limits of the literary text in 
problematising and supplementing its meaning.  
 
“The Poetics of Reciprocity”  
 
As in the case of his fiction, Coetzee’s criticism exposes the rules and conventions of 
different discursive registers to scrutiny (Attwell 63). Commenting on “The First 
Sentence of Yvonne Burgess’s The Strike” and “A Note on Writing”, Coetzee mentions 
that they “are by no means major pieces of work, and perhaps reflect little more 
substantial than exasperation on [his] part with a certain automatism of writing – writing 
unaccompanied by any real thought, any self-reflection” (64). Accordingly, “A Note on 
Writing” considers the middle voice as an alternative to the non-reflexive writing of the 
active voice, described by Coetzee as “a particular kind of writing, writing in stereotyped 
forms and genres and characterological systems and narrative orderings, where the 
machine runs the operator” (95). The “phantom presence of a middle voice” (94), as 
located between the active and the passive, “leave[s] the writer … inside the writing, not 
as a psychological subject ... but as the agent of the action” (Barthes qtd. in Coetzee 94).  
 
These “shorter, Barthesian pieces” (Attwell 7) appear to demonstrate Coetzee’s concern 
with the ideological implications and consequent limitations of unproblematised textual 
devices or, in other words, “power relations as they affect speech and discourse” (Attwell 
11). Providing a unique – yet supplementary – perspective on Coetzee’s notion of the 
novel’s place in society, the Jerusalem Prize Acceptance Speech suggests an “interest in 
the rule-conditioned character of discourse” (5), a concern which he relates, directly, to 
the state of confinement imposed on his writing by his context. Speaking of “the nature 
and crisis of fiction-writing in South Africa today” (Attwell 4), Coetzee expresses and 
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explains the “feelings of entrapment, entrapment in infinitudes” (98) experienced by 
South African writers. With regard to his fiction’s supposed evasion of political 
responsibility, Coetzee’s speech on “a literature in bondage” (98) serves to justify the 
belief expressed in his works of fiction that “an unquestioning attitude towards forms or 
conventions is as little radical as any other kind of obedience” (64). Regarding this 
conception, the author is obligated to demonstrate an awareness of the power relations 
embedded in automised, non-reflexive writing, especially if the writing originates from a 
context that, like apartheid, is “unnaturally preoccupied with power and the torsions of 
power, unable to move from elementary relations of contestation, domination, and 
subjugation to the vast and complex human world that lies beyond them” (98). Speaking 
of Kundera and Cervantes, for example, Coetzee argues that “proof of their deep social 
and historical responsibility lies in the penetration with which, in their different ways and 
to different degrees, they reflect on the nature and the crisis of fiction, of fictionalization” 
(67). 
 
On the topic of reciprocity, Coetzee speaks of “a failure of love” (97) in South Africa, 
given the “colonizer’s … valorization of land above people and polity” (Attwell 7). He 
then points to the colonizer’s “denial of an unacknowledgeable desire to embrace Africa, 
embrace the body of Africa; and fear of being embraced by Africa in return” (97). The 
speech expresses Coetzee’s consideration of the prerequisites for a “literature of equal 
and reciprocal relations” (62), if such an address is even possible (Attwell 4). 
 
The Achterberg essay, which constitutes the main focus of “The Poetics of Reciprocity”, 
concentrates, through a “reciprocal” (Coetzee 62) “embrace” (Coetzee 97), on the poem, 
“Ballade van de gasfitter”, a “cycle of fourteen sonnets” (58) by the 20th century Dutch 
poet, Gerrit Achterberg, “a major figure in postwar Dutch literature” (57) known for his 
“poetry of compression and paradox and irony, written in tight forms” (57-8).  
 
Apart from the characteristic self-reflexivity regarding the style of reading deployed in 
his analysis, the essay suggests Coetzee’s intimate knowledge of the poem’s 
particularities. “I ... found that I couldn’t translate it till I had understood it” (58), writes 
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Coetzee. In his engagement with the particularities of this text (he provides an individual 
analysis of each sonnet), Coetzee achieves a critical containment of the poem, noting that 
his particular reading is enabled by a “[moment] of choice” (88): “just like the process of 
translation, reading is a process of constructing a whole for oneself out of the datum of 
the printed text, of constructing one’s own version of the poem. In a clear sense, all 
reading is translation, just as all translation is criticism” (90). 
 
Throughout the essay, Coetzee emphasises the futility of attempting to solve “the 
problem of finding stable identifications for the personages” (69), or trying to “pin down 
the referents of the I and you” (71), stating that his essay will not ask “what I and You 
signify but how they signify in the field of language and in the field of the poem” (70). 
Coetzee explains:  
 
[t]wenty years of inconclusive debate on the ‘Ballade,’ with a record of 
irreconcilability on the identification of I and You, should warn us that 
adequate grounds for such identification may not exist within the poem, 
that I and You here may indeed be ‘empty signs’ filled variously as the 
axis of utterance (Benveniste’s ‘moment of discourse’) and the point of 
consciousness that is the I move through the poem. (71) 
 
Coetzee highlights the poem’s “axis of utterance” (70) which allows the reader to 
circulate within the registers figured by each pronoun, from I to You to he/she. The act of 
reading the poem is characterised by the reader’s futile attempts to fix the meaning of 
these ‘empty signs’. In a gifted gesture, Coetzee, in his respective analyses of the sonnets, 
performs the manner in which the reader thinks herself into the poem’s I by writing his 
response in the first person. In turn, the reader occupies or embodies Coetzee’s I for a 
moment, accompanying him in his singular encounter with the poem, an engagement 
which attempts “to bring the You into some fullness of being” (73).79
                                                 
79 The style of reading proposed by Coetzee is not unlike the type of interpretation solicited by Life & 
Times of Michael K. My critical response to the novel, therefore, seems to echo the style of reading 
encountered in “Achterberg’s ‘Ballade van de gasfitter’: The Mystery of I and You”, demonstrating that, in 
some cases, Coetzee’s fiction and criticism share similar concerns. 
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By means of a close consideration of Achterberg’s poem (and not its critical contexts), 
Coetzee problematises and supplements the play of meaning generated by the text, 
offering the reader of his essay an interpretative challenge, in turn. Instead of explaining 
and reducing the text’s indeterminacy, this gifted approach adds texture to the already 
multi-textured poem as part of an attempt to facilitate a reciprocal engagement, a 
conversation, between critic and text. In the four essays, Coetzee displays a passion, a 
fullness, or ‘swelling of the heart’ that expands the boundaries of the text by giving a 
particular interpretation, a gift, to the subject of the discursive analysis.  
 
“Doubling the Point”  
 
The title of the book in which “The Poetics of Reciprocity” is situated, Doubling the 
Point: Essays and Interviews, suggests that literary criticism, as well as the author’s 
intention or commentary on his own works of fiction, is a ‘doubling’ or, in other words, a 
supplementary reiteration of a previously established point. This conclusion to my thesis, 
in its concise consideration of Coetzee’s type of critical containment, can, similarly, be 
considered as an addendum, a supplement, a (post)script or (after)word that ‘doubles’ the 
‘points’ argued in the previous chapters. 
 
Conventionally, an argument is established by way of a thesis’s introduction, developed 
in the ensuing chapters and brought to a close in the conclusion. This conclusion usually 
reiterates and summarises the main points of the argument – doubles the ideas, if you 
will. Conventionally, the argument develops (doubles or swells) from its initial definition. 
In returning to these ideas, the conclusion has to account for their expansion and 
elaboration. In other words, it plays an integral role in demonstrating how the ideas 
voiced in the first chapter, and developed in the ensuing sections, have expanded, only to 
return to the starting point or opening, enriched.  
 
A similar image appears in Age of Iron, when Elizabeth Curren leaves her sleepy suburb, 
travels to the township, only to return home, but this time possessing an enhanced 
perspective. Another image of an enriched homecoming can be found in Life & Times of 
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Michael K’s opening and concluding image of containment: the teaspoon. Whereas 
Michael K is initially dependent on his mother’s handling of the spoon, the novel 
concludes with K’s independent utilisation of his own spoon, signifying the extent to 
which K has acquired sovereignty. This ‘doubling’ also evokes the journey of Goethe’s 
vagabond (as cited in Chapter Two, page 40).  
 
In Doubling the Point, David Attwell, the editor, also quotes an important paragraph from 
Foe, drawing a comparison between Foe’s return to a planted marker and Coetzee’s 
retrospective return to his critical texts. Indeed, “Coetzee’s writings on literature, rhetoric 
and popular culture, and censorship are his personal markers; taken together, they provide 
a retrospective itinerary” (Attwell 3), enabled by “the hillock or island created by 
[Coetzee and Attwell’s] ... dialogue” (392). 
 
It appears that both the literary text and literary criticism fold upon or into themselves. 
The title of the book, Doubling the Point (and not The Doubled Point), further suggests 
that the text, as well as my conclusion, is an ongoing process, a journey: an act of folding, 
of returning to the ideas, impressions and sensations embodied by Coetzee’s fiction – and 
tracing their evolution.  
 
Although I will conclude the thesis’s frame with a sentence that closes this particular 
delineation, every reading of Coetzee’s fiction, of Doubling the Point, as well as of this 
thesis, will expand the boundaries established by these texts. The notion of doubling or 
expanding a literary text by way of critical commentary can be related directly to the 
conception of critical containment as a gift, as an offering of the self that facilitates the 
attempt at an “equal and reciprocal” (Coetzee 62) relationship between critic and literary 
text – even if, as Coetzee suggests, a wholly ‘equal marriage’ is improbable. However, 
perhaps one could consider the deferential act of gift-giving as indicative of a different 
order of “passion” (Coetzee 61), of a gesture that, in fact, transcends the limited 
interaction between critic and text established by the notion of an ‘equal marriage’. 
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Conclusion: “I’ll stop there”  
 
In its conversations with four texts by J.M. Coetzee – Age of Iron (1990), Life & Times of 
Michael K (1983), Elizabeth Costello: Eight Lessons (2003) as well as the critical essays 
published in Doubling the Point, “The Poetics of Reciprocity” (1992) – this thesis has 
demonstrated the manner in which the singularities of each of these texts prompt, expand 
and challenge the framework that sustains its reading of Coetzee’s fiction. Whereas some 
critical methodologies attempt to eliminate the characteristic indeterminacy of Coetzee’s 
fiction, imprisoning his novels in a contextual cage, this thesis demonstrated an 
allegiance to the primacy of the literary text together with a concern with the ethics of 
reading. The thesis proposed – in both content and form – an inductive ‘style of reading’ 
akin to Derrida’s deconstruction, concerned with the continuous modification of its own 
strategies according to the ‘internal logics of the text’. Comparable to the style of reading 
employed by Coetzee’s own critical discourse, my reading – in allowing itself to be 
prompted and guided by Coetzee’s fictional texts – attempted to problematise and 
intensify, rather than to reduce, the concerns of these texts.  
 
Reading is an act of definition, using delimitation – the establishment of boundaries – to 
enable signification. This study identified its style of reading as a ‘containment’ rather 
than a ‘confinement’. The term intended to evoke an adaptable, constructive delineation 
of Coetzee’s fiction that involves a reciprocal relationship between critic and text. As the 
thesis’s primary conceptual tool, one that I argued is both solicited and thematised in 
Coetzee’s fiction, containment refers not only to a style of reading, but also to any 
reciprocal relationship, any mutual exchange. I related it to the relationship between two 
dissimilar genres (realism and metafiction) and reality in Age of Iron, between text and 
reader in Life & Times of Michael K, between self and other in Elizabeth Costello, and, 
finally, between text and critic in “The Poetics of Reciprocity”. The notion of 
containment accepts the critical challenge posed by Coetzee’s fiction to engage with what 
Derek Attridge would call each ‘singular event’ or ‘act of literature’ on its own terms.  
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However, this thesis is only one reading, one event, one gift in the lives of these singular 
texts. In the open-ended words of containment, as uttered by J.M. Coetzee himself, 
“[t]hat is Part One, as I see it today, in the light of all that has passed between us. I’ll stop 
there” (395).  
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